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PREFACE 
n some countries, savings banks are amongst the most important 
elements of the financial sector. For decades, however, the growing 
political and liberal market consensus in some countries has favoured 
the shareholder-value (SHV) model in banking where the almost exclusive 
objective of bank managers is to maximise shareholder value and often in a 
fairly short time horizon. In this environment, non-SHV institutions, such 
as savings banks, have been criticised for being an exception to the rule, for 
being relatively inefficient, for not being subject to the discipline of the 
capital market and corporate control, and for having weak corporate 
governance arrangements. Above all, it has been alleged that their 
objectives are not clear because there is no single focus. 
However, these views have recently come under challenge as a result 
of the global financial crisis, particularly with respect to short-term SHV 
strategies and the assumption that, in efficient markets based on SHV 
models, markets are self-correcting. This major and admirably 
comprehensive CEPS study is, therefore, particularly timely not least 
because much of the criticism directed at alternative models adopted by 
savings banks has been found to be unwarranted. 
As this CEPS study demonstrates, there is diversity in the ownership 
structure and business model of savings banks from one country to 
another. Nevertheless, there remain three common elements: 1) they are not 
exclusively profit orientated but, as the study suggests, adopt a ‘dual-
bottom line’ business model or what is also called a Stakeholder Value 
(STV) ethos; 2) they have something of a ‘social mission’, which is partly a 
product of their historical origins and 3) compared with SHV banks, 
ownership stakes cannot be sold in a secondary market. 
When analysing alternative business models in the financial sector, 
there are three particular issues to consider: the relative merits of different 
I ii | PREFACE 
 
models, their systemic stability characteristics and the benefits to be 
derived from having a mixed system. A general theme of the study is that, 
most especially with regard to stability characteristics, it is advantageous to 
create a mixed system incorporating both the SHV and STV models. The 
focus of this CEPS study is on savings banks in particular. 
Above all, the savings bank formula remains a viable governance 
model in the financial system: it is not to be regarded as an aberration from 
the SHV norm. On the basis of both theoretical analysis and recent 
experience, there is no presumption that the typical Anglo-Saxon 
governance model is best suited for all types of financial institutions. There 
are advantages and disadvantages in all governance models. Irrespective of 
the strengths and weaknesses of particular governance models, there is a 
systemic advantage in having a mixed system of models and a strong 
critical mass of savings banks and other STV institutions, such as mutuals 
and cooperative banks. 
The prevalence and long history of savings banks and cooperatives in 
the financial sectors of many economies, together with their relative 
scarcity in non-financial sectors, suggest that the STV model may be 
particularly suited to the provision of financial services, and most 
especially those related to longer-term contractual relationships such as 
mortgages and savings. This may be due to a greater ability of financial, as 
opposed to non-financial mutuals, to address any inherent agency 
problems.  
Since external suppliers of capital to SHV institutions need to be 
remunerated (in the form of a required rate of return on equity), the 
absence of external shareholders in the STV model can be deemed to be an 
inherent ‘efficiency advantage’ of financial mutuals in the sense that, other 
things being equal, they should be able to operate on lower margins. 
Given the potential inherent 'margin advantage' of mutual financial 
institutions and the systemic advantages of a mixed financial structure, 
there are economic and welfare benefits to be derived from a viable and 
successful savings bank sector in the financial system. The study finds that 
savings banks enhance competition in the financial sector, enhance stability 
characteristics, contribute to alleviating social exclusion and contribute to 
regional development. 
More generally, there is a powerful systemic interest in sustaining a 
strong STV sector and, therefore it is a legitimate public policy issue. There 
are several key issues in this regard: INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | iii 
 
•  A larger critical mass of savings banks (and other STV institutions) is 
likely to enhance competition in the financial system. 
•  Because STV banks are not owned by investment institutions, they 
are not subject to the short-term pressures of the capital market, and a 
myopic focus on the share price. 
•  There is benefit to be derived from a mixed ownership structure in 
the financial system, and the systemic value derived from mixed 
corporate governance arrangements. 
•  Most savings banks are locally based and have a particular focus and 
expertise on the local community. This reduces powerful centrifugal 
tendencies in the financial system, and the evidence of this study is 
that savings banks have a positive impact on regional development.  
•  There is a systemic advantage in having a mix of institutions with 
different portfolio structures with the potential to reduce overall 
systemic risk by virtue of institutions not being homogeneous. 
Furthermore, savings banks tend to adopt a lower-risk profile. A 
pluralistic approach to ownership is likely to be conducive to greater 
financial stability. With their contrasting capital structures, SHV and 
STV banks balance their risks and loan portfolios differently. 
Systemic risk is thereby reduced. The more diversified is a financial 
system in terms of size, ownership and structure of businesses, the 
better it is able to weather the strains produced by the normal 
business cycle, and in particular avoiding the bandwagon effect. The 
traditional business model of savings banks (particularly the 
dominance of retail funding) is less prone to the systemic instability 
problems that have recently arisen. 
•  The evidence also suggests that savings banks contribute to a 
reduction in social exclusion and offer wider access to financial 
services. 
•  In an uncertain market environment, diversity has advantages as it 
cannot be predicted which form of corporate structure is best suited 
to all particular circumstances. The case for diversity includes, as the 
study suggests, “reducing institutional risk, defined as the 
dependence on a single view of banking that may turn out to have 
serious weaknesses under unexpected conditions such as the current 
crisis”. iv | PREFACE 
 
The issue of having a financial system populated by a diversity of 
organisational forms is as significant as the merits and drawbacks of each 
particular form of organisation. The case for maintaining a significant 
savings bank sector in the financial system is wider than any alleged 
intrinsic merits of the ‘dual-bottom line’ model. It is in this respect that a 
significant public policy issue arises. 
Notwithstanding problems encountered by some savings banks in 
one of the worst financial crises ever experienced, the experience of the 
banking crisis offers some support to the argument that a financial system 
based on a mixed governance structure, and which includes a significant 
savings bank sector, is likely to be inherently more stable and less crisis-
prone than one populated exclusively by shareholder value institutions. 
There are, therefore, economic and welfare benefits to be derived from the 
continuation of a viable and successful savings bank sector.  
It is not to be expected that savings banks would be immune to 
collateral damage caused by the enormity of the banking crisis. 
Nevertheless, as this CEPS study argues, savings banks have generally 
been less scathed by the financial crisis than have banks in general. This 
suggests that a financial system characterised by a mixed array of corporate 
structures will be inherently more stable than one populated by only SHV 
institutions: this is analogous to the case for bio-diversity. 
 
David T. Llewellyn 
Loughborough University 
CASS Business School (London) 
Swiss Finance Institute (Zurich) 
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The value of biodiversity is more than the sum of its parts.  
Bryan G. Norton 
 
his study provides a contribution on the role of institutional diversity 
in the banking sector in selected European countries. The analysis 
emphasises the performance and role of savings banks as ‘dual-
bottom line’ financial institutions and their contribution to economic 
performance, competition, stability, growth and financial inclusion in 
countries where their presence is prominent and in others where they have 
progressively disappeared.  
Chapter 2 elaborates on traditional and new theoretical arguments in 
support of savings banks. These include improved access to financial 
services, compensating for negative external effects, fostering regional 
development, mitigating intertemporal risk and capitalising on the value of 
diversity. This chapter also provides a discussion on the political debate 
about savings banks at international, European and national levels over the 
last two decades.   
Chapter 3 finds that there are no radical differences between savings 
banks and their commercial peers in terms of profitability, efficiency and 
earnings stability. However, it appears that they contribute positively to 
competition, stability and regional development. Taken together, these 
findings imply that in addition to co-existing with other banks under 
similar conditions, savings banks have responded to shifts in market 
developments.  
The surveys provided in the country studies on the national savings 
bank systems of Spain, Germany and Austria in chapters 4, 5 and 6 confirm 
and complete the main findings of chapter 3, while elaborating on the 
distinctive competitive and social features of savings banks.  
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In  Spain, savings banks are private institutions with a social 
mandate. The consequences of the liberalisation trend in the 1980s, the 
expansion of branches and the fully established relationship-based banking 
model led savings banks to gain substantial market shares. In addition, 
they are leading the main initiatives aimed at combating financial exclusion 
mainly through their investment in ‘Obra Social’, their establishment in 
deprived and less populated areas and the development of specific 
products for family businesses and SMEs, remittances platforms and micro-
finance services.  
In  Germany, savings banks are organised as independent local 
institutions, governed – in most cases – by a public law regime conforming 
to the savings banks laws of the individual federal states. They are part of a 
network of affiliated institutions that jointly form the so-called ‘S-
Finanzgruppe’. For a long time, they have been the market leaders in retail 
banking in general and even more so in most of the local markets that their 
operations have traditionally focused on. Moreover, their performance is 
more stable over time than that of their private competitors. By being stable 
financial institutions themselves, they perform a stabilising role for the 
entire financial system. By tradition and according to their business model, 
they play an important role in preventing social and financial exclusion.  
In  Austria, savings banks have also transformed themselves into 
modern and efficient financial institutions that provide services to broad 
segments of the population, and they are important players in the national 
market for retail financial services. There is one specific characteristic worth 
highlighting in that country’s savings bank system: it is built around one 
central institution, the Erste Group Bank AG, an important player in the 
Austrian financial market and at the same time the hub of one of the most 
extensive banking groups in Central, Eastern and South-East Europe. Its 
success begs the question of why this anomology has developed only in 
Austria and not in other parts of Europe, and whether it might be regarded 
as a model of how savings bank systems should be organised in general. As 
it seems, the answer to this question is that it is not a general model of best 
practice. A high degree of concentration of assets, activities and power 
would seem to reflect a rational response to very specific local problems 
and opportunities.  
The country studies of Italy and Belgium in chapters 7 and 8 examine 
the impact of the progressive disappearance of savings banks in countries 
where the political stance was more in favour of privatising or abolishing INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 3 
 
this form of banking. The overall assessment is not straightforward and it 
remains to be seen whether the disappearance of savings banks in these 
countries has contributed to less competition, less access and more financial 
exclusion.  
Finally the study draws some general policy conclusions and offers 
some thoughts, which are necessarily speculative, on how savings banks 
might survive the crisis and even strengthen their positions in their 
respective national financial systems. The most important conclusion is that 
the current crisis has made it even more evident than before how valuable 
it is to promote a pluralistic market concept in Europe and, to this end, to 
protect and support all types of ownership structures without abandoning 
the principle of ‘same business, same risks, same rules’. The investigation 
of the role of savings banks in this study demonstrates the value of their 
presence in terms of the financial, economic and social welfare of the 
countries in which they operate.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The value of biodiversity is more than the sum of its parts.  
Bryan G. Norton 
 
1.1  Motivations 
The financial sector, which encompasses financial markets and institutions, 
especially banks, is an important part of the infrastructure of any economy. 
Theoretical and empirical arguments lend support to the view that a high 
state of development of the financial sector not only correlates with 
economic growth and increases in welfare, but also even causes growth and 
increases in welfare.1 However, it is less clear in this context what exactly 
constitutes a strong and healthy financial sector or financial system,2 and 
what serves as the exact transmission mechanism to the real economy.3 Is a 
bank-based financial system in some way better than a capital market-
based financial system, or vice-versa, and which characteristics of a 
banking sector are more conducive to fostering growth and welfare? 
Savings banks are a part of many financial systems, not least in some 
of the most advanced economies. In a number of them, savings banks have 
in the past greatly contributed to economic and social progress. For 
instance, in Japan the Post Office Savings Bank played an important role in 
                                                      
1 This view is now widely shared among policy-makers and economists, For 
theoretical and empirical arguments supporting it, see especially King & Levine 
(1993), Levine (1999), Allen & Gale (2000), World Bank (2001), Berger et al. (2004), 
and Demirguc–Kunt & Levine (2008).  
2 We use the terms “financial system” and “financial sector” interchangeably in this 
study.  
3 Wachtel (2003).  6 | INTRODUCTION 
 
supporting the stunning growth of that country for many decades after 
World War II by mobilising savings in rural areas and channelling them to 
the urban centres in which investment activity was concentrated. In Spain, 
Germany and Austria, three of the countries covered in this study, savings 
banks are still today – or even more so now than in the past – among the 
most important elements of the financial sector.  
At the same time, in a number of countries, savings banks no longer 
exist as a distinct class of financial institution. In a few cases, such as that of 
Belgium, they have simply disappeared. In others, such as Italy, they 
changed their characteristics in such a way that they can no longer be 
considered as savings banks. In others, e.g. the UK, they have been 
absorbed by commercial banks. And of course, there are also countries 
where they never existed or at least played only a minor role. These 
observations may suggest that, as an element of a financial system, savings 
banks may not be useful anymore, that they may be outdated. Even having 
financial institutions that can (still) be characterised as savings banks may 
be a sign of backwardness of a given financial system and possibly even a 
handicap for the development of those countries that still feature genuine 
savings banks, at least savings banks in a narrow and traditional sense of 
the term.  
The fact that the current financial crisis has hit many financial 
systems very hard, especially those that seem to be particularly modern, 
underlines the importance of the overarching questions that motivate this 
study. Is it beneficial in economic, social and political terms for a country to 
have savings banks? Should political authorities aim, within the limits of 
their legal powers, to support savings banks or simply tolerate their 
continuing existence or even try to contribute to their transformation into 
commercial banks of a different legal and institutional form? The current 
situation suggests adding another question: What lessons can be learnt 
from a financial crisis, in which academics and politicians are calling for a 
return to more traditional approaches to banking and finance?4 
Examining the merits, or the lack thereof, of savings banks and 
recommending an appropriate political stance vis-à-vis these institutions is 
                                                      
4 For a sample of calls for a return to more traditional banking, see, De Grauwe 
(2008), Group of Thirty (2009) report chaired by Paul Volcker and Jacob Frenkel, 
and the de Larosière (2009) report.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 7 
 
not an easy task, for a number of reasons. One is that it is now no longer 
clear what the defining characteristics of a savings bank are. Formerly, 
savings banks used to be different, and this has to do with the way in 
which they emerged in the currently more advanced countries in the 19th 
century, and how they were structured until only two decades ago in most 
countries. Nowadays, savings banks largely differ from what these 
institutions were in the past, and it is even unclear how one should define 
them. Today, they are a very heterogeneous group of financial institutions 
whose main common feature is that they are not exclusively profit-
oriented.  
Another reason for the difficulty of assessing the merits of savings 
banks is that the standards for such an assessment are not straightforward. 
Clearly, they need to be assessed in terms of pure economic performance, 
since economic performance determines their ability to survive as a 
financial institution over the longer term. However, economic or financial 
performance cannot be the only standard of assessment, since economic or 
financial success is not an end in itself for any organisation.5 This 
consideration is all the more relevant for organisations that have been 
created for other purposes than that of being successful in financial terms, 
as is the case of savings banks. Other relevant standards include the 
economic and social effects that their operations have on others, especially 
their clients. Therefore, assessing them on the basis of these effects may be 
worth considering. However, such an assessment is extremely difficult to 
perform because it would require having precise information concerning 
the banks’ economic and social involvement in the regions where they 
operate and the value derived by other beneficiaries from their operations. 
Moreover, in methodological terms it would require comparing real 
situations in which savings banks exist with hypothetical situations in 
which they do not exist (or vice-versa) under circumstances that are 
identical in all other respects. The comparison of the situation in countries 
in which they do exist and in those in which they have always only played 
a limited role (e.g. the US) or have been abolished (e.g. the UK) is evidently 
                                                      
5 The financial objectives of organisations are merely the means for realising the 
ultimate objectives of people, and these are non-financial in nature (see Simon, 
1952). It was mainly the research summarised in this book for which Herbert 
Simon received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1978. 8 | INTRODUCTION 
 
not sufficient to derive valid general conclusions, even though such a 
comparison may be instructive. 
Finally, there are other standards of assessment which follow from 
political considerations: Are savings banks compatible with the governing 
principles of a market economy? Do they perhaps undermine the proper 
functioning of such a system, e.g. by competing in an unfair way? Or are 
they, in contrast, all the more needed if the major part of an economy and 
its financial system are shaped by purely profit-oriented organisations? As 
will be shown later, the political aspects are particularly relevant for the 
purpose of this study in light of the fact that merely looking at the 
economic and financial performance of savings banks does not answer the 
question of whether or not they are beneficial.  
1.2  The challenge of defining a savings bank 
Not too long ago, it was easy to define savings banks and to distinguish 
them from other banks. Moreover, savings banks in different countries 
were largely similar. Their common features concerned their origin, their 
mission, their activities, their organisational form, and their legal status and 
ownership structure.  
The first savings banks were set up around the beginning of the 19th 
century as public or welfare institutions with the mission of fostering the 
‘spirit of thriftiness’, that is, the willingness of people from the lower 
economic classes of the population to save money in relatively good times 
so that they would have at least some modest means if they would fall on 
hard times, and of offering them safe deposit facilities. Later their mission 
was extended to providing access to financial services at reasonable terms 
for people who would not have this access, and to the financing of housing, 
local small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and local public 
investment projects.  
Savings banks were created by public authorities or groups of well-
intentioned and socially motivated citizens from the higher strata of society 
to serve others. As a consequence of this origin and mission, they were 
organised either under a public law regime or as foundations or 
associations with a non-profit mission. Their operations were largely 
concentrated or even formally restricted to a geographical region defined 
by the legal status of the public or private entity that had created them. 
And in some countries they were often closely linked to the respective 
municipality and also more or less dominated by politicians representing INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 9 
 
the public or private entity that had created them. By law or statute, 
savings banks were not purely profit oriented, that is, they were not meant 
to be profit-maximising entities, even though the need to achieve profits is, 
and has always been, recognised.  
In one sense, it would be appropriate to say that the municipality or, 
as the case may be, the foundation, is the owner of the savings bank; but in 
another sense it would also be correct to say that they do not have an 
owner since the ownership rights of the municipality or the foundations are 
different from those of private partners or shareholders in a conventional 
bank organised in the legal forms of a partnership or a corporation. They 
tend to be weaker than full legal ownership. 
Being locally owned, locally rooted and locally active financial 
institutions, savings banks in many countries belong to regional 
associations and directly or indirectly to a national association. 
Accordingly, they cooperate, in one way or another, with regional second-
tier financial institutions that are also part of these networks. Thus, they 
are, in most cases, elements of decentralised networks with second- and 
third-tier organisations that would support the decentralised or local units 
and perform certain functions for them that they cannot fulfil on their own. 
Nevertheless, by law and by status and especially according to the design 
and distribution of property rights, the individual savings banks were and 
still are independent organisations in most countries.  
During the past decades, many national savings bank systems have 
undergone a drastic transformation, a process that began in the 1970s and 
has continued ever since. This process has greatly increased the differences 
between the savings bank systems of different countries. But even 30 or 
more years ago, savings banks in different countries and even different 
savings banks in one country were not the same. One can easily see how 
much savings banks differ from country to country and even within a 
single country when one looks at the list of members of the World Savings 
Banks Institute.  
Today, savings banks have retained three main characteristics: 10 | INTRODUCTION 
 
1)  They are not only profit-oriented credit institutions6 in that they are 
committed to also pursue other objectives besides that of making a 
profit.  
2)  They or, as the case may be, the entities that own them, have a social 
mission, a regional commitment and a mandate to contribute to the 
‘general good’. 
3)  They can be decentralised elements of some larger system, network 
or nexus.  
These three characteristics are helpful to describe savings banks as a 
special type of financial institution, even though they cannot be used as a 
strict definition and distinction from other types of credit institutions.  
Having a not strictly profit orientation and instead a social mission 
and being a part of a decentralised network or nexus of related institutions 
are typical features of savings banks, but neither are they found in all 
savings banks, nor are they specific to savings banks. One can say the same 
of cooperative or member-owned financial institutions. Moreover, there are 
also a number of privately-owned banks whose profit orientation is in 
some way restricted and that also subscribe to a social mission.  
What distinguishes savings banks as well as cooperative banks from 
private commercial banks is their role as ‘double-bottom’ line institutions 
combining social and financial objectives, while what distinguishes savings 
banks from cooperative banks is, in many but not all cases, the ‘public 
ownership’ or public ‘Trägerschaft’. The latter German term is not easy to 
translate since it refers to the public law regime under which savings banks 
in Germany and some other countries are still organised. Possible 
translations for ‘Träger’ are ‘sponsor’ or ‘responsible or supporting entity’, 
meaning the public or private entity, in the case of a savings bank a 
municipality, a group of municipalities, or a county or a foundation or an 
association that is responsible for the creation and the general oversight of 
its operations. The rights of the supporting entity of a savings bank tend to 
be less extensive than those of an owner in a situation governed by private 
law.  
In some countries, savings banks are public banks in the sense that 
the sponsoring or responsible entity is a public administration. But not all 
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savings banks are public and not all public banks are savings banks. For 
instance, Spanish savings banks are purely private institutions and 
nevertheless have a social mandate. The fact that a number of savings 
banks are in a specific sense public or state-owned plays an important role 
in the political debates, especially among those who have general 
reservations against public or state involvement in economic activity. 
However, the current financial crisis has tempered reservations against 
government ownership of banks in a number of countries.  
1.3  Objectives, main propositions and structure  
This study aims to explore two overarching questions: What are the 
benefits of savings banks to a country or an integrated economic and 
political region such as the EU? What stance should policy-makers and 
political authorities take with respect to these institutions? 
We cannot pretend to have a conclusive answer to these overarching 
questions, particularly in the context of the profound financial crisis in 
which several widely held perceptions about the superiority of certain 
forms of ownership and business models of banks are almost continuously 
being questioned and revised. Nevertheless, our aim is to contribute to the 
debate by presenting and discussing a number of arguments that are 
relevant and also sufficiently well supported by economic research.  
On a more modest level, an overview of the political debate is 
presented in order to provide the arguments that are openly and also 
occasionally implicitly used to support or to question the merits of banks 
with the specific characteristics of saving banks.  
To lay the groundwork for what follows, chapter 2 takes a look at the 
economic policy debate that is going on in the international arena, in the 
EU, and in individual countries.  
The economic performance of savings banks and their contribution to 
competition, growth and stability are analysed and discussed in chapter 3. 
The questions that are addressed include:  
1)  How profitable and efficient are savings banks as ‘producers’ of 
financial services as compared to other banks, especially those in the 
legal form of a joint stock corporation? 
2)  Do the costs structure, the profitability and the earning stability of 
savings banks differ from those of other banks; and if so, is it true 
that, possibly due to their specific design and mission, their legal 12 | INTRODUCTION 
 
status or their ownership structure, they have higher costs and lower 
profitability than conventional banks; and how does their 
performance differ between countries?  
3)  How do they contribute to competition in the market, to regional 
development, to economic growth and to financial stability?  
The answers to these questions are highly relevant to the political 
debate because there is often a perception that savings banks may not be as 
profitable or as efficient as their counterparts that are privately owned and 
strictly profit-oriented and this lack of performance and efficiency may 
impede or even outweigh some beneficial effects savings banks may 
generate.  
However, our empirical evidence suggests that this assumption about 
the financial performance of savings banks is not correct. In the countries 
under examination in this study, their financial performance is not inferior, 
and possibly even superior to that of other types of banks. This implies that 
it would be wrong to consider savings banks merely as a politically 
motivated means of providing subsidised financial services to the 
population that uses these services.  
Nevertheless, financial performance is not the only nor the ultimate 
standard of assessing savings banks, and even if their performance were – 
to a certain extent – poorer than that of other banks, there might be other 
reasons why it would be beneficial for a country or a region to have savings 
banks. Therefore, the merits of savings banks need further analysis and this 
analysis should in the first place be based on the effects that savings banks 
have on their clients and the national and regional economies in which they 
are embedded.  
Although it is very difficult to conduct a final and uncontroversial 
assessment of savings banks on the basis of the effects that their existence 
and their operations have and can have, it is important to discuss the 
relevant existing evidence. What are these effects; how strong are they; how 
can they be assessed in principle; and to what extent do they depend on the 
different institutional set-ups that savings banks have adopted in the 
course of the last few decades in different countries? Chapters 4 to 8 
provide some answers to these questions, even though these answers are 
not as ‘hard’ as those concerning the economic and financial performance, 
competition, regional growth and financial stability. However, they are no 
less relevant for the objective of this study.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 13 
 
We believe that, incomplete as they may be, the theoretical and 
empirical arguments that we summarise and analyse in this study tend to 
support the view that, generally speaking, it is economically and socially 
beneficial to have savings banks. For those who accept this conclusion, it 
would suggest that policy-makers should not take or support actions that 
could jeopardise a valuable part of the financial systems in different 
countries in Europe and of the emerging integrated European financial 
system.  
It would be beyond the scope of this study to cover the full set of EU 
countries or even only all of those that still have an active savings bank 
system. Therefore our analysis focuses on three countries in which savings 
banks play an important role and in which the national savings bank 
system has developed in widely different ways: Austria, Germany and 
Spain. For the sake of comparison, a closer look is taken at two countries, 
namely Belgium and Italy, that no longer have such a system.  
The final chapter offers main conclusions and suggests new 
perspectives for further research.   
14 | 
 
 
2.  THE POLITICAL DEBATE ON 
SAVINGS BANKS 
2.1  The crucial issues of the political debate 
The status and role of savings banks have been debated on different levels 
for many years. Two facts form the basis and the starting point of this 
debate: 1) savings banks differ in a number of ways from what can be 
regarded as the prototype of a bank, and 2) in many countries savings 
banks are important competitors in the market for financial services.  
Savings banks and some other types of banks differ from 
‘conventional’ banks in several respects: 
1)  they are not strictly profit-oriented; 
2)  in a number of countries, they are owned by an organisation that in 
some way belongs to the state or the government, or member-owned 
or foundation-owned and/or 
3)  they have a mandate to serve their clients and the communities in 
which they operate and 
4)  at least according to their critics, they enjoyed and even still enjoy 
certain privileges.7 
The first question we address is whether it is desirable, from a public 
policy standpoint, to have savings banks or, more generally, banks with a 
non- strictly profit orientation. Even though this question is often not 
presented as explicitly political in nature, we consider it as highly 
                                                      
7 E.g. by virtue of being owned by public entities, there are lower expectations 
attached to return on investment and savings banks are sometimes the 
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politically relevant, since it underlies most of the past and present 
contributions to the debate.  
After discussing this question on a general and conceptual level, we 
turn to the explicit political debate at the international and the EU levels 
and on the level of individual countries focusing on those countries where 
the debate has been particularly vivid.  
2.2  The traditional main arguments for ‘dual-bottom line’ banks 
a)  Improving access to financial services 
Looking back at the time when savings banks and cooperative banks first 
came into existence, it is easy to explain why these types of banks were 
needed and why they had the specific feature of being not-for-profit 
institutions. This may offer a possible first answer to the question of 
whether these types of banks might still be needed today.  
It was a time in which modern banking was not widely spread. Even 
in Europe and North America, banking was largely confined to urban 
areas. Banks served only a small fraction of the population, mainly 
established businesses, landowners with sufficient collateral and a few 
other people from the more affluent classes who had the relevant 
connections and social ties to the existing banks and bankers. Moreover, 
deposit-taking and payment services were at that time not considered as 
genuine banking business but rather as services that would merely 
complement the ‘real business’, which was providing trade credit and 
enterprise credit.  
As a consequence, large segments of the population did not have 
access to financial services; they were ‘financially excluded’. Those who 
had no access to formal banks could only resort to money lenders, but they 
were considered to be usurers charging interest rates in excess of what poor 
people were able to bear.  
A similar situation prevailed in almost all developing countries up 
until only a few years ago and still prevails in a large number of these 
countries until today. For several years now, some government-owned and 
foreign-funded development finance institutions have tried to compensate 
for this lack of access by offering specialised lending facilities. As is well 
known, many of the early attempts to overcome this problem failed 
because the development finance institutions were inefficient and 
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financially sustainable institutions and to reach the intended clients in the 
first place, and then to offer them permanent and reliable access to financial 
services. 
But this failure does not suggest that the underlying idea of filling a 
gap in the supply of financial services went unmet by conventional banks 
in these countries was inappropriate in principle, since for many years a 
policy of so-called ‘financial repression’ had made it virtually impossible 
for the existing banks to lend to poor people and to the local micro, small- 
and even medium-sized firms as a profitable line of business.8 More 
recently, a small number of specialised micro-finance institutions has 
emerged that have succeeded in providing financial services to poor clients 
and other formerly excluded potential borrowers on a permanent basis. 
Interestingly, most of these institutions are also in some sense non-profit 
organisations; they are credit unions, NGOs, self-help organisations, in a 
few cases reformed state-owned banks or private commercially-oriented 
banks that nevertheless have a clear social mandate and mission and in 
most cases also enjoy some form of public support. 
Why did – and in some cases do – ‘conventional’ banks not serve the 
middle and lower classes? Certainly, there were socio-psychological 
reasons, such as social prejudices, stubbornness and ignorance on the part 
of the established bankers. But what is more important is the fact that it 
was, and sometimes still is, economically unattractive for profit-oriented 
bankers to serve these difficult clients. They do not possess sufficient 
collateral, the risks are considered too high and the transaction costs appear 
excessive given the financial technologies available to ‘conventional’ banks 
and bankers.  
However, high costs of lending and high default probabilities would 
appear to force bankers to request high interest rates as a matter of prudent 
                                                      
8 The term ‘financial repression’ refers to a policy applied by governments in most 
countries – developed as well as developing – well into the 1980s, which consisted 
of prescribing caps for credit and deposit interest rates, burdening banks with high 
requirements of holding deposits with central banks and strictly limiting the scope 
of their operations. The pitfalls of the policy were first criticised by McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) in two influential books. Their critique was one of the 
building blocks of the policy of financial liberalisation initiated in many countries 
in the 1980s. Unfortunately, liberalisation did not lead to the intended effects, since 
it ignored the need of complementing liberalisation with sound regulation.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 17 
 
and sound banking.9 But high interest rates have negative effects for the 
lending banks; they lead to adverse selection10 and moral hazard11 and thus 
themselves induce even higher default rates. In this situation, raising 
interest rates to a level commensurate with the presumed cost of lending to 
poor and unknown borrowers increases the risk-related costs so that it is 
better for banks to ration credit rather than to lend at high rates.12 
Credit-rationing is endogenous in markets, such as the loan market, 
in which information is unevenly distributed and lenders have reason to 
believe that they are less well informed than the potential borrowers. It is 
‘rational’ behaviour for banks.13  
It may be too radical and thus also unrealistic to assume that people 
with low income and with a poor data history are completely rationed out 
in credit markets, even though this could be expected in markets in which 
(only) strictly profit-oriented and not so well informed economic agents 
operate as lenders. There have always been some economic agents who 
would be prepared to lend to these people, although at high rates. Two 
                                                      
9 This fact has been grossly neglected in the subprime lending business, an 
oversight that has been the initial reason for the 2007-08 problems in the 
international financial system.  
10 Adverse selection means that with high interest rates only those borrowers who 
have risky projects would apply for loans. 
11 Moral hazard means that high interest rates would make it attractive for 
borrowers to avoid repayment or to increase the riskiness of the investment 
projects funded with a bank loan. 
12 This tendency will be even more pronounced under the new Basel risk sensitive 
regulatory rules. Borrowers are treated differently with respect to equity 
requirements depending on the level of sophistication of their internal risk 
management processes. Those asking for loans but who have no collateral and a 
poor credit history or no credit history at all will not even be considered as 
potential borrowers by banks.   
13 The standard source on credit rationing is Stiglitz & Weiss (1981). As these 
authors demonstrate, raising interest rates would lead to an increase in the 
riskiness of borrowers, such that there is no market-clearing equilibrium interest 
rate. Therefore banks ration credit irrespective of the existence of interest rate caps 
imposed by governments or central banks. The argument developed by Stiglitz 
and Weiss superseded the older view that held that credit rationing and limited 
access to finance was merely a consequence of ill-designed public policy.  18 | THE POLITICAL DEBATE ON SAVINGS BANKS 
 
groups of economic agents can be mentioned here: money lenders and 
people inspired by political and philanthropic considerations.  
Money lenders can succeed in their lending where banks would not 
even attempt to do business, not least because they typically have very 
good information about their potential borrowers and because they can use 
means of enforcing loan repayment that others cannot apply or would not 
want to apply. However, these features of the so-called ‘curb market’ – 
high information intensity and questionable means of enforcing 
repayments – are the reasons why entry into this market is difficult and 
competition is largely absent. This leads to a market structure that allows 
lenders to abuse their market power and to request borrowers to pay even 
higher interest rates than those warranted by a difficult lending 
environment. Even a casual look at reality – then as much as now – proves 
that this is exactly what happens: either there is exclusion, or there is 
exploitation, and possibly both.  
Exclusion and exploitation cause real problems for potential clients. 
From a social and economic perspective, this is a very undesirable 
situation. In this case, there is always a motive for some people, who are 
mainly inspired by political and/or philanthropic considerations, or some 
organisations with a similar orientation, to seek ways to change the 
situation of those people who are either excluded from access to credit or 
find themselves in the clutches of exploitative lenders.  
Finding ways of combating poverty that has its roots in a lack of 
access to credit can be done by creating institutions that pursue different 
objectives than just that of making a profit. They can be charitable 
institutions – an important element of the early history of socially oriented 
lending – or NGOs, or self-help institutions, the precursors of cooperative 
banks, or institutions created by benevolent entrepreneurs or, last but 
certainly not least, public banks, which include savings banks as a special 
group. This is the historical reason why savings banks, cooperative banks 
and other institutions of the types mentioned have been created: to serve 
people who would otherwise not have access to finance, but without the 
incentive to ‘overcharge’ their clients.  
The common feature of these institutions is that they pursue a dual 
purpose; they are – to use a term that has recently been introduced into the INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 19 
 
debate – dual-bottom line institutions14 (henceforth abbreviated as DBLIs): 
one objective and standard of assessment is the impact that they have on 
the lives of their clients; and the other one is profitability. Ultimately and 
over the long term, impact and effectiveness are the overriding goals of this 
approach, while in a short to medium perspective, profitability is more 
important. Profit is necessary since without profit DBLIs would not be able 
to survive as institutions and to continue performing their socially valuable 
functions.  
This leads to the first important result: savings banks and other 
DBLIs are needed from a political and social point of view. They are 
‘inclusive’ financial institutions offering services to people who would not 
otherwise have access to financial services. One might be inclined to think 
that financial exclusion is only a phenomenon of developing countries and, 
as far as advanced economies are concerned, belongs to the past. 
Unfortunately, this is however not correct.15 
It is important to understand the duality of the objectives of DBLIs. 
The relative weights of the two objectives necessarily change in the course 
of time, and they need to change when conditions change. The stronger the 
competitive challenge, the more weight that needs to be attached to the 
                                                      
14 As it seems, the term ‘dual-bottom line institutions’ was first used in a CGAP 
publication by Christen et al. (2004).  
15 The World Bank has just published a concise summary of the state of knowledge 
concerning financial exclusion (see World Bank, 2008). The authors demonstrate 
that financial exclusion is still a pervasive phenomenon in most countries, 
especially in the developing countries, but also in transition economies and even in 
advanced countries. For additional information on exclusion in advanced 
countries, see Carbó Valverde et al. (2005) and the collection of essays edited by 
FUNCAS (2005). Ayadi & Rodkiewitcz (2008) analyse the market response to tackle 
financial exclusion in the EU15. In countries where ownership diversity prevails, 
such as in Austria, France, Germany and Spain, institutions such as savings banks, 
cooperatives and postal financial offices are either required (according to their 
mission) to allocate a percentage of their profits to social cohesion projects or by 
regional regulations to ensure the provision of basic financial services. Moreover, 
because of their dense networks, they operate in rural and remote areas and 
therefore alleviate geographical exclusion naturally. The competition between 
these institutions and commercial banks creates strong incentives to financially 
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financial objective that secures institutional survival as a precondition for 
providing socially relevant services, without, however, losing sight of the 
social objectives. This consideration applies also, or even specifically, to 
savings banks and cooperative banks. From their traditional retail banking 
roots of catering to the poorer social groups and providing a limited range 
of relatively simple financial services, many of them have evolved into full-
service universal banks that appear to be indistinguishable from their 
commercial bank competitors. This appearance may indicate that they are 
truly indistinguishable from ‘conventional’ banks, and if this were indeed 
the case, it would only show that they have completely lost their former 
social roles.  
But the appearance that they are just like any other bank may also be 
deceptive. Economic survival requires that DBLIs remain economically 
strong and attractive partners for their clients, many of whom now have 
vastly different financial needs than 150 years, or only 50 years, ago. 
Moreover, economic survival as institutions requires that the DBLIs remain 
competitive in the changing market for financial services, which they can 
only do if they adopt strategies and methods of modern professional 
banking. Therefore, the crucial question is not whether DBLIs look like 
modern banks and whether they have added new services and new client 
groups to those offered and served many years ago, but rather whether 
they have discontinued providing financial services to those who would 
otherwise find the access to finance difficult if not outright impossible. The 
ethical and political rationale for having this type of institution discussed 
here would no longer be valid only in the latter case, and other arguments 
would need to be invoked. However, as the next section shows, there are 
indeed such other arguments.  
b)  Compensation of negative external effects  
DBLIs are supposed to not only generate private benefits for their owners 
but also for others. They are expected to create what economists call 
p o s i t i v e  e x t e r n a l  e f f e c t s .  I t  i s  a  s t a n d a r d  r e s u l t  o f  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  t h a t  
external effects or other sources of market failure can lead to an equilibrium 
in a market composed of profit-maximising firms and utility-maximising 
consumers that does not constitute a social welfare optimum. If equilibrium 
and social optimum do not coincide, there is, at least in principle, the 
possibility of achieving welfare gains through appropriate forms of 
intervention in the market. One role of not strictly profit-oriented 
organisations can be to aspire to improve social welfare by compensating INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 21 
 
market failures that are due to external effects or other reasons. Another 
role can be to ‘correct’ market outcomes that are perceived as unfair and 
inequitable, by shifting income and economic opportunities to those who 
would be disadvantaged in a pure market economy.16  
This argument applies in principle to state-owned banks and to 
private savings banks as well as to other DBLIs that aspire to improve 
economic efficiency and social justice, and it provides a slightly different 
argument for public banks and other DBLIs than the argument that builds 
on improved access. Their activity – and thus also their existence – may be 
socially valuable if they would make certain transactions possible and 
economically attractive that are valuable from an overall economic 
perspective, but would not be attractive for one or both parties to the 
transactions if they only took their own costs and benefits into account.17  
c)  Relevant open questions 
These two main arguments – avoiding exclusion and enabling socially 
valuable transactions – apply to savings banks in principle. However, the 
normal form in which economic activity is organised in a market economy 
is that of private and for-profit firms. In some countries, savings banks are 
not fully private and almost everywhere they are not strictly or exclusively 
profit-oriented. Therefore, demonstrating stringently that it is economically 
favourable to have this type of banks in a single European country or in 
Europe as a whole, presupposes having answers to the following questions:  
1)  Is exclusion or the lack of access to financial services less of a problem 
in those European countries in which savings bank systems exists 
                                                      
16 These rationales for government intervention in markets are discussed in any 
public finance textbook. Of course, one needs to add the cautioning note that it is 
not easy to achieve a (socially) better resource allocation than that generated by a 
market economy that would be free of intervention, and to implement a 
redistribution that is perceived as more equitable. Market failure is only a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for interventions being effective in the 
aspired sense.  
17 However, credit rationing is also a form of market failure, and providing 
financial services to people who would be excluded from access to the financial 
sector can constitute a case in which savings banks and other DBLIs compensate a 
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than in other countries? And would it be more of a problem if DBLIs 
had suddenly disappeared or changed their legal and institutional 
status and their objectives and become like any other bank?  
2)  Do savings banks provide financial services that are socially valuable 
and that would not be provided by a banking sector that is 
exclusively comprised of purely profit-oriented banks? Or in other 
words, is there a gap in terms of available financial products or 
services that should be filled by savings banks and other DBLIs? 
3)  Even if savings banks could be said to perform valuable functions, 
are the benefits that they may produce more important than the costs 
that their existence would entail? Or, in other words, is the net benefit 
of having savings banks positive?  
4)  And finally, are savings banks and in particular publicly owned 
savings banks better suited than other DBLIs to perform the socially 
valuable functions that can be expected from them?  
In later sections of this chapter and in the following chapters of this 
study we shall provide detailed arguments which, taken together, suggest 
the following answers:  
1)  Exclusion is still a problem in a number of countries, and especially in 
some of those countries in which the former savings bank systems 
have disappeared.  
2)  There are reasons to assume that some services that DBLIs offer 
would not be available in a banking system composed only of private 
and purely profit-oriented banks.  
3)  There are potential weaknesses of savings banks as a form of 
organisation; however, these depend on the specific features of 
national savings bank systems and the characteristics of the financial, 
economic and political system of the country that one looks at. For 
most countries, the strengths of saving banks dominate their 
weaknesses. 
4)  One cannot say in general terms to what extent savings banks 
perform certain socially valuable functions better than other DBLIs, 
since this depends on how the different types of DBLIs are organised 
and how they operate, and on the features of the respective national 
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2.3  Additional new arguments  
Recent economic research concerning financial systems has led to a set of 
additional arguments in favour of savings banks and other types of banks 
that are not purely profit-oriented and do not have owners with the 
unrestricted property rights that the owners of a private bank have. Three 
of these arguments are presented below.18  
a)  Fostering regional development  
The conventional discussion of the reason why it is good to have savings 
banks refers to a set of functions that savings banks perform. These 
functions range from the provision of financial services to a broader 
population also in more remote areas and fostering competition in regions 
in which not a sufficient number of private banks would want to do 
business so that local monopolies could emerge.19  
Like other banks whose operations are largely confined to a given 
and narrowly defined area, savings banks also play a special role in 
fostering local economic development by mobilising savings and at the 
same time lending out the funds they have mobilised in the same region. In 
doing so, they help to prevent a ‘capital drain’ that may occur if savings are 
mobilised in one region in which economic activity is less developed and 
then transferred and lent out in economically more active regions. This can 
induce migration, cement relative under-development and even induce a 
downward spiral for the less developed region.20 Moreover, a sufficient 
supply of banking services helps to make cities and regions attractive for 
people who consider moving there or not moving away. Longer-term 
relationships between banks and local businesses tend to strengthen local 
businesses and even attract new businesses and create local employment. 
Finally, local banks such as savings banks contribute to a high and stable 
                                                      
18 For a brief sketch of additional new arguments and references to the original 
sources, see Allen (2005).  
19 See Fischer (2006) for the competition-enhancing effects of savings banks in the 
case of Germany. 
20 A formal model showing that this ‘capital drain’ effect can occur and that 
savings banks can counter it, is provided in a theoretical paper by Hakenes & 
Schnable (2006). The empirical support for the proposition advanced in the 
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tax revenue, which also fosters the local economy, since they are less able 
and therefore also less likely than large internationally active banks to 
reduce their tax burden by shifting profits to countries with a favourable 
tax regime.21  
b)  Mitigating intertemporal risk  
In any advanced economy, there is a certain degree of competition between 
banks as financial intermediaries and capital markets. Both have their 
specific roles, strengths and weaknesses, and both have important 
functions with respect to managing risk, with each type of institution 
specialising in managing one specific form of risk. Capital markets are 
particularly good at managing the risk that materialises in one time period, 
say a year, since they have a competitive advantage over banks in 
providing opportunities for investors to reduce risk by diversifying their 
shareholdings. Moreover, they are particularly good at permitting risk-
sharing and the efficient allocation of those risks that are not eliminated 
through diversification. The type of risks that capital markets are so good at 
handling, the risk within a given time period, is called ‘intratemporal’ risk.  
However, diversification and risk-sharing are methods that cannot 
cope with all kinds of risk. There is another form of risk, namely the risk 
that in the course of time the income for the entire economy varies in an 
unpredictable way. This is the so-called ‘intertemporal’ risk, and this risk 
cannot be eliminated through diversification. Technically speaking, it is the 
systematic and macroeconomic risk of good times being followed by bad 
times. Evidently, intertemporal risk is important, and reducing it is a 
socially valuable function, since the people that make up an economy 
would want to have protection against this risk.  
Capital markets are in a certain sense short-sighted and therefore 
unable to deal with intertemporal risk. In contrast, banks are in principle 
able to do just this by creating reserves in good times and reducing these 
reserves in bad times, provided that they wish to do so. Creating and 
unlocking reserves is a specific technique of risk-management that closely 
resembles the role of storage in a primitive and isolated farming society. If 
                                                      
21 In an empirical study using a very broad data set, Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga 
(2001) have confirmed that larger banks are more likely than small local banks to 
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there is a bumper harvest in one year, a large part of the harvest is stored, 
and if the next year’s harvest turns out to be poor, the stored reserves can 
be taken out and consumed. Intertemporal risk is thereby ‘smoothed’, and 
utility increases. It is intuitive, and can be proven in a relatively simple 
economic model, that risk-averse people value this ‘storage’ option highly. 
This implies that having banks that can and want to create reserves in good 
times and unlock them in bad times would be socially valuable. However, 
it is important to understand that being able to mitigate intertemporal risk 
is not the same as having the incentive to do it and of wanting to do it. 
Unlocking reserves can occur in two forms. One is the isolated or 
direct sale of the reserves if they have been created in the first place. The 
other possibility is the sale of the entire bank at a price that includes the 
value of the reserves. If the direct sale is made impossible by some relevant 
regulation, it may appear attractive to choose the second alternative.  
There is a conflict between what is optimal for the entire economy 
and what is optimal for the individual bank and its owners and managers. 
For the owners of an individual bank, disclosing and selling its reserves in 
good times is always more profitable than keeping them. Therefore, strictly 
profit-oriented bank owners or bank managers who act exclusively in the 
financial interest of a bank’s private owners would choose the more 
profitable option, that is, disclose and sell the reserves. And even if the 
managers would not want to act in this way, stock market pressure would 
force them to do it and thus expose the economy to higher intertemporal 
risk and cause severe social damage.  
The next step of the argument is straightforward. It would be socially 
valuable if bank managers and owners were not interested in disclosing 
and selling the reserves they may have built up or that it would not be 
possible for them to act in this way. This is the case with savings banks, 
public banks and cooperative banks. They are not strictly profit-oriented, 
and because of their institutional and legal design they cannot be sold at 
their full value. Thus their managers can be expected to create reserves in 
good time and unlock them if there is a need to do so. Neither earnings 
pressure nor stock market pressure prevents them from doing something 
that amounts to the socially valuable function of intertemporal risk 
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This argument has been developed by the economists Franklin Allen 
and Douglas Gale in a series of influential academic articles.22 It is an 
economically powerful and theoretically sophisticated argument for having 
and retaining banks that are not strictly profit-oriented and whose 
ownership position cannot be sold. These banks include public banks, 
banks owned by foundations that would not consider selling the banks – 
thus different forms of savings banks – as well as, to a certain extent, 
cooperative banks. In a book that summarises their relevant research, Allen 
& Gale (2000) argue that macroeconomic shocks, i.e. manifestations of 
intertemporal risk, affect countries in whose financial sectors non-sellable 
and not strictly profit-oriented banks play an important role much less than 
other countries whose banking sectors are composed exclusively of private 
banks whose shares are listed and traded on a stock market.  
c)  Capitalising on the value of diversity 
We now turn to a different argument in favour of savings banks that also 
rests on recent developments in economic theory but also corresponds to 
what non-economists would regard as plausible. This argument relates to 
competition.  
Competition is much more complicated than standard accounts of 
introductory economics textbooks, which only rely on established 
microeconomic theory, might suggest. According to a view that goes back 
to the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, competition is a process that 
is driven to a large extent by knowledge that exists and newly created and 
discovered knowledge, and by innovation. For competition to work, new 
ideas must be generated. But this is not enough. There must also be the 
possibility to transform these ideas into economic reality: invention must 
be translated into innovation.  
Financial systems develop over time; new instruments and new 
institutional forms are invented and used, and they may turn out to be 
more or less successful. As a matter of principle, it is impossible to predict 
what will be successful financial instruments and institutions in the future. 
A process of creative and dynamic competition must be based on openness. 
                                                      
22 See the original research paper Allen & Gale (1997) and, in a less formal version, 
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This argues for diversity. Diversity offers an optimal basis for new ideas to 
come to life and also for old ideas to make their come-back.  
In the context of banking systems, openness and diversity imply that 
different institutional forms should exist and should be made sufficiently 
strong so that they have a fair chance of emerging successfully from the 
struggle in which different forms of organising banking activity compete 
with each other.23 One such form is that of a savings bank or, to be more 
precise, a number of such forms are the different institutional designs that 
jointly make up the universe of savings banks. In the past, savings banks 
have demonstrated an impressive ability to compete with other 
institutional forms of banking, to adjust to new circumstances, to create and 
harbour new ideas and new products and processes and to survive in 
environments that are more and more shaped by fierce competition. They 
are as valuable as other institutional forms of banking such as small and 
large private commercial banks, cooperative banks and ‘other public banks’ 
(in the sense defined above). All of these institutional forms should have 
their chance to develop and to display their respective strengths. The 
economic arguments that would suggest that one specific form of 
organising banking activity, namely that of the large private bank with 
many shareholders, is definitely the best one, may appear plausible, but 
they are not conclusive.24 So far we do not know enough about the merits 
and the potential of different forms of enterprise, especially in banking, to 
be able to assign a clear priority to one specific model and to obstruct the 
development of others.  
As Carbó Valverde & Mendez (2004) argue, diversity is all the more 
important in Europe, an economic and political region that thrives on the 
benefits of having a long tradition of diversity and that even aspires to 
make better use of this tradition. Diversity has economic benefits for 
Europe as a whole and the countries within the region, and it has its own 
cultural value that is worth preserving, since diversity fosters creativity in 
many respects.25 It is a characteristic element of this European tradition that 
                                                      
23 This argument was confirmed in Llewellyn (2009) for the case of building 
societies in the UK.   
24 See Hansmann (1996), especially chapters 1 and 2. 
25 This is one of the reasons why diversity is explicitly protected by the EU Treaty. 
The relevant legal norm in the context discussed here is Art. 295 of the EU Treaty. 
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there are many institutional forms in which economic activity is performed 
that are, in terms of their design and functions, located somewhere between 
the State and its centralised power structure and fully decentralised and 
purely private enterprise. There may be substantial benefits to having these 
hybrid forms. Just like cooperative banks, savings banks are a part of this 
tradition of diversity and openness, and this is an important argument in 
its own right on behalf of savings banks. Neither the request of central 
governments to expand their powers nor an overly simplistic model of a 
market economy should be used to undermine this tradition and force 
savings banks into adopting one of the polar forms of a State Bank or a 
‘normal’ private firm.  
2.4  The ongoing political debate  
For many years, savings banks have, at least indirectly, been the subject of 
intense political debates conducted at various levels. We will briefly review 
the debate on the international, European and national levels with a focus 
on Spain and Germany. Some elements of the discussion on the national 
level will be elaborated further in the later chapters of this study.  
a)  The international debate 
In the international arena, there has not been any substantive debate for a 
long time about savings banks as a special type of bank. However, since in 
a number of countries savings banks are, or have formerly been, public 
banks, the broader, and indeed very lively debate concerning financial 
sector development and public or state-owned banks also has implications 
for savings banks. If one looks at this debate with a longer time perspective, 
one can see at least two fundamental changes in the prevailing views held 
with respect to public banks and the policies that were inspired by these 
views.  
Since the end of World War II and into the 1980s, many policy-
makers as well as many academics were convinced that the financial sector 
is such an important element of the infrastructure of any country and that 
the efficient allocation of capital and an assured supply of credit to 
                                                                                                                                       
It states that EU integration policy must by no means undermine the norms, legal 
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businesses and households are of such a vital importance that it would be 
too dangerous to leave them exposed to unreliable and fickle market 
forces.26 This view was widespread both in the developing countries as well 
as in the developed economies of the West and Japan.  
In the developed or industrialised countries, state ownership of banks 
and other forms of state involvement including rather restrictive financial 
regulation were the rule rather than the exception in the 30 to 40 years 
following the Second World War. The general distrust of commercial 
banks, and even of markets in general, and the lack of long-term funds 
seemed to make state ownership of banks and heavy-handed banking 
regulation a pure necessity consistent with the general economic policy 
regimes of this time. State involvement in banking was possibly even a 
cause of the economic successes in the reconstruction years. Public banks 
dominated the financial sectors of most advanced countries during that 
time. As long as interest rates were moderate and exchange rates were 
fixed, that is, until the early 1970s, the performance of public banks as well 
as their economic effects appeared to be good, and the strong role of the 
state in banking was not controversial.  
Because they were in most cases owned or dominated by other public 
bodies than the central governments, which had the role of shaping overall 
economic policies, savings banks were not in the focus of national economic 
policy during that time. But the economic and political ‘esprit du temps’ 
was friendly to their status and role.  
Experience in the West in the post-war years provided a model for 
banking and finance in the developing countries. In the 1960s, 1970s and 
even 1980s, a large number of specialised large state-owned banks were set 
up with ample technical and financial assistance from foreign and 
international donor agencies in developing countries.27 The idea behind 
founding and funding these development banks was that they should 
make up for the lack of capital and banking know-how in their respective 
                                                      
26 Among the well-known advocates of this view, were, among many others, 
eminent economists such as Gunnar Myrdal and James Tobin, and among policy-
makers Jacques Delors, before he became the President of the European 
Community in 1985 and still served as the French Minister of Finance.  
27 See the estimate of World Bank support for state-owned banks in developing 
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countries. In the early 1970s, the economic situation as well as the views 
concerning economic theory and economic institutions started to change in 
a fundamental way. The dominant economic philosophy became much 
more ‘liberal pro-market’ and ‘anti-government’ and ‘anti-interventionist’ 
than it had been in the 30 years before.28 The new orientation, which 
became known as the ‘Washington consensus’29 called for balanced 
budgets, low inflation rates, deregulation and especially privatisation. The 
term ‘Washington consensus’ for this set of desirable elements is due to the 
fact that, in addition to the US Government, the two big international 
financial institutions located in Washington, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, which had formerly been the main promoters of 
public banking in developing countries, re-oriented their strategies and 
became fervent advocates of the new approach.  
Private and strictly profit-oriented economic institutions came to be 
regarded as the norm, and even the ideal, for any market economy. Of 
course, this new orientation was also applied to financial systems in 
general and to banks in particular. Not surprisingly, this ‘ideological 
climate change’ was also going to have an effect on the view concerning 
savings banks, though this effect would at first only be indirect.  
Whereas in the years before, the positive experience of the advanced 
countries with public banks had provided the model for the policies 
applied in developing countries, the situation was then reversed: 
Information concerning banks in developing countries that had been 
available for some time but had also largely been ignored for political 
reasons, spurred policy changes in the advanced countries.  
In the early 1970s, state-owned banks in developing countries, 
especially in Latin America, were reassessed in a series of rigorous studies 
and found to be inefficient, corrupt and over-politicised and a heavy 
                                                      
28 The political leaders of that time, who strongly supported this policy change, 
were Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Among academic economists, Milton 
Friedman was the most influential.  
29 The concept and name of the ‘Washington Consensus’ was first presented in 
1982 by John Williams, an economist from the Institute of International Economics 
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burden for their national and international sponsors.30 The studies 
identified a number of reasons for the dismal performance, and they 
acknowledged that it would be very difficult to trace poor performance to 
one specific cause. It could have been due to inappropriate management 
structures and policies, the inhospitable environment of financial 
repression, corruption and political abuse, or the legal and ownership form 
of these banks, or any combination of these factors. In the public domain, 
however, state ownership came to be regarded as the main weakness of 
development banks, and this lesson was later transferred to industrialised 
countries, putting these countries’ public banks in general under political 
stress, even though their performance was much less unsettling than that of 
public banks in most developing countries. By the middle of the 1980s, the 
dominant view had definitely changed. A large number of public banks 
were privatised or even closed.  
The new policy was reinforced by research findings that showed 
convincingly that financial sector development is very important for 
growth in general and seemed to imply that financial sector development 
required deregulation and liberalisation. This research was to a large extent 
carried out at the research department of the World Bank, and it is very 
well summarised in the World Bank publication Finance and Growth from 
2001. Even though the evidence concerning this point is less clear-cut, this 
work seemed to also suggest that unrestricted competition in the financial 
sector is conducive to financial sector development and thus, at least 
indirectly, to growth.31 Moreover, this research was more or less 
universally assumed to imply that the privatisation of banks is called for 
since it would in turn foster competition.  
This was the state of the international political debate until quite 
recently, and it had also largely been adopted in academic circles. 
Evidently, it is not favourable for savings banks and other banks that are 
                                                      
30 An overview of this research, which had mainly been funded by the American 
aid agency US AID and the World Bank, is provided in two collections of essays, 
see Von Pischke et al. (1981) and Adams et al. (1984). Von Pischke (1993) 
summarises some of this work and its findings.  
31 In view of the events since the summer of 2007 and especially the enormous 
losses of banks in many countries, this general statement may, in retrospect, appear 
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not strictly and exclusively profit-oriented. They were, and to some extent 
still are, criticised as following policies that do not contribute to 
competition and, even more so in some countries, as still being state-owned 
and thus not conforming to the relevant norm. For instance in Germany, 
some academic economists have strongly requested that public banks, 
including savings banks, should be abolished or privatised,32 and in a 
number of countries, e.g. Belgium, Great Britain33 and Italy, this has 
actually happened. Until recently, the International Monetary Fund was 
strictly committed to the views that jointly constitute the Washington 
consensus,34 even though these views have by now been challenged by 
several highly respected academics and have, as a consequence, lost their 
appeal as being unambiguously correct and even self-evident.35  
However, liberal orthodoxy was not only questioned by academics 
and their work. The strict confidence in the Washington consensus was first 
shaken by the stock market bubble at the end of the last century and its 
aftermath. The turmoil in the American financial system that started in the 
summer of 2007 and turned into an serious crisis in the international 
financial system shortly after, has led to requests from many sides, 
including leading bankers and bankers’ associations like the Institute for 
International Finance, to rethink the role of the state in the financial system 
and to reconsider more stringent banking regulation.  
                                                      
32 See e.g. Möschel (1993), Steiner (1994) and Sinn (1997).  
33 For more details on the UK, see, Drake & Llewellyn (2001). 
34 Thus it is not surprising that the IMF has regularly requested a fundamental 
change of the German savings bank system, which still features public ownership; 
see IMF (2003) for the most forceful plea of this kind.  
35 See numerous recent papers by Franklin Allen and his co-authors, including 
those quoted above, and most recently Allen & Gale (2007), several books and 
academic studies by Joseph Stiglitz, a former chief economist of the World Bank 
and the recipient of the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics, such as his widely quoted 
book (Stiglitz, 2002) on globalisation and Stiglitz (2000), as well as a series of 
papers by the French economist Jean Tirole summarised in Tirole (2006), Part VI. 
These three authors are also among those who have greatly contributed to a new 
line of economic research called the ‘new institutional economics’ that is based on 
the assumption that markets do not always function efficiently and instead focuses 
on the role of information, incentives and institutions, providing a more favourable 
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This new trend of questioning the ultra-liberal positions that had 
emerged as the almost universally held view only ten years ago coincides 
with another intellectual and political development of the past three or four 
years that is highly relevant for the role of public banks in general and for 
savings banks in particular.  
Very recently, a more differentiated view of financial sector 
development and growth has begun to attract the attention of policy-
makers, academics and other observers. It is grounded in the insight that 
financial sector development and growth are much too general terms for 
guiding and assessing policy. Growth is not an end in itself; it should also 
support development, and development in turn is closely related to the 
notion of offering opportunities to many people and contributing to social 
cohesion. Nobel Laureate Armatya Sen has been an early advocate of this 
view.36 Now his view has started to gain many followers, who suspect that 
financial sector development and growth in general might not be in line 
with the requirement that they should be ‘inclusive’. Correspondingly, 
inclusive financial systems are those that offer adequate access to financial 
services to broad segments of the population.  
It was once more the World Bank that has taken the intellectual lead 
in this new debate, and this alone may be a reason for attaching great 
importance to it. In November 2007, the World Bank published a highly 
instructive non-technical volume entitled Finance for All?, which 
summarises the work on exclusion and inclusion of financial sectors that its 
research department had produced in the previous years. This volume 
demonstrates that exclusion is not only a problem in developing and 
transition countries but also in many advanced economies. The thrust of 
this book is that one should aspire to make financial systems more 
inclusive in all parts of the world and that financial sectors should also be 
assessed on the basis of the extent to which they provide access to financial 
services to the majority of people. But the World Bank is not alone in its 
interest in exclusion and inclusion. In recent months, a host of other 
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publications have appeared that testify that the new perspective is already 
now widely adopted.37  
Together with the current financial crisis, the new attention devoted 
to the issue of exclusion and inclusion shifts the focus of the international 
debate in a direction that is extremely fruitful. In spite of the weaknesses 
that they may have, many public banks aspire to work against exclusion, 
and savings banks are among the most ‘inclusive’ financial institutions in a 
large number of countries.38 Interestingly, in those countries in Europe that 
still have active savings bank systems, exclusion is less of a problem than in 
those that do not.39 This is not surprising given that savings banks were 
first created for the explicit purpose of fighting exclusion. As it appears, all 
of a sudden this positive role is now acknowledged and the participants in 
the debate may even understand that savings banks have been able and 
willing to continue playing this role because of their specific legal and 
ownership structure and their specific business models of being connected 
through national networks as a feature that contributes to their stability. 
Thus exactly those factors that have once appeared as fundamental 
weaknesses from a public policy standpoint may start to be regarded as 
specific strengths.  
b)  The debate at the EU level 
In the past decade, EU financial services policy has largely been shaped by 
the objective of creating an integrated market for financial services 
characterised by strong and efficient financial institutions, including banks, 
insurance companies, capital markets and non-bank financial 
intermediaries, and a high level of competition. The core element of this 
                                                      
37 See e.g. the two collections of essays edited by Barr et al. (2007) and Anderloni et 
al. (2007) and the European Commission (2008) study and the sources quoted in 
the contributions to these books.  
38 See Peachey & Roe (2007). 
39 The detailed results of the EU Commission Report (2008) on exclusion seems to 
suggest the general tendency mentioned in the text, and this in turn suggests that 
savings banks contribute to avoiding exclusion. However, there are some 
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policy was the FSAP40 which covered the time period between 1999 and 
2005. It was extended by the post-FASP activity41 ever since, and was 
complemented by competition policy actions42 with respect to the financial 
sectors of member countries. Creating an integrated market is the domain 
of DG Internal Market, and ensuring unrestricted competition is that of DG 
Competition.  
The underlying vision of the policies pursued by these two 
directorates was to deliver the full potential of a well-functioning market 
for consumers in terms of a broad range of safe, competitive products and 
for industry in terms of easier access to a single deep and liquid market for 
investment capital. 
Without simplifying too much, one can say that the general 
orientation that inspired this policy was that of a liberal market economy 
based on well-defined private property, unrestricted freedom for the 
movement of capital, universal and unrestricted competition between all of 
the actors on one side of any financial market, and an important role for 
                                                      
40 The plan initiated by DG Internal Market, contains some 45 measures that have 
largely been implemented so far. The measures were put forth to provide a legal 
and regulatory environment that supports the integration of financial markets 
across the EU member states. Among its various objectives, the plan aimed to 
facilitate the development of a single wholesale services market and an open and 
secure retail services market while, at the same time, ensuring the stability of 
financial markets and eliminating obstacles that inhibit integration.  
41 In December 2005, the Commission published a White Paper on the EU financial 
services policy which extends the plan to the 2005-10 period. It emphasises the full 
implementation and enforcement of the FSAP measures, particularly in the retail 
financial services market, and the removal of explicit and implicit barriers to 
integration.  
42 Actions by Directorate General Competition mainly aim at ensuring a fair and 
competitive European financial services market. Besides the traditional 
competition policy tools on antitrust set out by the EC Treaty under Article 81 (on 
cooperation on cartels), Article 82 (on abuse of dominant position) and on state aid 
under Article 87, there is the instrument of sector inquiries which was used in 2005 
in retail banking. This instrument has its legal basis in Article 17 (1) of Regulation 
EC No 1/2003, and gives the European Commission the power to decide to 
conduct an inquiry into a particular sector of the economy or into particular types 
of agreements across various sectors, where evidence suggests that competition 
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capital markets – in other words, the Anglo-Saxon model of an economy 
and a financial system.  
As a consequence of this EU financial sector policy, financial 
institutions in Europe were put under pressure to improve in terms of their 
efficiency, risk management policies and, above all, value creation for 
shareholders. At the same time, it was, and still is, considered desirable that 
financial institutions reach out across borders within Europe in as many 
ways as possible. Conceptually – or if one prefers this term here, 
ideologically – this orientation of EU policy implied a strong preference for 
unrestricted private ownership of financial institutions in Europe and a 
strict profit or shareholder value orientation of these institutions.  
As one might expect, this political orientation was not favourable for 
savings banks and other institutions that, for various reasons and in several 
respects, did not, and do not, conform to the underlying model of what 
financial institutions should be like and how they should operate. In 
particular, state-owned or public banks and more specifically the 
institutions belonging to some national savings bank systems were under a 
certain suspicion of not fully supporting this policy orientation. While it 
appears to be perfectly compatible with the financial and strategic 
aspirations of shareholder value-oriented financial institutions to expand 
their activities in all member states and ultimately to create large pan-
European players,43 this is less so for savings banks, since they have 
                                                      
43 Whether this strategic orientation makes sense from a purely financial 
perspective and an economic policy perspective is, however, less clear than it may 
appear to be. The relevant empirical literature has so far failed to reach an 
agreement on whether bank consolidation in the EU has led to decisive economic 
and social gains. Vander Vennet (1996) finds that mergers enhance the profitability 
of partner of equal size. However, the findings are not sufficient to disentangle 
socially beneficial improvements from gains from increased market power. In a 
later study, Vander Vennet (2002) finds evidence of significant profit 
enhancements, which may be due to increased market power, with no operational 
efficiency gains. Altunbaş & Ibañez (2004) show that strategic dissimilarities 
between consolidating parties may partially explain the apparent lack of cost and 
profit benefits. Ayadi (2007) shows that the underlying M&A logics (activity 
reinforcement versus activity expansion within or across regions) matter when 
assessing the financial and economic performance of 71 bank-to-bank M&As in 
Europe in the 1996-2003 period and that cross-border M&As are not the most 
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remained committed to their original objectives such as local/regional 
development and the provision of financial services to the entire 
population, which are not necessarily profits maximising. Most 
importantly, many of them are, by design and legal-institutional structure, 
not open to investments from outside their respective networks and thus 
also not contributing to the aspired cross-border integration of financial 
institutions and markets.  
However, the European treaties leave it up to the individual member 
countries to decide how their respective financial systems are shaped and 
especially what legal and institutional forms of ownership can exist and 
thus also which forms of ownership their financial institutions should have. 
This openness is a corollary of the right to ownership as provided for in the 
EU treaties that guarantee respect for the different configurations 
protecting national rights. Therefore, the Commission would not have been 
in a position to even attempt to pursue a policy that would have been 
openly directed against savings banks and cooperative banks, even if it had 
wanted to do so. Therefore, it is irrelevant to speculate whether there might 
have been a certain political apprehension at the EU level against these 
types of financial institutions. If it existed, it would, most probably, have 
rested on much the same grounds that were already discussed in the last 
section.  
In contrast, EU competition policy offers some opportunities, and 
indeed even creates the need, to interfere with national savings bank 
systems if their behaviour or that of the institutions belonging to them or 
the way in which a member state interacts with these institutions can be 
perceived as violating EU competition rules. This was, for instance, the 
legal basis for the Commission’s position in the controversy between the 
German Government and the German Savings Banks Association on the 
one side and the EU Commission (and the Association of German Private 
Banks) over State guarantees for ‘Landesbanken’ and savings banks, which 
led to the agreement of 2001 to phase out these guarantees in 2005. And it is 
also the basis for EU concerns with certain measures of state support for the 
German Landesbank WestLB.  
One instrument of EU competition policy is so-called ‘sector 
inquiries’. DG Competition has the right to initiate an inquiry into a specific 
sector if it has reasons to suspect that in this sector certain facts or business 
practices restrict competition. The EU used this instrument with its retail 
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The mere fact that this inquiry was started caused some concerns among 
the savings banks and their associations and federations, since there were 
indeed grounds for the expectation that savings banks would be found 
deficient in the sense of not conforming to the strict but one-sided model of 
how banks should be designed and how they should operate that the 
Commission was assumed to hold. Most importantly, the network 
structure that characterises several savings bank systems and the regional 
principle that is still in force within some networks of DBLIs could have 
been regarded as anti-competitive.  
The retail banking inquiry led to some moderate misgivings that the 
Commission had with respect to savings banks,44 but did not provide a 
basis for the comprehensive attack on private or public sector savings 
banks or even on all savings banks and other financial institutions with a 
dual-bottom line, that some observers had expected and, depending on 
their positions, hoped for or feared.  
In summary, as far as the two (important) EU Directorates 
responsible for the Internal Market and for Competition are concerned, one 
can say in summary that they had for quite some time held a rather critical 
position vis-à-vis savings banks, especially those with public ownership, 
but for various reasons did not or even could not “do anything about it”.  
However, there are also other considerations and other factors that 
had an impact on the political standing of savings banks and other DBLIs 
                                                      
44 The findings of the retail banking inquiry suggested that some forms of 
cooperation (strategies, pricing and selling policies) can seriously distort 
competition and thus be detrimental to consumers, while others, such as credit 
information sharing and the development of common standards for the operation 
of payment networks, were recognised to be beneficial and pro-competitive. They 
increase banks’ operational efficiency, improve the risk and cost management of 
smaller banks and ensure the smooth operation of payment systems and thereby 
contribute to fostering overall competition in retail banking. Some of those forms 
of cooperation that were deemed to be more problematic have already been 
challenged in several member states. For instance in 2006, the German savings 
banks withdrew a joint advertisement campaign that included pricing details 
following the concerns raised by the German Federal Cartel Office, and in 2007, 
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and, correspondingly, the policy of the EU vis-à-vis these institutions. We 
want to briefly point out three such factors.  
1) Also at the EU level, there is now a growing concern about the 
phenomenon of financial exclusion at the EU level. In 2007, the EU has 
undertaken a study on “financial services provision and prevention of 
financial exclusion”. The main findings confirm that financial exclusion 
remains a policy concern in several member states and reaffirms the need 
for future policy action.45 Since savings banks and cooperative banks have 
explicitly been created with the mission to counteract financial exclusion, 
and have closely adhered to this traditional mission, the outcome of the 
study can be regarded as strengthening the political position of savings and 
other banks in Europe.46 It has become much clearer than it used to be that 
savings banks, by being ‘inclusive’ financial institutions, serve not only 
important economic functions but also highly important social and political 
functions. To illustrate the weight of this factor, it may be useful to note 
that the EU activity that aims at combating financial and social exclusion 
had originally only been initiated by Directorate General Employment, 
Equal Opportunities and Social Affairs. Now, since it is well under way, 
this initiative is backed and followed up by DG Internal Market.47  
2) A second factor that only emerged very recently and has so far not 
been studied or documented in detail corresponds to the role of savings 
banks in ensuring financial stability. Being decentralised and ‘down to 
earth’ institutions, savings banks play an important role as a stabilising 
factor in general and, most importantly, also in the current financial crises. 
There may be indeed potential benefits from their decentralised structures 
and their established safety nets or mutual support mechanisms, as this 
                                                      
45 See European Commission (2008). 
46 See Ayadi & Rodkiewitcz (2008) for details. 
47 In this vein, a consultation paper on the prevention of financial exclusion was 
published in February 2009 by the services of DG Internal Market. The document 
aimed at publicly consulting on the requirement of a basic bank account in the 27 
MS. This policy response is in line with the Commission’s communication entitled 
“A Single Market for 21st Century Europe” (COM (2007) 0724, adopted by the 
Commission on 20 November 2007). This communication sets policy initiatives to 
re-position the Single Market as a socially relevant project. It is accompanied by a 
communication on services of general interest, including social services of general 
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tends to strengthen the provision of liquidity for the overall financial 
system. Even the fact that savings banks are less closely integrated into the 
international banking system than most other banks and less subject to the 
shocks that come from the drastic fall of their own share prices – since 
many of them simply do not have shares and share prices – suddenly 
appears as a factor that contributes to overall financial stability and thereby 
shows a specific strength of financial institutions that do not conform to the 
model that was considered as the ideal in the past years.  
3) Finally, and once more relating to the current financial crisis which 
seems to have reached a point of culmination – as one may hope – exactly 
at the time of finalising this chapter of our study, one of the most 
fundamental misgivings that the EU policy seems to have had in recent 
years, all of a sudden appears in a new light. It relates to the public or semi-
public ownership and governance features of the savings banks in some 
countries. This feature was indeed a major concern of the Commission in 
the past, even though there did not seem to be much it could “do about it”. 
Now, suddenly, Great Britain and the US and a number of other countries 
have greatly stepped up state interventions and even state ownership in 
formerly purely private banks, and similar plans have been approved in 
the EU. If state ownership appears to be a possible, and even perhaps 
suitable, means of stabilising the financial system, this feature of some 
savings bank systems will in the future appear much less problematic than 
in the past, and any fundamental opposition to a stronger role of public or 
semi-public banks or banks with some state influence may have lost the 
intuitive appeal that it enjoyed in the past. As far as the political climate in 
the EU is concerned, this recent experience may have a lasting effect and 
strengthen the position of the savings banks in their dealings with the 
Commission.  
c)  The debate in specific countries  
The political debate in Germany concerning savings banks has a tradition 
that goes back several decades. The crucial point of this debate has always 
been the fact that, with a few exceptions, savings banks have almost forever 
been ‘owned’ by the State, though not by the central or Federal State but 
rather by local municipalities and districts, the subdivision of the 
individual States (Länder). Ownership in the case of savings banks meant 
different things at different times. Until the end of the 1920s, most savings 
banks were simply parts of the respective local administration. Then they 
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governed under a public law regime defined by the savings banks laws of 
the individual States. Even though these laws differ to some extent, they 
share many features, which jointly constitute the common legal and 
institutional character of the savings banks in Germany (and for a long time 
also for those in Austria).  
For more than three quarters of a century, ‘ownership’ of savings 
banks meant four things at the same time: These banks enjoyed public 
support in the form of 1) an explicit and complete State guarantee for the 
deposits of the clients (Gewährträgerhaftung), and 2) an obligation of the 
municipality to assure the proper functioning of the banking operations, 
which is the so-called ‘maintenance obligation’ (Anstaltslast). Then, 3) the 
governing body of the local savings banks and the committee that was 
responsible for major credit decisions were staffed, among others, by local 
politicians. Finally 4) the savings banks laws stipulate that the savings 
banks had a mission to provide financial services that benefit the local 
community and the local economy.  
However, ‘ownership’ is limited in so far as, in accordance with most 
savings banks laws, the ownership position cannot be sold, and the right to 
have a financial surplus distributed is severely limited. Thus, the 
ownership rights of the municipalities are weaker than those of the owners 
of a private corporation. Political influence is regarded as appropriate in 
principle as far as bank strategy is concerned, but it is curtailed in principle 
as well as in practice since the laws stipulate that the operations of the 
savings banks have to strictly adhere to sound business principles. This 
adherence is closely monitored by the savings banks’ own regional 
supervisory organisations. Since the economic performance of the savings 
banks in Germany has been in line with that of other groups of banks, or 
even somewhat better for a large part of the past 20 years, one may be 
inclined to think that political influence which may have existed, was not 
used to make savings banks operate in an economically unsound manner.  
The debate about the privatisation of the German savings banks 
started after 1990, the time of Germany’s reunification. The first widely 
perceived call for a full or material privatisation of local savings banks and 
the regional second-layer institutions in the savings bank system, the State 
banks or ‘Landesbanken’, came from the independent German Monopolies 
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contributions.48 Then, in the mid-1990s, the German Associations of 
(private) Banks complained to the European Commission that the existing 
State guarantees for savings banks and Landesbanken constituted an unfair 
competitive advantage for these banks, which is incompatible with EU law. 
After a lengthy process of negotiations, in which the German savings banks 
Association and the German Government attempted to save the banks that 
belong to the Savings Bank Group from the ‘attacks’ from Brussels and 
from the private banks, the EU Commission and Germany reached an 
agreement which amounted to outlawing the State guarantees. This 
agreement came into force in 2005. It affected the Landesbanken to a larger 
extent than the local savings banks, but granted both groups of banks an 
extended period in which State guarantees would still apply to obligations 
that the public banks had incurred before.  
State guarantees were not the only controversial issue. Another one 
was the impossibility of private banks to acquire individual savings banks 
or, seen from the other side, the impossibility of municipalities to sell their 
savings banks. This was considered as an impediment to the free 
movement of capital and of a fundamental restructuring of the entire 
German banking system. Especially in view of the dominant role of savings 
banks in the German retail market – as well as the relatively good financial 
performance – private banks were keen to obtain the right to buy 
individual savings banks, especially the larger and economically more 
successful ones. But the legal and institutional structure of the savings 
banks made this impossible. Pleas to change this legal structure therefore 
surfaced. Among those who argued that the special legal status of the 
savings banks should be altered in such a way that the sale/acquisition of 
individual savings banks would become possible, was the IMF which, in 
2002, advocated transforming the public law institutions into private 
institutions with equity stakes that are freely transferrable and can be 
acquired by others, including German and foreign private banks.  
As envisioned by those who advocated the legal transformation, it 
might indeed lead to the sale of individual savings banks and ultimately to 
the dissolution of the network structure of the savings bank system. Since 
this network structure is deemed to be of crucial importance for the 
economic success of the savings bank system, pleas for a legal 
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transformation raised opposition from the side of the savings banks and 
their association. So far, this opposition has been successful and the aspired 
legal transformation has not occurred. Political proclamations such as that 
by Chancellor Merkel at the 2007 annual meeting of the German Savings 
Banks Association in Bochum to the effect that the German government 
will continue supporting savings banks are generally understood as 
commitments to the current legal and institutional structure which serves 
to keep the network intact. Nevertheless, the pressure to change the legal 
status of the savings banks and ultimately also the pressure towards full 
privatisation is still there.  
The recent turmoil in the banking system due to the subprime 
lending crisis has also affected the internal debate in Germany about public 
banks in general and about savings banks and Landesbanken. While the 
individual savings banks are not affected directly by the fallout of the 
subprime crisis, they are indirectly affected in their role as co-owners of 
Landesbanken, some of which are seriously affected by the current crisis. 
This situation has led to the emergence of conflicts between savings banks 
and Landesbanken. The German Savings Bank Association is more and 
more taking an active stand in favour of a fundamental transformation of 
the current system of Landesbanken, a move that might for a certain time 
alleviate the pressure under which they find themselves. 
In Spain, the political debate concerning savings banks (cajas) was for 
a long time also shaped by the controversy concerning their legal status 
and the role of politics in these banks. Generally speaking, the arguments 
used by the opponents of the cajas largely resemble those used at the 
international and EU levels. They relate to what is perceived as public 
ownership, to the political influence to which these institutions are subject 
and to the presumed fact that they cooperate among themselves and that 
this might undermine fair and open competition. 
As we will discuss at greater length in the following chapters, the 
Spanish savings banks are organised as private enterprises but have 
foundational origins and fulfil social functions. In the past, this 
idiosyncratic mix of private and social elements was a matter of concern in 
the political arena and especially among competitors. However, this 
concern was cleared up in 1988 when the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that 
the cajas are private institutions. Legally, cajas are foundations, which in 
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Even following the court ruling, the debate about the public status 
and influence did not end. The social involvement of the cajas, 
implemented by the foundations, and the extensive public sector 
representation in the governing bodies of the individual cajas continued to 
generate a dose of ambiguity as to whether in substance they belong to the 
private or the public sector. Although legal status and ownership structure 
in a narrow sense are not matters of political debate on their own any more, 
there are still controversial political debates concerning two closely related 
issues: the cajas’ governance and the implications for competition in the 
Spanish banking sector that arise from the cooperation among savings 
banks.  
As far as governance is concerned, despite the broader representation 
in cajas’ governing bodies and the liberalisation measures aimed at 
levelling the playing field between cajas and other banks, the governance 
structure of cajas is more extensively regulated – by the State and by the 
Autonomous Communities – than that of other banks. Since 1985, several 
reforms were implemented that aimed at changing the cajas’ governance 
structure. In 2002, a law reduced public sector representation in the cajas’ 
decision-making bodies, and thus, the scope for political influence. These 
reforms responded to the need of ensuring that the cajas’ loans and 
investments would not be considered public aid under European 
Commission regulations.  
The controversy on governance of Spanish cajas is the sum of two 
ingredients. 
The ownership structure of the Spanish savings banks is such that 
those exercising control in the governing bodies – that is, representatives of 
the public sector, depositors, employees and others – are neither legal nor 
economic owners in the sense of being able to appropriate any surplus that 
these institutions may generate. However, this creates an inconsistency 
between ownership and control and leads to incentive and accountability 
problems.  
In addition, cajas (in all regions) are required to allocate at least half 
of their profits to reserves, and they channel the remainder back into the 
community towards projects that fall under their social mandate (Obra 
Social). Nevertheless, critics still argue that given such a use and 
distribution of profits, savings banks are not sufficiently exposed to 
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fact that the savings banks do not have listed shares with voting rights for 
the shareholders. 
In spite of their particular ownership and governance structure, the 
cajas seek to maximise their profits – and thus maximise their allocation to 
the Obra Social – through their day-to-day business operations, and by 
fiercely competing between themselves and with all other credit 
institutions for the provision of financial intermediation services. This 
feature accentuates the suspicions on the part of private commercial banks 
that cajas are under less pressure to operate strictly according to 
commercial rules and that this gives them the freedom to operate in ways 
that may not be compatible with competitive rules, e.g. by extending their 
branch networks and expanding the level of their activity more than would 
be appropriate for a private bank that is under strict pressure from its 
owners.  
Despite reducing the representation ceiling of the public sector to 
50%, political influence seems to have remained strong. The Spanish 
savings banks have also recently responded to these concerns by adopting 
strict rules concerning what can be done under the ‘Obra Social’ and a 
requirement to disclose in a very systematic and transparent manner, and 
thereby to strictly separate commercial business operations and socially 
determined profit distribution.  
Another controversy is related to the cooperation among savings 
banks and the consequences that this may have on competition, a concern 
that was also central to the recent retail banking inquiry undertaken by the 
EU and to which Spanish cajas and their Confederation have responded by 
emphasising the importance of strictly distinguishing between pro-
competitive, efficiency-enhancing and anti-competitive forms of 
cooperation.  
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3.  BANKING PERFORMANCE AND 
CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL 
GROWTH AND STABILITY 
he main objective of the chapter is to investigate the performance 
and role of savings banks in three countries where they are still 
prevalent (Austria, Germany and Spain) and where they are 
disappearing or have already disappeared (Italy and Belgium). The first 
part of the chapter surveys the economic literature on the performance of 
savings banks as well as their contributions to competition, regional growth 
and financial stability. Most studies have focused on a relatively narrow set 
of countries or issues, without taking a look at the broader picture. The lack 
of a comparative assessment of the conditions and roles of savings banks in 
Europe and institutional diversity – that is, the degree to which savings 
banks participate, together with commercial banks and other types of 
banks – in a financial system has motivated this chapter and the study as a 
whole. This is why the second part of this chapter reports the results of an 
empirical examination of the performance and roles of savings banks in the 
five European countries mentioned above. The results confirm that, 
according to a number of different performance measures, savings banks 
are by and large as efficient as their commercial peers. Their presence 
appears to have a positive impact on competition and on regional economic 
growth, particularly through their role of lending to smaller businesses. 
Lastly, they contribute positively to the stability of the financial system as 
the returns of savings banks are significantly less volatile than those of 
commercial banks of comparable size.  
This chapter is structured as follows: section 3.1 offers a review of the 
literature covering the performance of savings banks, the impact on 
competition, the links between small-business lending and small banks 
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(including savings banks) and the contribution of savings banks to the local 
and domestic economy and stability. Section 3.2 offers a description of the 
methodology used in a European-wide econometric study of the economic 
performance of savings banks, their impact on competition and their role 
for regional economic growth and stability. Finally, the main results of the 
empirical analysis are reported in section 3.3. 
3.1  Review of the empirical literature 
a)  Performance of savings banks 
The economic literature has identified a number of hypotheses regarding 
the relationship between the likelihood of intervention by owners of capital 
and an organisation’s performance. For privately owned organisations, this 
relationship is expected to be strong and positive, since shareholder 
earnings are in line with the company’s performance. For publicly and 
semi-publicly owned organisations, however, such an alignment is weak or 
even non-existent. In many instances authorities have other priorities than 
maximising the net present value of a public entity. For example, the social 
value of an organisation’s output often takes precedence over its financial 
performance. Moreover, there is also the concern that officials may use the 
organisation to pursue their own agenda, further weakening the 
relationship.49  
The performance of savings banks in Europe has been scrutinised by 
a number of studies. Carbó Valverde et al. (2002) use a large panel of banks 
to examine the absolute cost efficiencies of European savings banks 
between the years 1989 and 1996. The authors find that doubling all 
outputs would give rise to a 90 to 93% rise in total costs, implying the 
existence of scale economies. Moreover, the same level of output could be 
produced with only 78% of inputs, indicating the existence of inefficiencies 
of savings banks. These results suggest that savings banks can reduce their 
costs by managing their inputs better and by increasing their scale. 
However, this does not imply that these institutions perform worse than 
other banks and notably than privately-owned banks.50 
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A comparison of the performances of commercial banks, savings 
banks and cooperative banks is provided by Altunbaş et al. (2001). Using 
individual bank data on German banks between 1989 and 1996, the authors 
fail to identify any significant performance differences. If anything, 
cooperative and savings banks appear to have slight profit and cost 
advantages. In particular, savings banks appear more cost efficient since 
they seem to waste only 16% of their inputs, while commercial banks waste 
about 21%. Similar results are found for profit efficiencies.  
Altunbaş et al. (2003) undertook a similar study for a sample of banks 
in 15 European countries and in the US between the years 1990 and 2000. 
Their results show that savings and cooperative banks are more cost 
efficient than their commercial peers, except in Finland, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands. In contrast, commercial banks are closer to the best-
practice (alternative) profit function in all countries. Taken together, these 
results suggest that savings banks and cooperative banks are better at 
raising revenues but not at minimising costs.  
The studies surveyed so far have revealed that savings and 
cooperative banks are by no means less profitable than their commercial 
peers. It is possible that these results arise because of the advantages 
enjoyed by these banks. For example, one common argument is that the 
implicit or explicit state guarantees may have allowed these banks to have 
access to cheaper financing. This line of reasoning has been used repeatedly 
with reference to the case of Germany as a country that has a sizeable 
savings bank sector. Chakravarty & Williams (2006) use a simulation 
technique to find out whether this claim is correct. In their study, they first 
show that German commercial banks come last in terms of (alternative) 
profit efficiency, and they then demonstrate that the efficiency ranks of the 
different groups of banks would not change significantly if borrowing costs 
were equal for all banks.  
Crespi et al. (2004) take a more direct approach by comparing the 
internal control structures of Spanish banks operating under different 
ownership structures. Four control mechanisms are analysed, including 
changes in the board, removal of the chairman, CEO dismissal and 
mergers/acquisitions. Using data for commercial and savings banks 
operating in Spain from 1986 to 2000, the authors confirm that Spanish 
savings banks enjoy a higher return-on-assets (ROA) than other banks. 
However, the relationship between the removal of management and poor 
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instrument of governance for commercial banks. For these savings banks, 
economic performance is more likely to be corrected through mergers, 
which is seen as the explanatory factor behind the banks’ superior 
performance. 
b)  Impact on competition 
There is a reason for concern that the persistent ties that savings banks 
develop with their local customers may give competitive advantages to 
these banks. Sharpe (1990) argues that the inside information may indeed 
give a bank a certain degree of monopoly power in subsequent 
transactions, which can be transformed into gains for the bank by charging 
a non-competitive interest rate.  
Hempell (2002) empirically examines the competitive behaviour of 
German banks using a large panel data covering the years 1993 to 1998 by 
examining how responsive revenues are to changes in banks’ input prices, 
the so-called ‘H-statistic’ method developed by Panzar & Rosse (1987).51 
The author finds that the behaviour of commercial banks is closer to perfect 
competition than the behaviour of savings banks. Moreover, the results 
suggest that competition decreased over the six years for the German 
savings banks.  
Another approach is assessing the market power enjoyed by a bank 
by measuring the Lerner index for that bank, which measures the distance 
between prices and marginal cost. Using Spanish data during 1986-2002 
covering commercial and savings banks, Fernández de Guevara and 
Maudos (2006) find that savings banks have a greater market power than 
commercial banks.  
                                                      
51 Panzar & Rosse’s (1987) ‘H-statistic’ approach uses the fact that firms operating 
under perfect competition or in a contestable market (i.e. with zero profits) have no 
option but to translate input cost hikes into proportional increases in revenues by 
increasing output prices. If they increase their prices any less, they will make 
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c)  Small business lending and bank characteristics 
The relationship between a bank and its borrowers is particularly vital for 
smaller firms, since for them close personal ties between bank officials and 
borrowers can allow collecting and using significantly more information 
than in the case of firms with a more distributed organisational structure.52 
As banks grow and expand across borders, other objectives than satisfying 
the local borrower and other difficulties may emerge. A number of 
researchers have argued that larger banks are less capable of processing 
and transmitting the soft and relational information through their 
hierarchical structures.53 This would put local banks, such as savings banks, 
in a position to better respond to the needs of smaller local enterprises than 
larger and less regionally focused banks.  
Keeton (1995) uses cross-sectional data for 1994 from seven US states 
to compare the small business lending practices of different types of banks. 
The author finds that banks with a higher degree of interstate presence lend 
significantly less to small businesses than their peers. The same result is 
also obtained for banks that are held by out-of-state banks. These results 
confirm that small business lending has a local element.  
Using a larger sample of banks, Berger & Udell (1995) test the 
hypothesis that small business lending is inversely correlated with bank 
size. The results confirm that larger banks are less inclined to finance small 
businesses. Moreover, the large banks appear to distinguish between 
transparent and opaque borrowers, as evidenced by the less restrictive loan 
terms offered to the pool of borrowers that do get financing. 
Using survey data on the financing patterns of a large number of 
German small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), Harhoff & Körting 
(1998) empirically confirm the anecdotal evidence that many German 
businesses maintain lending relationships with a single bank.54 More 
importantly, loans in cities are more expensive and require more collateral 
than those in rural communities. The authors interpret these findings 
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supporting the idea that a competitive market may be incompatible with 
strong relational ties, as was first mentioned by Mayer (1988).  
Another issue that arises in the context of SME lending is whether 
small businesses receive fewer loans from foreign banks based at a 
considerable distance from the borrower’s location. Such a hypothesis 
seems plausible, given the arguments outlined above. Foreign banks are 
often very large organisations. The decision-makers in these banks often 
speak a different language and are subject to different regulations than 
those applicable in the local environment surrounding the small business 
clients. This is a particularly important issue amidst the current wave of 
cross-border consolidations. Berger, Klapper & Udell (2001) investigate it 
using Argentinean cross-sectional data from the end of 1998. The data have 
been provided by the central bank’s credit registry, and they include 
detailed information on loan characteristics. The authors find that the 
foreign-owned banks lend less to small businesses, particularly if the 
banks’ headquarters is located in a far-away country and if the businesses 
are opaque.  
d)  Contribution to the local and domestic economy 
Those who support the development view of non-commercial banks argue 
that such institutions contributed to regional economic growth by 
providing financial services in regions where private institutions are 
missing.55 Indeed, there is evidence that savings banks have played an 
important role in the development of under-privileged regions. To uncover 
this relationship, Guiso et al. (2004) construct an index of financial 
development in different Italian regions and show that the historical 
presence of savings banks had a positive impact on the long-term regional 
development.  
The literature has identified a number of channels through which the 
availability of local banks has contributed to regional growth. Hakenes & 
Schnabel (2006) argue that by investing in their local economies, these 
banks effectively prevent a ‘capital drain’ to other regions. Most 
importantly, the authors show that to become credible alternatives to 
private banks in local markets, the regional banks should either be 
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subsidised by tax-financed public guarantees, as in the case of savings 
banks, or operate as cooperative banks, engaging exclusively with their 
members. More recently, Hakenes, Schmidt & Xie (2009) use regional 
economic data for Germany to show that the presence of savings banks has 
a positive impact on regional economic growth, through SME lending and 
that this effect is significantly stronger in poorer regions. 
A parallel argument can be used that also supports the use of 
regional restrictions on banking activities, such as the ‘regional principle’ in 
Germany. If these restrictions do not exist, larger banks can put smaller 
local banks out of business, effectively restricting the number of institutions 
active in the region. In addition to competition problems due to increased 
market power, the disappearance of local banks will also reduce the 
availability of relational information on lenders, thereby leading to 
economic welfare losses and reducing the availability of credit.56  
Large commercial banks also engage in activities that may enable 
them to shift taxable resources away from the host country or needy 
regions. In particular, profit-shifting activities enable banks to reduce their 
tax obligations by allocating income to group entities located in favourable 
regimes. Using a large sample of commercial bank accounting observations 
from 80 countries during the years 1988 to 1995, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Huizinga (2001) confirm that banks with foreign subsidiaries face a 
significantly lower tax bill than their comparable domestic peers.  
e)  Earnings stability of savings banks 
The development of literature on the stability of banks with different 
ownership structures is relatively recent. Using a large cross-sectional 
dataset covering over 60 countries for the year of 1997, Barth et al. (1999) 
find that the banking crises are more common in markets with prevalent 
public ownership. In an attempt to explain this finding, Goodhart (2004) 
suggests that the finding may be due to the inherent advantages granted to 
p u b l i c  o r  s e m i  p u b l i c  b a n k s ,  w h i c h may reduce interest margins in 
traditional banking and push private sector banks to engage in more risky 
activities.  
Three recent studies have addressed the alleged relationship between 
bank ownership and stability more systematically. Cihák & Hesse (2007) 
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compare the stability of cooperative and commercial banks by using a 
panel of a large number of individual banks, covering 29 major advanced 
economies over the period of 1994 to 2004. The authors use a well-known 
indicator of bank risk, the so-called ‘z-score’, to measure solvency risks as a 
function of a bank’s income generating capacity.57 Cooperative and savings 
banks are more – not less – stable than their commercial counterparts. As a 
possible explanation of this latter finding, the authors argue that the 
customer-oriented strategies of these banks may allow them to better 
absorb profitability shocks and smooth their returns over time.  
Garcia-Marco & Robles-Fernandez (2008) examine whether 
ownership structure plays a role in the risk-taking of Spanish financial 
institutions. Using a sample that covers over one hundred institutions over 
the 1993 to 2000 period, the authors perform a comparative analysis of 
savings and commercial banks. In addition to the z-score, the authors also 
base their results on an alternative measure of risk, the ‘solvency margin’, 
measuring the bank’s exposure to losses. The results are in line with Cihák 
& Hesse’s (2007) findings; commercial banks are more risk prone.  
More recently, Beck et al. (2009) examine the stability of German 
banks under different ownership structures. The authors’ results confirm 
that savings banks have higher z-scores than commercial banks, almost 
entirely due to the lower volatility of their profits over years. Two 
additional measures of stability, comprised of the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans and the likelihood of distress,58 are also reported. 
Savings banks score better than their peers in terms of these two indicators, 
having a smaller share of loans as non-performing and facing a 
significantly lower likelihood of distress. Perhaps more intriguingly, while 
the authors confirm that larger commercial banks are less stable, possibly 
due to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem, the opposite holds for savings banks. 
                                                      
57 The z-score measure was developed by Hannan & Hanweck (1988) and Boyd & 
Runkle (1993). 
58 The distress measure indicates “whether a bank has i) faced compulsory 
notifications about events that may jeopardise the existence of the bank as a going 
concern ii) suffered severe losses of capital and extreme declines in return on 
equity, iii) benefited from capital injections from the deposit insurance scheme, iv) 
been subject to a distress merger, or v) been closed by the bank supervisory 
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Indeed, larger savings banks are found to be more stable, possibly due to 
their increased ability to smoothen their profit streams, giving them an 
additional boost in terms of stability.  
To summarise, the studies reviewed in this section find that savings 
banks do not necessarily perform worse than their commercial peers. At the 
same time, owing to their small size and local nature, these banks provide 
financing to smaller businesses, particularly in economically less developed 
regions. Moreover, recent studies have revealed that their returns are less 
volatile. In short, despite questions regarding their governance structures, 
the performance of savings banks is comparable with their commercial 
peers while fulfilling an important role in development and contributing to 
the stability of the financial system.  
The next section delves deeper into the comparative analysis of 
performance, competition, contribution to growth and earnings stability in 
the five countries included in this study covering the years between 1996 
and 2006.  
3.2  Investigating profitability, efficiency, competition, growth 
and stability  
The objective of the empirical investigation presented in this section is to 
examine profitability, efficiency, competition, earning stability and role on 
regional growth of savings banks in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and 
Spain during 1996-2006 and for three sub-periods, 1996-1999, 1999-2003 and 
2004-2006 while comparing with their commercial peers.  
The empirical analysis relies on two data sources. The primary source 
is the Bankscope database, provided by Bureau van Dijk. Only consolidated 
information on the balance sheets and income statements of commercial 
banks and savings banks is included in the study. The coverage of savings 
banks in Belgium and Italy includes banks which are either joint-stock 
corporations (Italy) or small banks that are indistinguishable from their 
commercial peers (Belgium). To facilitate comparison, benchmark figures 
for EU-15 countries are also provided whenever applicable.  
The distribution of the sample information across countries and 
between savings and commercial banks is given in Table 3.1. The empirical 
analysis also benefits from several economic and demographic indicators 
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Table 3.1 Primary sample. Number of observations by type of institution 
(1996-2006) 
 All  Banks  Commercial  Banks Savings  Banks 
Austria 1116  521  595 
Belgium 1283  842  441 
Spain 1584 783  801 
Italy  1985 602 1383 
Germany 6392  2099  4293 
EU-15 19139 8104 11035 
 
A secondary dataset is employed to undertake a more detailed case 
study of Germany, Spain and Austria. The database used for this study 
includes unconsolidated balance sheet and income statement information 
provided by the savings banks associations of the three countries. In 
addition, it also contains information on the territorial distribution of 
savings banks in these countries, their delivery channels (branches, ATMs), 
and employees.  
The empirical analysis follows four steps:  
First, the primary database is used to compute banks performance 
using accounting ratios and efficiency indicators based on more 
sophisticated econometric models for the five countries and for EU-15 as a 
whole when possible.  
Second, efficiency and competition indicators are computed and used 
to undertake an examination of the determinants of competition controlling 
for a number of explanatory variables including bank size, market 
capitalisation, entry, contestability and institutional diversity. Separate 
estimations are made to allow a comparison between savings banks and 
commercial banks.  
Third, the determinants of regional growth in Austria, Germany, and 
Spain are examined, paying close attention to the role of savings banks.  
Fourth, z-scores are computed and used to undertake an examination 
of the earnings stability of savings and commercial banks.  
The following subsections provide details on the estimation 
methodology. The results of the empirical analysis are presented in the 
following section.  56 | BANKING PERFORMANCE & CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL GROWTH & STABILITY 
 
a)  Measuring bank financial and economic performance 
In the first step, a number of accounting ratios are used to measure the 
economic and financial performance of banks. Two commonly used 
profitability measures, return on assets (RoA) and return on equity (RoE), 
are calculated by dividing pre-tax profits of each bank by total assets and 
equity, respectively. As a measure of the economic efficiency of a bank, the 
cost-to-income ratio is used, which is calculated by dividing the total 
operating costs by total operating income.  
The calculation of the second efficiency indicator, the X-efficiency 
score, requires the estimation of the best-practice cost frontier. Once this 
frontier is estimated, the score is calculated as the distance between the 
costs of a given bank and the costs of the bank with the best practice when 
both banks produce the same output and operate under the same 
environmental conditions. This efficiency score measures the quality of a 
bank’s cost management. The rest of the section details the derivation of the 
X-efficiency score.  
The estimation of the best practice frontier follows the stochastic 
frontier approach originally proposed by Aigner et al. (1977). In this model, 
the stochastic cost frontier has the general log form,  ε + ⋅ = ) ( ln f c , where c 
represents a measure of costs,  ) (⋅ f  is a functional form that accounts for 
the relationship between inputs and expenses and ε is an error term. The 
error term is assumed to be composed of two components,  u v+ = ε . The 
first component (v) captures the random variation of the frontier across 
firms, assumed to be normally distributed around zero with standard 
deviation σ. The second error component (u) captures the X-inefficiency, or 
the incremental costs incurred by the bank costs relative to the best practice 
frontier. This second error term is assumed to be distributed as half-normal 
with standard deviation λσ, truncated below from zero. Therefore, the 
greater the value of ui is, the further away bank i is from the best practice 
frontier.  
If both components are distributed independently, the frontier can be 
estimated with maximum likelihood procedures. Individual inefficiency 
estimates can be calculated by using the distribution of the inefficiency 
term conditional on the estimation of the composed error term. The 
inefficiency estimate for bank i is equivalent to the following conditional 
distribution, INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 57 
 
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
− Φ
⋅
+
=
σ
λ ε
σ λ ε
σ λ ε φ
λ
λσ
ε
i
i
i
i i u E
) / (
) / (
1
] | [ 2 , (1) 
where ) (⋅ φ and  ) (⋅ Φ   represent the standard normal density and 
cumulative distribution functions, respectively. The X-efficiency measure is 
then defined as  
] | [ 1 i i i u E XEFF ε − = . (1’) 
The efficiency index (XEFF) in equation (1’) is interpreted as the share 
of total costs needed to produce a given amount of output if bank i were to 
operate on the best practice frontier. The closer this value is to 1, the more 
cost efficient is the bank.  
The estimation exercise follows the translog frontier cost function 
treatment already used in Altunbaş et al. (2001), Carbó Valverde et al. 
(2002) and Chakravarty & Williams (2006). In this approach a bank’s costs 
(c) are assumed to be a function of its two outputs, i.e. loans and deposits, 
and the input prices, i.e. the prices of capital and labour. A time trend 
variable is included to account for changes in efficiency that may be due to 
technological improvements over time. The cost equation to be estimated is 
defined as follows: 
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where  
i  =  bank index; 
t  =  year; 
ln c =   natural logarithm of total operating costs 
ln w1 =   natural logarithm of price of labour, measured by 
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ln w2 =   natural logarithm of price of capital, measured by total 
depreciation and other capital expenses / total assets; 
ln D  =  natural logarithm of deposits; 
ln L =   natural logarithm of loans; and 
Trend  =  time trend. 
 
In order to obtain a measure of competition, which will be discussed 
in the next section, it is also necessary to get an estimation of the marginal 
costs – i.e. changes in costs arising from incremental increases in output – 
faced by each bank. Using equation (2), marginal costs can be written as: 
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Lastly, the cross-country comparisons envisioned in the study require 
the estimation of a common cost efficiency frontier for all banks in the 
sample. However, a robust cross-country analysis of bank efficiency 
requires controlling for heterogeneity in environmental conditions which 
are beyond the responsibility/influence of bank management. The 
environmental variables are GDP per capita at constant prices, population 
density (inhabitants per square kilometre) and bank branches per capita in 
each national market. In addition, country-level dummy variables are 
introduced to control for the influence of other country-specific issues, such 
as regulatory and institutional factors. 
b)  Measuring competition and market power 
To assess competition, the Lerner Index is used to measure the 
market power of banks. The indicator is calculated by taking the difference 
between price and marginal costs and t h e n  d i v i d i n g  i t  b y  p r i c e .  U n d e r  
standard assumptions, prices converge to marginal costs, as competition in 
a market increases, implying that the index would converge to zero. 
Therefore, the greater the index is, the greater is a given bank’s market 
power.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 59 
 
The index is a good indicator of the competitive conditions in a 
market. The following equation, obtained as a solution for symmetric 
oligopolistic competition, highlights this relationship: 
) (
1
p NE p
mc p
LERN
d
=
−
≡  (4) 
where p is the price of a bank’s earning assets (measured by total 
interest and non-interest revenues/total assets), mc is the marginal cost 
(calculated in the previous step), Ed  is the absolute value of the price 
elasticity of demand and N is the number of competitors in the territory 
where the bank operates. According to equation (4), firms can enjoy a 
greater market power when the elasticity of demand is low, i.e. when the 
bank’s services are a necessity for consumers, or when the number of 
competitors is low. In either case, a bank can get away with charging a non-
competitive price, that is, one that significantly exceeds the marginal costs 
for a given financial service.  
c)  Determinants of competition  
The objective for the second empirical step is to identify the determinants 
of competition, paying close attention to differences between savings and 
commercial banks. The relationship to be estimated is as follows: 
it i it it X LERN ε μ θ + + = '  (5) 
where X is a vector of explanatory factors, μ accounts for bank-level 
fixed effects and θ is the vector of coefficients to be estimated.  
For each country, two separate estimations are undertaken, one for 
‘all banks’ (commercial and savings banks) and one only for savings banks, 
in order to highlight statistical differences in the competitive behaviour of 
savings banks. Equation (5) is fitted using panel estimation with fixed-
effects routine. 
The explanatory variables (X)  included in the estimation are 
identified as follows:  
a.  Concentration, size, efficiency and capitalisation: The first set of 
explanatory variables includes a measure of market concentration, 
bank’s size (logarithm of total assets), cost-efficiency (i.e. the X-
efficiency score), and market capitalisation (ratio of the bank’s total 
capital and reserves to total liabilities). Concentration is measured by 60 | BANKING PERFORMANCE & CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL GROWTH & STABILITY 
 
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) for bank deposits, which is 
the sum of the squared market share of the firms in a given market.59  
b.  Contestability and barriers to entry: Contestability captures the 
extent to which competition may increase with the entry of new 
competitors to the market. The set of variables includes a measure of 
branch opening (growth in number of bank branches), an indicator of 
the distribution of branches (ratio of inhabitants to number of 
branches) and an industry-wide variable to account for foreign entry 
(ratio of foreign competitors to total banks in country).  
c.  Other control variables: Differences in bank ownership are 
controlled by including a dummy variable that takes the value 0 for 
commercial banks and 1 for savings banks. The influence of the 
business-cycle is controlled by including GDP growth for each 
observation year. Lastly, the magnitude of retail banking in each 
country is controlled by including the logarithm of total deposits in 
the market. 
d)  Savings banks and regional growth 
The third empirical step assesses the impact of institutional diversity on 
economic growth. Two general assumptions are made for this purpose. 
First, the analysis is conducted on a regional basis to accurately capture the 
contribution of local institutions. The locations are based on the 
administrative regional distribution of savings banks in Austria, Germany 
and Spain. Second, institutional diversity is defined as the ratio of savings 
banks’ assets to total bank assets in a given region. It is assumed that this 
measure adequately incorporates the relative importance of alternative 
ownership models.  
The data on bank-level indicators are obtained from the respective 
savings banks association database while the regional economic and 
demographic indicators are obtained from Eurostat. The use of dynamic 
panel data techniques is particularly appropriate within this framework to 
capture persistent unobservable heterogeneity across regions. As in Carbó 
Valverde et al. (2003), we use the Generalised-Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator for dynamic panel data, first introduced by Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988) and Arellano & Bover (1995). The dynamic panel procedure is 
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employed since the lagged GDP values may partially explain the 
subsequent behaviour of some of the variables over time (Sala-i-Martin, 
2002).  
We consider the following regression equation: 
t i i t i t i t i t i X y y y , , 1 , 1 , , ' ) 1 ( ε η β α + + + − = − − −  (6) 
where y is GDP, X is a set of explanatory variables representing both 
the general determinants of growth in most empirical models (Sala-i-
Martin, 2002) and banking sector developments, ηi  is an unobserved 
regional-specific effect, ε is the error term, and the subscripts i and t 
represent region and time period, respectively.60 As general determinants 
of economic growth, initial (lagged) GDP, level of schooling (measured by 
the share of population with a university degree), capital stock, percentage 
of urban population and inflation (derived from the cost-of-living index) 
are considered. As for the regional banking sector variables, the ratio of 
lending to private sector to GDP, the growth of bank branches, the 
institutional diversity indicator (as described above), the Lerner Index and 
the ratio of the number of ATMs to branches (showing technical change in 
delivery channels) are also included.  
Equation (6) can be rewritten as:  
t i i t i t i t i X y y , , , , ε η β α + + ′ + =
 (7) 
The (time-invariant) region-specific effects (ηi ) can be eliminated by 
taking first-differences in equation (7) so that: 
) ( ) ( ) ( 1 , , 1 , , 2 , 1 , 1 , , − − − − − − + − ′ + − = − t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i X X y y y y ε ε β α
   (8) 
The use of appropriate instruments is necessary to deal with the 
likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The instruments for the 
regression in differences are the lagged values of the explanatory variables. 
The instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the 
corresponding variables. All regressions include time dummies.  
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may differ over different time periods and between different regions, particularly 
in the case in Germany and Spain.   62 | BANKING PERFORMANCE & CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL GROWTH & STABILITY 
 
e)  Measuring savings banks’ earnings stability 
The fourth step of our empirical investigation is to analyse the stability of 
savings banks versus commercial banks. Following Cihák & Hesse (2007), 
z-scores are used as a measure of individual bank risk. They are computed 
for Austria, Germany and Spain in order to highlight the impact of 
different ownership structures in a consistent manner where differences 
between savings banks and commercial banks exist in this respect.  
The index (Z) is calculated for each bank-year observation according 
to the following equation: 
RoA
i
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it
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μ +
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 (9) 
where E/A is the equity capital as a share of assets and μRoA and σRoA 
are the mean and standard deviation of pre-tax return on assets (RoA), 
respectively. The index measures a corporation’s capacity to absorb 
deviations in income. More specifically, the z-score shows how many 
standard deviations from the mean income have to fall to make the 
corporation insolvent by depleting its equity. The greater the value, the 
lower is the probability of default.  
f)  Determinants of savings banks’ earnings stability 
A number of exogenous variables are used to examine the determinants of 
bank risk. First, a dummy variable is used to identify the earnings stability 
of savings banks. Bank size is measured by total assets. Large banks benefit 
from diversification opportunities, which may allow them to better absorb 
shocks. Conversely, large banks could also be more risk-prone due to the 
implicit deposit insurance guarantees they enjoy. In order to distinguish 
between the stability of banks with different ownership structures and 
different sizes, an interaction variable for the size of savings banks is also 
included. 
Other explanatory variables are also incorporated to control for bank-
specific factors and market conditions. The cost-to-income ratio is included 
to account for differences in efficiency between banks. A dummy variable 
for listed institutions is included in order to control for governance issues 
relating to commercial banks. In general, better governed and more 
efficient banks should be able to absorb shocks better, implying a higher z-INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 63 
 
score. However, it is also possible that these effects will be less important 
once other individual characteristics are accounted for.  
Market concentration, which also serves as an indicator of sector-
wide competition, will be measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). There are different and partially compensating effects that 
concentration can have on the risks taken by a bank.61  
Lastly, in order to control the impact of external imbalances and the 
ease with which capital can flow in and out of the country, an indicator 
developed by Chinn & Ito (2008) on financial openness will also be 
included in the estimation exercise. It is expected that more open markets 
will also be more volatile and open to external shocks due to the speed with 
which capital flows can enter and leave the country. Although this variable 
is not directly related to savings banks, it is nevertheless included to control 
for the differing levels of current and financial account imbalances. 
The equation to be estimated is given as follows: 
it it i i it it it u X S S A A Z + + + × + + = ' ) (ln ln 3 2 1 θ β β β α  (10) 
where 
i  =  Bank index; 
t  =  year; 
Z =  z-score as described in equation (9) 
ln A =   natural logarithm of total assets; 
S =  dummy indicator for savings banks; 
ln A × S  =  interactive variable for size of savings banks; 
X =  other explanatory variables, including cost-to-income 
ratio, listed institutions dummy variable, HHI, and 
financial openness index. 
                                                      
61 The current literature provides little guidance on the net impact of concentration 
on a bank’s earning stability. The ‘trade-off’ view, recently advocated by Allen & 
Gale (2004) and empirically supported by Beck et al. (2006), claiming that despite 
the efficiency gains, less concentrated and more competitive markets exacerbate 
agency problems and thereby lead to instability. Boyd & de Nicolo (2005), 
however, counter this argument by noting that the supra-normal loan rates that 
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In order to ensure that the results are robust to procedural choice, 
each estimation stage is composed of a pooled OLS regression and a fixed-
effect panel regression, which accounts for unspecified individual effects.  
3.3  Main results 
a)  Profitability, efficiency, competition and earnings stability: 
commercial vs. savings banks 
This section reports the comparison of profitability, efficiency, market 
power and earning stability for commercial and savings banks in Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain during the period between 1996 and 
2006. 
Regarding various profitability measures, Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 
depict the evolution of the return on assets (RoA). Profitability has declined 
in all the five countries over time, which seems to be mainly due to 
increasing competitive pressures resulting from liberalisation and financial 
integration. The RoA values are particularly low in Germany and relatively 
high in Spain. No statistical differences exist between savings and 
commercial banks at the 1% level of significance. However, in Italy and 
Germany, commercial banks score higher on profitability measures at the 
5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. While the RoA measures 
point at these minor differences, there are no observable differences in 
terms of the return on equity (RoE) of different types of banks (see Table 3.3 
and Figure 3.2).  
In terms of cost-to-income ratios (see Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3), the 
banks in the five countries appear to do no worse than the EU-15 averages. 
Even Italian banks, whose operating costs were elevated over the 1996 to 
1999 period, have rationalised their structures over the years. While 
Spanish banks have consistently remained above average over the years. In 
comparison, the savings banks are once again to a large extent 
indistinguishable from commercial banks. The only exception is Austria, 
where savings banks have higher cost-to-income ratios at 10% significance 
level.  
The estimated X-efficiency scores are shown in Table 3.5 and Figure 
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dispersed evenly around 85%, which is in line with earlier studies.62 For the 
EU-15 region as a whole, the measures for the years 1996 to 2006 average at 
85.7% and exhibit a consistent improvement over the years. This score 
means that there is a potential 14.3% improvement in cost efficiency for the 
average EU-15 bank relative to the benchmark of best practice. Among the 
five countries, the Belgian and Spanish banks have the highest scores while 
the Austrian banks come last. More importantly, the results indicate that 
the cost efficiencies of commercial and savings banks are highly 
comparable. According to mean-difference tests, there are no significant 
differences between savings and commercial banks at the 5% level in any of 
the countries with the only exception of Italy.63 This suggests that savings 
banks are at least as efficient as commercial banks, a result that stands out 
in a marked contrast to widely held beliefs to the effect that savings banks 
are less efficient than commercial banks. 
Turning to the competition measures, Table 3.6 gives the Lerner 
Index estimates. The average Lerner Index for the EU-15 is 27.4%. Again, 
differences between commercial and savings banks are not found to be 
significant, except in the case of Italy where savings banks exhibit a 
statistically significantly higher market power. However, this is not a 
specific feature of savings banks since all commercial and savings banks in 
Italy show the higher level of market power within the countries analysed. 
In Germany and Spain, where regional competition is particularly strong, 
there is virtually no difference between the market powers of the two types 
of banks.  
As for the evolution of market power, the results in Table 3.6 show 
that the Lerner Index has increased from 1996 to 2003 and decreased from 
2003 to 2006 in all countries.64 Interestingly, these studies have also shown 
                                                      
62 The result is consistent with Altunbaş et al. (2001), Carbó Valverde et al. (2002) 
and Carbó Valverde et al. (2007).  
63 Importantly, in most of the countries, any statistical difference between savings 
and commercial banks vanishes when the environmental conditions in the 
efficiency estimation are considered. 
64 These findings are to the most part in line with earlier studies. Maudos & 
Fernandez de Guevara (2004) show that the Lerner Indices for banks in France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK have been inching upwards between 1996 and 
2000. Using a larger sample, Carbó Valverde & Rodriguez (2007a) confirm that the 
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that the most competitive activities have been deposit-taking and lending – 
in which savings banks are specialised – while other non-interest income 
(fee- and commission-based) activities are the main source of market power 
in European banking.  
The comparative examination of the earnings stability of different 
types of banks is given in Table 3.7 and Figure 3.6.65 The weighted averages 
in Figure 3.6 show that Spanish savings banks score remarkably higher 
than their commercial peers. These differences are smaller for banks in 
Austria and Germany.66  
To sum up, the results above highlight that there are no clearly visible 
differences between savings and commercial banks in terms of profitability, 
efficiency, competition and earnings stability in the five countries between 
the years 1996 and 2006. In Italy, the savings banks score slightly worse 
than commercial banks in three of the relevant measures. This is all the 
more intriguing given the fact that these banks have operated as joint-stock 
corporations since early 1990s and are therefore now indistinguishable 
                                                                                                                                       
indices for the old member states (EU-15) and the entire union (EU-27) have been 
increasing, although at a much slower speed following 2001 until 2005. 
65 Some banks have missing data for certain years while others have shifted their 
accounting practices during the years 1996-2006. In order to reduce biases resulting 
from fewer observations, the numbers reported in the figure are weighted 
according to assets and number of years with observed data. Also, in order to 
eliminate outliers, bank-year observations within the 1st and 99th percentiles of z-
score distribution are removed from sample.  
66 Table 3.7 also provides the outcomes of the difference in means tests. The last 
column of the table reports the p-values that correspond to the alternative 
hypothesis that the z-score means for commercial and savings banks differ. The 
results show that the z-scores for savings and commercial banks differ in Germany 
and Spain. In particular, Spanish savings banks score more than 50 standard 
deviations higher in the stability tests. In turn, the German savings banks score an 
arithmetic average of at least 10 standard deviations lower than their commercial 
peers in terms of stability. It is possible that the differences highlighted above 
would be smaller once other factors contributing to volatility were accounted for. 
There appears to be no distinction between the z-scores of Austrian savings and 
commercial banks. Additional tests (not reported here) show that the qualitative 
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from their commercial peers in terms of their legal and regulatory status.67 
In turn, the smaller savings banks in Belgium appear to have aligned 
themselves with their commercial peers over the years, with no significant 
differences in any one of the measures considered in the study.  
Turning to countries with an active savings bank sector, Austrian 
savings banks score slightly worse in terms of the cost efficiency, market 
power and cost-to-income ratios. However, the two types of banks are 
indistinguishable in terms of the two profitability indicators (RoA and RoE) 
as well as the stability of earnings. Spanish commercial banks appear to 
have a small edge in terms of cost efficiency and profitability (only in RoA). 
However, the earnings of Spanish savings banks are considerably more 
stable than those of their commercial peers. Lastly, German savings banks 
score slightly worse in terms of profitability and earnings stability but they 
are virtually identical to their commercial peers in all other measures.  
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Table 3.2 Profitability (return on assets): Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
  EU-15 
Austria 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Austria 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Savings 
Banks) 
1996-1999  0.62  0.79  0.77  0.89 0.84 0.45 0.41  0.96  0.85  1.18  1.06 
2000-2003  0.68  0.75  0.72  0.84 0.80 0.40 0.37  0.92  0.88  0.98  0.94 
2004-2006  0.79  0.68  0.66  0.72 0.70 0.34 0.30  0.89  0.86  1.02  0.99 
1996-2006  0.69  0.64  0.68  0.83 0.85 0.41 0.37  0.93  0.87  1.03  1.00 
Differences in means 
commercial and 
savings banks 
(p-values) 
 0.321  0.369  0.076  0.032  0.099 
Figure 3.1 Profitability (return on assets): Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
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Table 3.3 Profitability (return on equity). Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
  EU-15 
Austria 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Austria 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Savings 
Banks) 
1996-1999  11.16  13.87  13.33  15.01 14.81 14.86 14.95  14.38  14.16  15.96  15.40 
2000-2003  13.73  12.39  12.18  14.38 14.02 13.02 13.58  13.44  13.27  14.38  13.59 
2004-2006  14.52  11.61  11.50  13.91 13.63 12.17 12.61  12.75  12.48  13.52  12.88 
1996-2006  13.98  12.53  12.11  14.26 14.18 13.01 13.41  13.37  13.16  14.18  13.41 
Differences in 
means commercial 
and savings banks 
(p-values) 
 0.583  0.444  0.393  0.781  0.256 
Figure 3.2 Profitability (return on equity): Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
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Table 3.4 Cost-to-income ratios: Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
  EU-15 
Austria 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Austria 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Savings 
Banks) 
1996-1999  66.92  59.36  62.16  59.97 60.16 64.48 65.63  67.39  67.85  58.19  56.36 
2000-2003  60.18  54.32  59.03  57.13 59.15 60.19 61.08  60.18  60.32  53.23  54.02 
2004-2006  56.20  51.06  54.91  54.93 56.26 56.02 56.53  58.51  58.93  48.27  49.03 
1996-2006  60.97  54.33  58.42  56.27 57.63 58.11 59.25  60.02  60.34  51.06  52.70 
Differences in 
means commercial 
and savings banks 
(p-values) 
 0.063  0.393  0.148  0.627  0.112 
Figure 3.3 Cost-to-income ratios: Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
A l lC BS BC BS BC BS BC BS BC BS B
EU - 1 5 Austria Belgium Germany Italy  Spain
1 996-1 999 2000-2003  2004-2006 1 996-2006 
 INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 71 
 
Table 3.5 Cost efficiency (x-efficiency) scores: Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
  EU-15 
Austria 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Austria 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Savings 
Banks) 
1996-1999  84.1  85.1  82.3  88.2 87.9 83.3 84.4  87.7  84.2  87.8  87.0 
2000-2003  85.2  82.3  83.3  86.3 85.8 86.4 85.9  86.6  83.8  88.2  87.4 
2004-2006  89.3  83.7  83.1  87.7 86.7 84.3 83.9  85.2  84.1  87.6  87.0 
1996-2006  85.7  83.4  82.9  87.5  87.0  85.1  84.6  86.7  84.0  87.9  87.2 
Differences in 
means commercial 
and savings banks 
(p-values) 
 0.089  0.116  0.125  0.042  0.089 
Figure 3.4 Cost efficiency (x-efficiency) scores: Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
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Table 3.6 Market power indicators (Lerner Index): Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
  EU-15 
Austria 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Austria 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Com. 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Savings 
Banks) 
1996-1999  29.8  22.2  24.2  31.6 30.3 30.4 32.7  39.3  32.2  27.8  28.9 
2000-2003  30.4  24.1  29.5  42.2 43.2 41.7 43.2  47.5  44.6  26.9  27.7 
2004-2006  24.1  24.4  24.6  29.7 29.2 31.9 28.8  29.8  36.6  22.4  23.2 
1996-2006  27.4  23.2  25.7  33.8  33.1  33.2  33.8  34.6  38.1  25.1  25.5 
Differences in 
means commercial 
and savings banks 
(p-values) 
 0.046  0.126  0.221  0.039  0.229 
Figure 3.5 Market power indicators (Lerner Index): Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006), in percentage points 
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Table 3.7 Comparison of z-scores: Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006) 
  
Commercial banks 
unweighted avg. 
(weighted avg.) 
Savings banks 
unweighted avg. 
(weighted avg.) 
Diff. in means test 
for unweighted 
avg. (p-value) 
Austria 
34.1  
(34.1) 
37.3 
(38.0) 
0.113 
Germany 
33.8 
(28.0) 
22.3 
(25.1) 
0.000 
Spain 
44.8 
(38.4) 
98.4 
(110.9) 
0.000 
Note: The figures in parentheses are weighted according to assets and number of 
observation years.  
Figure 3.6 Weighted z-score averages: Commercial vs. savings banks (1996-2006) 
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Note: The numbers in the figure are weighted according to assets and number of years with 
observed data.  
b)  Determinants of competition  
The determinants of market power in the EU banking industry are shown 
in Table 3.8, which provides a comparison between different types of 
banks. As described above, the dependent variable – the Lerner Index – 
was estimated for each bank using the fixed effects panel data routines. 
When all banks are included in the estimation, a dummy variable, 
‘ownership structure’, is included to assess whether the market power 74 | BANKING PERFORMANCE & CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL GROWTH & STABILITY 
 
enjoyed by the savings banks is statistically different from that of 
commercial banks.  
To a large extent, the results are consistent across countries and types 
of banks. Bank concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
Index (HHI) for bank deposits, has no impact on market power, with the 
exception of a weak downward effect for German banks. Similarly, a bank’s 
size (total assets) has no impact on its market power, except for a weak and 
positive impact in Italy. However, efficiency is found to be negatively and 
significantly related to market power. In other words, the banks are unable 
to translate their efficiency gains into market gains and ultimately into 
prices.68 Similarly, higher capitalisation is also negatively and significantly 
related to market power and, in particular in Germany and Spain, showing 
that adequate risk management also helps improve bank competition in 
those countries.  
More importantly for our purposes, ownership structure does not 
have a significant influence, except for a weak pro-competitive impact in 
Germany. Despite this result, differences between savings banks and 
commercial banks also exist. In particular, the key measure of regional 
contestability, ‘branch opening’, reduces market power significantly 
especially for savings banks in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain. 
Similarly, a sparsely distributed branch structure has a significant negative 
impact in all countries with an active savings banks industry, i.e. Austria, 
Germany and Spain.69 While the entry of foreign players improves 
competition on average in EU-15 and in Belgium and, to a lesser extent, in 
Spain, no strong ties are found for the other three countries included in the 
sample.  
Importantly, contestability indicators appear to show that the 
development of savings banks in the different local and regional territories 
in the countries analysed has helped to foster competition in those 
countries to a significant extent.  
                                                      
68 One potential explanation is that the efficiency scores act as a proxy for the 
concomitant competitive pressures, which would have a downward impact on the 
market power. 
69 Wald tests (not included here) performed on the pair of coefficient estimates for 
each country show that the impact of branch growth and scarcity is stronger for 
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Table 3.8 Determinants of market power in the EU banking industry: All banks vs. savings banks (1996-2006) 
Panel data estimations with fixed effects 
  EU-15 
Austria 
(All 
Banks) 
Austria 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(All 
Banks) 
Belgium 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Germany 
(All 
Banks) 
Germany 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Italy 
(All 
Banks) 
Italy 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Spain 
(All 
Banks) 
Spain 
(Savings 
Banks) 
Concentration, size, efficiency 
& capitalisation                     
Concentration, HHI deposits 
-0.0048 
(-0.26) 
-0.0037 
(-0.19) 
-0.0044 
(-0.23) 
0.0221 
(0.18) 
0.0244 
(0.94) 
-0.0033* 
(-1.95) 
-0.0016 
(-1.42) 
0.0237 
(0.24) 
0.0162 
(0.21) 
-0.0056 
(-0.61) 
-0.0064 
(-0.78) 
Size, log(total assets) 
0.1947 
(1.38) 
0.1874 
(1.11) 
0.0971 
(1.34) 
0.1714 
(0.99) 
0.0551 
(0.37) 
0.0731 
(1.13) 
0.0897 
(1.05) 
0.0235* 
(1.99) 
0.0327 
(0.88) 
0.0751 
(1.14) 
0.0704 
(1.00) 
Cost efficiency, X-efficiency score 
-0.0652** 
(-3.98) 
-0.0725** 
(-3.21) 
-0.0990** 
(-3.58) 
-0.0688* 
(-2.19) 
-0.1977** 
(-6.11) 
-0.0708* 
(-1.98) 
-0.1358** 
(-4.56) 
-0.0392** 
(-2.98) 
-0.0299** 
(-6.89) 
-0.0421* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0921** 
(-1.94) 
Capitalisation, capital & 
reserves/total liabilities 
-0.0964** 
(-6.86) 
-0.0692* 
(-1.91) 
-0.0672** 
(-2.83) 
-0.0058 
(-0.47) 
-0.0011 
(-0.35) 
-0.0633** 
(-4.44) 
-0.0887** 
(-7.10) 
-0.0121 
(-0.53) 
-0.0141 
(-0.78) 
-0.0840** 
(-4.10) 
-0.1660** 
(-3.28) 
Contestability and barriers to entry                     
Branch opening, 
growth in bank branches 
-0.0913* 
(-2.14) 
-0.0844 
(-0.90) 
-0.0698** 
(-3.61) 
-0.0624 
(-1.07) 
-0.1406** 
(-2.82) 
-0.0477** 
(-2.71) 
-0.1454** 
(-5.25) 
-0.0211 
(-1.12) 
-0.0302 
(-0.63) 
-0.1195* 
(-2.25) 
-0.1645** 
(-6.41) 
Branch scarcity, 
inhabitants/branches 
0.0147* 
(2.16) 
0.0057* 
(1.96) 
0.0044** 
(2.82) 
0.0071** 
(3.71) 
0.0014** 
(2.74) 
0.0296** 
(4.04) 
0.0850** 
(3.01) 
0.0081* 
(1.94) 
0.0091* 
(2.12) 
0.0218 
(-1.01) 
0.0811** 
(3.85) 
Entry of foreign competitors, 
number of foreign banks/total banks 
-0.0048** 
(-2.81) 
-0.0022 
(-1.62) 
-0.0019 
(-1.41) 
-0.0017** 
(-4.33) 
-0.0060** 
(-3.15) 
-0.0030 
(-0.19) 
-0.0014 
(-0.17) 
-0.0012 
(-1.17) 
-0.0016 
(-1.02) 
-0.0121* 
(-1.92) 
-0.0074* 
(-1.97) 
Other control variables                     
Ownership structure, 
dummy var.for savings banks 
0.0667 
(0.34) 
0.0188 
(0.12) 
- 
-0.0041 
(0.45) 
- 
-0.0317* 
(2.14) 
- 
-0.0111 
(0.!0) 
- 
0.0417 
(0.71) 
- 
GDP growth 
-0.0008** 
(-4.22) 
-0.0021** 
(-6.72) 
-0.0018** 
(-5.51) 
-0.0018** 
(-6.63) 
-0.0014** 
(-2.83) 
-0.0011** 
(-3.37) 
-0.0010** 
(-3.75) 
-0.0011* 
(-2.25) 
-0.0008* 
(-2.11) 
-0.0016** 
(-2.92) 
-0.0014** 
(-2.73) 
Market size, log 
(total deposits in the market) 
-0.0626** 
(-4.91) 
-0.0970** 
(-2.69) 
-0.0741* 
(-2.11) 
-0.0311** 
(-2.97) 
-0.0414* 
(-2.06) 
-0.0011 
(-1.01) 
-0.0019* 
(-2.13) 
-0.0211** 
(-3.53) 
-0.0492* 
(-2.34) 
-0.0704** 
(-6.83) 
-0.0847** 
(-3.16) 
R2  0.92 0.89 0.90  0.84  0.88  0.88  0.91  0.81  0.79  0.91  0.93 
Notes: *, **: statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively; t-statistics in parentheses.  76 | BANKING PERFORMANCE & CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL GROWTH & STABILITY 
 
c)  Savings banks and regional growth 
The last empirical exercise presents evidence on how the presence of 
savings banks has helped spur a better channelling of financial resources, 
thereby increasing growth. Table 3.9 summarises the results of the dynamic 
panel fixed effects regressions on the determinants of economic growth in 
Austria, Germany and Spain. The standard explanatory factors in growth 
models are found to be significant and have the expected signs. In 
particular, level of schooling and capital stock are positively and 
significantly related to GDP growth. The percentage of urban population, 
which could be an indicator of development, has no influence on growth. 
Lagged GDP either is not significant or has weak significance. In turn, 
inflation has a negative impact on growth. The results are also robust to the 
inclusion or exclusion of institutional diversity indicators in Table 3.9, 
columns I and II for each country.70 
Turning to the banking sector variables, the lending specialisation 
variable (ratio of private sector loans to GDP) is shown to have a significant 
positive impact on regional economic growth. Its marginal effect is found 
to be among the largest in the model, with a coefficient of 0.074 for 
Germany and 0.069 for Spain. The growth of bank branches, which has 
been an area where Savings Banks have been particularly active, also 
enhances growth. In the Spanish case, the impact of for branch growth is 
found to be particularly strong, with a coefficient estimate of 0.086, 
followed by Austria (0.069) and Germany (0.032). 
The key finding in Table 3.8 relates to the institutional diversity 
indicator, which is the ratio of savings bank assets to total bank assets.  
The results in column II for each country show that markets with 
greater presence of savings banks also experience significantly greater 
growth rates. In particular, a 1% increase in the share of savings bank assets 
leads to 0.04% to 0.07% increase in growth rates in the three countries 
Austria, Germany and Spain. Additionally, the development of distribution 
                                                      
70 Sargan’s test for over-identifying restrictions does not reject the instruments used 
in Austria and Spain but points to minor problems in Germany at the 10% 
significance level. Nevertheless, all the equations pass the overall significance tests, 
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channels, which is measured by the number of ATMs per branch, also has a 
positive impact on regional GDP growth in Germany and Spain71  
Table 3.9 Banking sector development and regional GDP growth (1996-2005) 
Dynamic panel regressions, system estimators 
  AUSTRIA GERMANY  SPAIN 
  I II I II I II 
Initial GDP 
0.0284 
(1.31) 
0.0251 
(1.17) 
0.0325 
(1.81) 
0.0237* 
(1.93) 
0.0442* 
(2.16) 
0.0484 
(1.44) 
Level of schooling 
0.0584** 
(5.14) 
0.0591** 
(4.78) 
-0.0652 
(-0.39) 
0.0639** 
(3.33) 
0.0581** 
(2.83) 
0.0455** 
(3.27) 
Capital stock 
0.0628** 
(10.22) 
0.0694** 
(11.58) 
0.0977** 
(8.18) 
0.0624** 
(22.44) 
0.0747** 
(16.52) 
0.0648** 
(4.19) 
Percentage of urban 
population 
0.008 
(1.06) 
0.007 
(1.01) 
0.03855 
(1.33) 
0.0329 
(0.91) 
0.0014 
(1.61) 
0.016 
(0.79) 
Inflation 
-0.0633** 
(-3.92) 
-0.0685* 
(-2.32) 
-0.0538** 
(-3.90) 
-0.0321** 
(-4.40) 
-0.0495** 
(-5.24) 
-0.0302** 
(-5.78) 
Lending to private 
sector/GDP 
0.0770** 
(12.83) 
0.0796** 
(7.10) 
0.0663** 
(3.22) 
0.0739** 
(3.49) 
0.0744*** 
(-8.11) 
0.0694** 
(8.22) 
Growth of bank branches  0.0804** 
(6.19) 
0.0694** 
(4.74) 
0.0310** 
(5.21) 
0.0326** 
(4.80) 
0.0632** 
(3.30) 
0.0861** 
(3.91) 
Regional institutional 
diversity (savings banks 
assets/total bank assets) 
- 
0.0432** 
(9.19) 
- 
0.0552** 
(8.79) 
- 
0.0719** 
(6.27) 
Lerner index 
0.0118 
(0.92) 
0.0101 
(0.63) 
-0.0221 
(-0.40) 
-0.0822 
(-0.25) 
0.0451 
(0.41) 
0.0218 
(0.65) 
ATMs/branches  - - 
0.0633* 
(2.10) 
0.0504** 
(2.82) 
0.0631** 
(2.84) 
0.04511** 
(3.82) 
        
Sargan Test (p-value)  0.132 0.148 0.083 0.088 0.117 0.111 
F-test (p-value)  0.008 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.010 
        
Number of observations  560 4570 654 
Notes: *, ** statistically significant at 5% and 1% level, respectively; t-statistics (White heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors) in parentheses. 
d)  Determinants of earnings stability of banks 
For the results reported in this section, a close variant of the Bankscope 
dataset is used. In order to eliminate outliers, bank-year observations 
                                                      
71 The distribution channels variable was not available for Austria and, therefore, is 
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corresponding to the 1st and 99th percentiles of z-score distribution are 
removed from the sample. The results of the regressions that examine the 
determinants of earnings stability are given in Table 3.10.72 The odd 
numbered columns (columns I, III, V, and VII) correspond to ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions, which pool the data into a single sample by not 
distinguishing between observations corresponding to different time 
periods or countries. In turn, the even numbered columns (columns II, IV, 
VI, and VIII) take advantage of these differences and report the results of 
fixed effects (FE) panel regressions.73  
The results of the empirical exercise are as follows. The coefficient 
estimates for the country dummy variables in the first pooled regression 
(column I) show that the Austrian and German banks have less stable 
earnings than their Spanish counterparts.74 Moreover, listed institutions 
appear to be more stable in Germany and Spain, but less so in Austria. The 
coefficient estimate for financial openness index is negative and has a high 
level of significance in almost all regressions, except for the pooled OLS 
results for Spain (column VII), reinforcing the view that that more open 
systems could be more risk-prone.75 
                                                      
72 For each country, two separate procedures are followed to ensure that the results 
are robust. In the left-side column for each country reports the pooled OLS results. 
In order to control for the impact of shorter series, dummies that correspond to the 
number of reported years are also included in these regressions. In the second 
column, the results of fixed-effect (FE) panel regressions are reported. However, 
the use of this procedure means that a number of individual-specific time-invariant 
variables, i.e. the savings banks dummy, listed institutions, etc., are dropped since 
these effects are absorbed by the fixed intercept estimates.  
73 The panel regression procedures fully take into account of bank-specific effects. 
It is therefore not possible to include the time-invariant dummy variables saving 
bank, listed institution and the two country dummies.  
74 It is not possible to add an additional dummy for Spain due to perfect correlation 
with the other two country dummies.  
75 The significance of the result on financial openness should be tempered with the 
fact that the index varies between 2.0 and 2.5 for the country-year observations. In 
other words, the impact of moving from an open to a less open financial system 
would have a very modest impact (a drop of 1.5 to 7 standard deviations for the 
corresponding z-scores) for the countries in the sample. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 79 
 
Table 3.10 Determinants of stability (z-scores): Commercial and savings banks in Austria, Germany and Spain (1996-2006) 
  ALL   AUSTRIA  GERMANY  SPAIN 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
-7.044  -4.189 -13.485 -9.425  -3.190 -4.053  -10.012  11.541  Financial openness index 
(0.034)** (0.000)*** (0.032)** (0.000)*** (0.071)* (0.000)*** (0.569) (0.000)*** 
191.259 288.369 494.855 247.423 -13.886 648.320 335.358 138.789  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI)  (0.152)  (0.000)*** (0.027)** (0.000)***  (0.936) (0.000)*** (0.082)*  (0.000)*** 
0.070 0.029 -9.251  -1.254 0.327 0.062  -20.178  -1.037  Cost-to-income ratio 
(0.879) (0.71)  (0.005)***  (0.011)**  (0.001)*** (0.442) (0.002)*** (0.324) 
-0.771 -12.909 1.312  -8.401  -0.333 -15.370 -4.136  -8.528  log(Asset) 
(0.189) (0.000)*** (0.171) (0.000)***  (0.66)  (0.000)*** (0.015)** (0.000)*** 
6.050 12.488 -1.824 6.885  1.871 12.114  15.190 2.632  log(Asset) × Savings bank 
(0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.141) (0.000)***  (0.019)** (0.000)*** (0.001)***  (0.179) 
-79.239 .. 36.148 .. -33.911 ..  -176.583  ..  Savings bank 
(0.000)***  (0.027)**  (0.002)***  (0.009)***  
-0.589 .. 51.864 .. -19.693 .. 15.982 ..  Listed institution 
(0.862)   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.011)**  
-14.528  .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  Austrian bank 
(0.000)***         
-14.831  .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  German bank 
(0.002)***         
153.159 92.141  52.929 106.542  123.525 110.757 219.708 145.029  Constant 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observation dummies  Yes .. Yes .. Yes .. Yes .. 
Procedure  OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
R2  0.182 0.121 0.199 0.175 0.113 0.146 0.222 0.133 
F-statistic  28.48 236.36 18.59  43.32  13.74 228.25 12.27  25.23 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of observations  9800 1188 7560 1052 
Notes: For coefficient estimates, robust p-values are in parentheses. OLS: ordinary least squares pooled regression; FE: fixed-effect panel regression. *, **, and 
*** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. For FE regressions, only the within R2 is reported.  80 | BANKING PERFORMANCE & CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL GROWTH & STABILITY 
 
A more noteworthy impact, at least in terms of magnitude, is the 
effect of concentration on stability, as captured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) variable. With the exception of the OLS results for 
the pooled sample and for Germany (column V) in particular, the 
coefficient estimates are highly significant. The impact of a one percent 
increase in a country’s HHI increases the earnings stability by 2 to 6 
standard deviations. Thus, banks in more concentrated systems secure 
steadier earnings streams over time.76  
The impact of cost-efficiency, as measured by the cost-to-income 
ratio, is less clear. Consistent results can only be established for Austrian 
banks (columns III and IV), where efficiency is positively related to 
stability. This could be a direct effect, in that banks that operate with lower 
costs may also be able to secure persistent earnings. Cost efficiency may 
also be a proxy for other variables, such as governance, that could also have 
a positive impact on bank stability. A comparison of the OLS results with 
the fixed effects (FE) panel regression results for Germany and Spain 
(columns V and VII vs. VI and VIII) shows that the impact of efficiency can 
no longer be identified once bank-specific factors are considered.  
The main results of the empirical exercise are obtained by examining 
the size and ownership parameters. First, bank size, captured by the 
log(Asset) variable, appears to influence stability inversely. In other words, 
on average larger banks have less stable earnings.77 The impact of size on 
stability is particularly striking when individual effects are controlled for 
by the panel regression procedures. However, the coefficient estimates for 
the interactive variable [log(Asset) × Savings bank] show that the negative 
impact of size on earnings stability does not seem to exist for savings 
banks. Indeed, in Austria and Germany, the counteracting effects are 
almost equivalent, meaning that larger savings banks are almost as stable 
as other savings banks and much more stable than their commercial peers 
of equal sizes (see Columns II and IV).  
                                                      
76 This finding is in line with the findings of Beck et al. (2006), who use a sample of 
69 countries over the years 1980-1997 to show that systemic banking crises are less 
likely in systems with more concentrated systems.  
77 This result is in line wit h the findin gs of Beck et al. (2009), w ho explain the 
finding by noting that larger institutions may have an added advantage in 
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In order to test the validity of a broader hypothesis concerning all 
savings banks, the OLS estimates also include the dummy variable for 
savings banks. The coefficient estimates for this dummy variable show that 
German and Spanish savings banks are not more stable in general while the 
opposite is true for Austrian banks. In Spain, earnings stability increases 
significantly with asset size, effectively offsetting the negative impact for 
savings banks.78 Holding all other factors constant, smaller savings banks 
perform below the country average while larger savings banks have more 
stable earnings than banks of all sizes. The results are identical but less 
pronounced in Germany, where the offsetting impact of savings bank size 
is relatively small.  
3.4  Conclusions 
These results (summarised in the tables below) confirm that there are no 
radical differences between savings banks and their commercial peers in 
terms of profitability, cost-efficiency, market power and earnings stability 
in the five countries included in the study. Savings banks appear to be 
slightly less profitable in Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain, but the 
differences are not consistent and depend on the choice of profitability 
measure, i.e. RoA, RoE or cost to income. It is worth noting that the only 
country where a notable difference exists across the three performance 
measures is Italy, where savings banks operate as joint-stock corporations 
just like commercial banks. In terms of cost-efficiency, savings banks 
exhibit a slightly inferior performance in Austria, Italy and Spain.  
Savings banks enjoy greater market power in Austria but the 
opposite is true for Italy; in either case, the differences are relatively small.  
The results also highlight two distinguishing aspects of savings 
banks. First, savings banks fulfil an important role in assisting regional 
                                                      
78 In Spain, the largest savings bank, with a logarithm of assets of around 19.2 
units, is significantly more stable than all other banks. This can be seen by 
calculating the cumulative impact of the size variables [(log(Asset) and log(Asset) × 
Savings bank)] in column VII and the dummy variable, Savings bank. Adding these 
together and holding all else constant, it can be seen that the z-score of the largest 
savings bank is at least 115 standard deviations (19.2 × 15.2 – 176.6) superior than 
commercial banks of all sizes. For larger commercial banks the difference is even 
greater, since stability decreases with asset size for commercial banks (i.e. the 
coefficient estimate for log(Asset) is negative).  82 | BANKING PERFORMANCE & CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL GROWTH & STABILITY 
 
economic growth. In the three countries with active savings banks, i.e. 
Austria, Germany and Spain – regions with a greater presence of savings 
banks – experience stronger growth rates. Second, in some cases savings 
banks cope with income volatility better than other banks. Although the 
statement is true for all Austrian savings banks, in Germany and Spain the 
larger savings banks are better able to absorb deviations in income.  
Taken together, these findings imply that in addition to co-existing 
with other banks under similar conditions, savings banks have responded 
to shifts in market developments while fulfilling an integral role for the 
sustained development and stability of economies.  
Table 3.11 Comparison of savings banks to commercial banks 
 Performance 
 RoA  RoE  Cost-to-income 
Cost 
efficiency 
Market 
power 
Earning 
stability 
Austria   0 0  0  0  +  0 
Belgium   0 0  0  0  0  n.a. 
Germany  0 0  0  0  0  - 
Italy  - 0  0  -  -  n.a. 
Spain   0 0  0  0  0  + 
Note: n.a. = No data were available for comparison; +/- imply that savings banks scored 
better/worse (in difference in means test with a p-value < 5%). 0 means that there was 
no significant difference between the two types of banks. 
Table 3.12 Banking sector determinants of market power 
  Sector concentration  Cost efficiency  Bank size  Branching 
Austria   0 -  0  - 
Belgium   0 -  0  - 
Germany  - -  0  - 
Italy  0 -  +  - 
Spain   0 -  0  - 
Note: +/- indicate the sign of the coefficient estimate (statistically different from 0 with a p-
value < 5%).  
Table 3.13 Banking sector determinants of regional growth 
  Diversity Competition  Branching ATMs 
Austria   + 0 +  n.a. 
Germany  + 0 +  + 
Spain   + 0 +  + 
Note: n.a. = No data were available. +/- indicate the sign of the coefficient estimate 
(statistically different from 0 with a p-value < 5%). INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 83 
 
Table 3.14 Banking sector determinants of earning stability 
 
Savings 
bank size 
Commercial 
bank size 
Sector 
concentration 
Cost-to-
income 
Austria   0 -  + 0 
Germany  + -  + + 
Spain   + -  + - 
Note: n.a. = No data were available for comparison. +/- indicate the sign of the coefficient 
estimate (statistically different from 0 with a p-value < 5%).  
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4.  COUNTRY ANALYSIS: 
SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS 
4.1  Origins and historical development  
The emergence of Spanish savings banks dates to the 19th century in 
parallel with the main national financial systems in Europe today. They 
were invariably influenced by some of the previous developments in other 
countries under liberal regimes where private initiatives fostered the 
development of modern banking institutions. Since then, they have 
experienced a significant expansion and have largely contributed to 
mobilising savings and promoting competition in the Spanish banking 
sector. They were heavily regulated and dominated by political 
intervention in the pre- and post-civil war environment, from 1936 to the 
1970s. Finally, the process of reforms and economic liberalisation that 
began in the 1970s led to what Spanish savings banks are nowadays. In 
particular, with the liberalisation initiatives of the 1970s, Spanish savings 
banks were converted into modern financial institutions and started to 
offer their clients a wide range of financial services. They have been, and 
continue to be, financial institutions with strong local roots, whose mission 
is extending financial services to large segments of the population and 
distributing the profits obtained, with the purpose of contributing to the 
welfare and development of the society as a whole. Thus, they started 
competing successfully with other banking institutions, until achieving 
more than 50% of the market share at present.  
Spanish savings banks emerged with a clear regional vocation and 
with the objective of attending to the needs of the families and businesses 
within their territories. At present (2008), there are 45 savings banks in 
Spain covering the entire national territory, providing their services to over 
96% of the population with branches in their own towns and the other 3.7% INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 85 
 
in a more dispersed manner, according to the data provided by the Spanish 
Savings banks Confederation (CECA).  
4.2  Ownership structure, regulation and supervision  
The Spanish saving banks are foundations of a private nature that combine 
their financial activity with a deep social vocation. In particular, they follow 
the ‘French model’ where individual savings banks were linked to a 
‘Mount of Piety’ (a literal translation from the Spanish ‘Montes de Piedad’). 
These Mounts of Piety were early modern charitable institutions where 
advances were made against a kind of collateral in pawn (usually, jewellery 
or clothes). Consequently, Spanish savings banks would accept low-value 
and low-volume savings in deposit and, in turn, place these funds in the 
‘Mounts of Piety’ in order to make small loans to the underprivileged 
classes. Like their counterparts in Scotland and France, Spanish savings 
banks briefly placed their excess deposits in a publicly-owned institution 
(Caja General de Consignaciones y Depósitos, 1852-1868). The introduction 
of this ‘business model’ was part of a change in government policy that 
aimed at more involvement in the business of Spanish savings banks and 
also included the provision of financial aid to the Caja General de 
Consignaciones y Depósitos, which invested the funds mainly in Spanish 
government bonds. However, the change in strategy was short lived due to 
the poor quality of the government bonds in the 19th century. As a 
consequence, the Spanish savings banks soon turned to using deposits to 
finance the activities of the ‘Mount of Piety’.  
By the end of the 19th century, Spanish regulation lacked precision 
regarding the rules Spanish savings banks had to follow. However, it was 
precisely this lack of precision that allowed the growth and development of 
the savings banks. In particular, freedom regarding investment policies 
resulted in diversification and growth of assets at a greater rate than that of 
other savings banks elsewhere in Europe. Between 1870 and 1900, the 
financial strength of the Spanish savings banks increased significantly. 
During that period, the pawn and emergency loan operations of the 
Mounts of Piety were unable to absorb all deposits collected at the savings 
banks. They began making short-term advances and issuing mortgages 
directly to the public. Initially they issued short-term loans using public 
and industrial goods in stock as collateral. Diversification continued and 
around the outbreak of World War I, Spanish savings banks were readily 
issuing mortgages directly to retail customers. The Mortgage Act of 4 June 86 | COUNTRY ANALYSIS: SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS 
 
1908 contributed to this development as it pioneered exemption from 
having to pay different forms of taxes on mortgages issued by the Mounts 
of Piety. 
Most savings banks established at an early stage were located in the 
largest urban centres, and they managed to grow in financial strength 
through retained surpluses. Between 1900 and 1925 the number of Spanish 
savings banks tripled to 150 banks, although no major change in regulation 
or the banks’ business portfolio had taken place. 
In 1921 the first Spanish banking law was enacted and the Consejo 
Superior Bancario or CSB (High Banking Council) was established by 
private commercial banks. The role of the CSB was to coordinate the 
actions of private commercial banks as their economic power became more 
important. At the beginning of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), private 
commercial banks dominated the financial markets. They were organised 
as a cartel that was built around the CSB and were supervised by the 
Ministry of Employment, Commerce and Industry (and later on by the 
Ministry of Employment and Welfare). 
During the 1920s, the savings banks started to abandon their 
charitable nature and gradually turned into genuine financial institutions. 
Growth was limited, however, and it was difficult, and at the same time 
necessary, to find new business opportunities. Competitive pressure from 
the private commercial banking sector resulted in a savings banks policy 
that consisted of expanding the geographic scope of their branch networks 
and diversifying their business operations.  
The Franco regime (1939-1975) reaffirmed the pre-eminence of 
private commercial banks within the Spanish financial system and 
introduced regulation that discriminated against the savings banks. 
Supervision of the savings banks was transferred from the Ministry of 
Interior to the Bank of Spain. 
The first episodes of regulatory change relevant for savings banks 
were characterised by the intensification of regulatory burden. This 
affected the overwhelming majority of those new savings banks that were 
established by local and regional governments between 1939 and 1977. The 
Franco regime continued a policy that had been developed during the 
1920s, called the principle of territoriality. According to this principle, the 
business of each savings bank was restricted to its home province. This 
principle remained an informal arrangement until it was formally enacted 
in law in 1964. At the same time, the increasing asset base of the savings INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 87 
 
banks prompted the Finance Ministry to start regulating the sources and 
applications of their funds. As a result, the Finance Ministry directed a 
growing proportion of the assets of savings banks to finance public 
expenditures and private banks' short term liabilities. One effect of this 
regulation was that funds available for the banks’ own lending activity 
were significantly reduced. 
The second regulatory change for the savings banks occurred in the 
early 1960s when attempts were made to ease the regulatory burden on 
Spanish savings banks (particularly in 1962 and 1964). Nonetheless, until 
1974 the savings banks remained outside the Spanish clearing house system 
and the portfolio of their business activities continued to be restricted. 
However, under the Fuentes Quintana Reform of 1977, the regulatory 
regime applicable to private banks and savings banks started to converge, 
and as a consequence competition became more intense. The reform gave 
savings banks strong incentives to modernise their infrastructure and 
develop new competencies and new activities. For example, the Bank of 
Spain authorised the first automated teller machine for the savings banks in 
1977, and by 1996, their combined network comprised 14,169 ATMs, which 
was the biggest ATM network in Spain and the third largest in the world at 
that time. 
Nowadays, Spanish savings banks are double bottom-line institutions 
with both financial and social objectives that employ an important part of 
their profits in the form of ‘Obra Social’ or social projects. This activity is 
developed in parallel with their role as financial intermediaries and is 
intended to tackle the social needs of the population that are not satisfied in 
other ways, ranging from the integration of the most disadvantaged 
collectives to cultural activities, from the restoration and conservation of 
historical and artistic heritage to the conservation of the environment.  
As for the ownership structure, there are six distinctive features of 
Spanish savings banks:  
i)  According to their legal status, they are private foundations with a 
heritage showing a markedly social purpose. The current political 
debate in Spain has left behind some of the main past concerns, in 
particular those related to their legal status as private enterprises. 
Although Spanish savings banks do not have any share capital and 
their equity consists mainly of accumulated reserves generated 
through retained earnings, since 1988, the Constitutional Tribunal has 
ratified their private nature and legal status.  88 | COUNTRY ANALYSIS: SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS 
 
ii)  They are financial entities with complete freedom of operation.  
iii)  All their actions and business activities are executed according to 
market criteria. Thus, they are subject to unrestricted market 
discipline, and together with their social mission they aspire to the 
maximisation of their profits, just like any other type of financial 
institutions and strictly under the same rules that apply to 
commercial banks.  
iv)  Although savings banks try to maximise their profits, another 
distinctive feature is the lack of any private appropriation of these 
profits. Instead, profits are destined to serve social purposes. In other 
words, Spanish savings banks seek to maximise their profits and 
thereby their allocation to what is called ‘Obra Social’ through their 
day-to-day business operations. In fact, they compete fiercely 
between themselves and with other credit institutions for the 
provisions of financial services. 
v)  They offer a wide range of products although they remain mainly 
retail financial institutions specialising in mobilising people’s savings 
and lending to households, family-based firms and other small and 
medium-sized firms.  
vi)  They have strong local roots since the majority of clients are from 
their respective areas of origin. They mainly develop projects in that 
area and they take most of the decisions at a local level. 
As for the supervision of savings banks, they are under the 
monitoring and supervision of the Bank of Spain like any other depository 
institution in Spain. However, other legal considerations regarding the 
composition of their governance bodies are set by the regional government 
(Autonomous Communities) of the region in which a savings bank is 
located. There is some public debate and a certain amount of controversy 
that appears to be the result of the interaction between their ownership 
structure and their social mission. First of all, the ownership structure of 
savings banks is such that those exercising control are not legal owners. 
Different stakeholders, including employees and representatives of 
depositors, local and regional government bodies, founding entities and 
community interest groups constitute the governing bodies of the savings 
banks.  
Secondly, Spanish savings banks are required to allocate at least half 
of their profits to reserves, and to channel the remainder back into the 
community toward projects that fall under the category of Obra Social. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 89 
 
Since Spanish savings banks are not quoted enterprises, the main ‘concern’ 
is that they would not be sufficiently exposed to market discipline 
exercised by a functioning stock market.  
In Spain, as in other countries (i.e. Germany) the substantial 
representation of the public sector in the governing bodies of savings banks 
has led to this type of concern in the past. As a response to these concerns, 
the representation ceiling of the public sector was reduced to 50%, that is, 
not more than half of the members of the governing bodies should be 
members or representatives of local governments and political parties. It 
has been argued, however, that despite this reduction, the public sector 
remains highly influential in the governing bodies of savings banks and, 
therefore, this initiative may not have fully dissipated perceptions that 
there may still be too much political influence.79 The Spanish savings banks 
have also responded to these new concerns by internally assuming and 
fully adopting strict and politically-independent social responsibility 
initiatives. Among these initiatives, all savings banks (starting with the 
CECA in 2005) have been progressively issuing very detailed corporate 
responsibility statements whereby new policies and governance initiatives 
– both for operating and financial management and for social mandates 
management – have been described in detail.  
4.3  Competitive and other market developments  
a)  Deregulation and the shift in market shares 
The recent changes in the competitive environment of the Spanish banking 
system are closely related to the deregulation process that started in 1977 
and has since then led to a fundamental transformation of the Spanish 
banking market. Starting with the Law 2290/77 on the regulation of the 
governing bodies and activities of savings banks, various regulatory 
initiatives have permitted Spanish savings banks to fully compete with 
commercial banks and with each other. These initiatives were followed by 
other important deregulation measures during the 1980s such as the 
liberalisation of the interest rates of assets and liabilities and the lifting of 
territorial branching constraints for savings banks. From 1984 to 2007, the 
total number of banking institutions decreased from 369 to 275 according to 
the Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Spain. As in most other European 
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countries, this reduction is mainly due to consolidation and liberalisation 
and to the subsequent wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Although 
all types of financial intermediaries were affected by consolidation, it has 
been more intense for those that had formerly been subjected to territorial 
constraints in their activities, as had been the case of savings banks. In 1989 
these branching constraints were lifted (Royal Decree 1044/1989). Since 
then, according to the Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Spain, the number 
of savings banks fell from 76 to 54. Similarly, the number of credit 
cooperatives declined from 149 to 83. The reduction of the number of 
commercial banks during that period was more limited, falling from 110 to 
72. 
Although the number of institutions has decreased over the last thirty 
years, there are significant differences in the branching strategies followed 
by the three main different banking groups in Spain – commercial banks, 
savings banks and credit cooperatives. As shown in Figure 4.1, one can 
distinguish three main stages in the evolution of bank branches within 
these groups, as outlined below.  
Figure 4.1 Number of branches (1974-2008) 
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Source: Bank of Spain. 
1.  In a first stage, from 1977 to 1988, savings banks together with 
commercial banks and credit cooperatives, significantly increased the 
number of branches by 79.6%, 89.7% and 33.2%, respectively.  
2.  From 1989 to 1997, the lifting of branching restrictions was followed by 
differential branching strategies. Despite a consolidation trend, savings INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 91 
 
banks and credit cooperatives continued to increase the number of their 
branches (26% and 20%, respectively), while that of the commercial 
banks only increased by 5.6%.  
3.  From 1997 to 2007, savings banks (41.9%) and credit cooperatives 
(38.6%) have continued opening branches to a significant extent, in 
contrast with commercial banks, which started to close branches with a 
total decrease of 13.2% over that period.  
The above-mentioned differences have been the seed of what is 
known today as a distinctive relationship-based banking model of savings 
banks, a model that is founded on retail specialisation and territorial 
proximity. Conversely, Spanish commercial banks opted for a model based 
upon diversification with a mix of retail and investment banking. The 
combination of these branching strategies with the economic and financial 
development of recent decades has led to substantial changes in the 
competitive structure of Spanish banking markets. First of all, as shown in 
Figure 4.2, deposits from the private sector (households and non-financial 
firms) have increased significantly, and in particular from 1991 to 2007. 
Savings banks have played a leading role in this market. In 1991 they 
managed €84,000 million and in 2007 the stock of deposits was multiplied 
by more than six reaching €522,000 million. At the same time commercial 
banks only tripled their deposits (from €94,000 to 322,000 million) while 
credit cooperatives, although less significant in absolute terms, increased 
their deposits from €9,000 to €67,000 million. 
As a consequence of the unequal evolution of deposits for the 
different types of banks, market shares have considerably changed over 
time, as shown in Figure 4.3. Savings banks increased their market share 
from 44.82% in 1991 to 57.21% in 2007, while commercial banks lost market 
share, falling from 52.31% to 35.29% in the same period. The market share 
of credit cooperatives also increased from 4.87% to 7.39%. Figure 4.3 also 
shows that from 1994 onwards, savings banks have dominated the market 
with more than the 50% of all deposits from the private sector. The 
consequences of this trend go beyond the mobilisation of savings. Indeed, 
this trend implies that Spanish savings banks have suffered to a lesser 
extent from the increasing pressures to which retail banks have been 
exposed in recent years in Spain and elsewhere since the mid-1990s.  
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Figure 4.2 Evolution of deposits from the private sector in Spanish banking 
(1991-2007) 
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Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
Figure 4.3 Market shares in the Spanish banking sector: deposits (1991-2007) 
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Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
Together with these competitive changes in the market for deposits, 
there has also been a change in the relative weight of the different types of 
deposit accounts across the different banking groups. As shown in Figure 
4.4, savings banks have increased their market share in all kind of deposit 
accounts although long-term/savings related deposits (savings and term 
accounts) have grown more than demand deposits. In the case of INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 93 
 
commercial banks, demand deposits have grown faster than other deposits, 
so that the level of demand deposits held by commercial and savings banks 
in 2007 are largely similar (€122,000 and €123,000 million, respectively). In 
contrast, there are now considerable differences in the stock of savings 
accounts (€55,000 million for commercial banks and €105,000 million for 
savings banks) and term accounts (€144,000 million for commercial banks 
and €293,000 million for savings banks). These comparisons demonstrate 
that savings banks have mainly focused on long-term savings which may 
contribute more to strengthening their customer relationships than short-
term deposits would do.  
Figure 4.4 Deposits from the private sector in Spanish banking by type of account 
(1991, 2000, 2007) 
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Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
The Spanish loan market has also experienced a noticeable change in 
recent years. Although commercial banks traditionally dominated this 
market, the expansion of savings banks in the market for deposits 
facilitated their penetration into the loan market based on the long-term 
relationship banking model mentioned above. As shown in Figure 4.5, the 
stock of loans granted by savings banks multiplied by twelve during 1991-
2007, from €67,647 million to €832,940 million. Commercial banks 
experienced a growth of only about half of that of the savings banks in the 94 | COUNTRY ANALYSIS: SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS 
 
same period (from €131,012 to €762,264 million). The growth of the loan 
portfolio of the credit cooperatives (€6,319 to €90,759 million) is about the 
same as that of the savings banks. 
Figure 4.5 Evolution of loans to the private sector in Spanish banking (1991-2007) 
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Source: Bank of Spain and own elaboration. 
 
The rapid penetration of savings banks into the loan market after 
deregulation resulted in a major change in the market shares of bank loans 
to the private sector. Savings banks increased their market share from 
33.1% in 1991 to 49.2% in 2007 and since 2003, they have been the leading 
banking group in the loan market. Cooperative banks have almost doubled 
their share of the loan market. The flip side of this evolution is the case of 
commercial banks, whose market shares in loans decreased from 63.9% to 
45.4% in the same period. Again, the retail and territorial specialisation of 
savings banks and their focus on customer-relationships have been the 
main reasons for their competitive success in Spain over the last 20 years. 
See Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6 Market shares in the Spanish banking sector: Loans (1991-2007) 
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Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
b)  Competition, margins, efficiency and capitalisation 
The changes observed in market shares – with Spanish savings banks 
becoming the leading institutions in deposits and loan markets – may have 
affected the degree of competition in these markets. Deregulation and in 
particular the lifting of branching restrictions have led to increasing 
competition of local markets with savings banks opening branches in a 
larger number of territories in which they compete with multi-market 
commercial banks and other savings banks (Carbó Valverde & Rodríguez, 
2007b). As a first indicator, we look at concentration to illustrate what the 
change in market shares has meant in competitive terms. One widely used 
concentration measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index80 (HHI). In 2007, 
this indicator was 1,328 in Spain. The following thought experiment is 
instructive: if savings banks were excluded from the market, the HHI for 
Spain would be 3,440, while if commercial banks were the ones excluded, 
the indicator would be 798. This simple simulation exercise illustrates the 
relevance of savings banks in reaching territories where entry was 
previously banned. 
                                                      
80 It is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all competitors in a 
market, and the values it can take on range from 0 (perfect competition) to 10,000 
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Another issue related to the impact of the expansion of savings banks 
on competition is cooperation among savings banks. In this matter, pro-
competitive cooperation should be distinguished from collusive 
cooperation.81 Spanish savings banks represent an example of the first case 
in various ways. They cooperate in gathering certain inputs that require a 
large-scale operation to be undertaken on efficient technological standards 
(such as payment settlement systems and the management of foreign 
operations). Similarly, the Confederation of Spanish Savings Banks (CECA) 
provides assistance on how to standardise technological processes that 
result in significant cost savings (such as transfer between deposit accounts 
across savings banks or direct debit transactions). Another area of intensive 
cooperation is retail electronic payments and, in particular, card payment 
networks. As in most developed economies retail payments are organised 
as networks to fully exploit network externalities from sharing ATMs and 
point-of-sale devices to allow consumers to enjoy a wider range of 
possibilities to use their debit and credit cards. Despite this technological 
cooperation, savings banks fully compete on a commercial basis with each 
other and with commercial banks.  
In order to explore to what extent the increasing role of savings banks 
may have resulted in changes in prices and costs relative to competitors, 
Figure 4.7 offers an analysis of interest margins (as a percentage of total 
assets) of the different groups of banks in Spain from 1991 to 2007. The 
figure shows that these margins have both converged and declined over 
time in Spain from values over 1% to values around 0.4%. In any event, the 
fall in interest margins affects all institutions and it is mainly the result of 
competitive pressures that are due to the entry of Spain to the European 
single market and the generalised and sharp decrease in monetary policy 
interest rates during the second half of the 1990s. Hence, the competitive 
shift in Spain, with savings banks increasing their market share, have 
apparently taken place in a more competitive environment, at least as far as 
loans and deposits markets are concerned.  
                                                      
81 See Laffont (2003) and Bordignon & Brusco (2006). INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 97 
 
Figure 4.7 Evolution of the net interest margin to total assets in Spanish banking 
(1991-2007) 
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Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
The same downward trend applies to non-interest income which has 
also declined over time. All commercial, savings and cooperative banks 
seem to have reduced the relative weight of these sources of income as a 
proportion of total assets, as shown in Figure 4.8. Similarly, overall 
profitability – measured by the return on assets (RoA) – has become more 
similar across the different types of financial institutions and is now on the 
European standard of around 0.4% (Figure 4.9). 
Figure 4.8 Evolution of non-interest income to total assets in Spanish banking 
(1991-2007) 
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Figure 4.9 Evolution of the return on assets (RoA) in Spanish banking 
(1991-2007) 
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Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
Increasing competition was also accompanied by an improvement in 
efficiency levels. Figure 4.10 shows that the ratio ‘operating costs/gross 
income’ decreased from 58.6% in 1991 to 43.3% in 2007 for commercial 
banks and from 60.9% to 53.8% for cooperatives. This improvement has 
been even greater in the case of savings banks changing from 64.0% to 
46.80% during the same period.  
Figure 4.10 Evolution of the ‘cost/income’ ratio in Spanish banking (1991-2007) 
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Figure 4.11  Capitalisation ratio (‘capital and reserves/total assets’) in Spanish 
banking (1991-2007) 
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Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
As for capitalisation, the evolution of the capital ratio shown in 
Figure 4.11 suggests that Spanish savings and commercial banks have 
somehow converged to similar levels of capitalisation even if the 
composition of these capital resources should necessarily vary since 
savings banks cannot, by definition, issue stock. However, the evolution of 
the capitalisation of savings banks contrasts with their hypothetical limited 
capacity to raise capital beyond reserves. It should be also noted that, to 
help address these limitations, since 1990 Spanish savings banks can also 
raise funds through the issuance of so-called equity units (cuotas 
participativas), which are considered part of Tier 1 capital. As financial 
instruments,  cuotas participativas are like non-voting preferred shares in 
some other countries. These equity units may contribute to raising the own 
funds that savings banks are required under capital regulation to have, and 
that may be needed to meet the future challenges, particularly as a result of 
the financial crisis. However, so far the Spanish savings banks have 
scarcely used this possibility. The negative economic outlook and the 
quickly deteriorating housing market have also had an impact on Spanish 
banking institutions. The overall loan quality of credit institutions has 
weakened considerably as the total non-performing loans more than tripled 100 | COUNTRY ANALYSIS: SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS 
 
between September 2007 and 2008.82 Savings banks scored slightly worse, 
with non-performing loans representing 3% of total loans by September 
2008, compared with an industry average of 2.6%. At the time of the 
publication of this report, banks in Spain have remained relatively resilient. 
Despite worsening asset quality, the institutions have been able to absorb 
the shocks, thanks in part to the counter-cyclical generic provisioning 
requirements put forth by the Spanish regulator. As deposits in all credit 
institutions increased, savings banks proved a preferred choice; between 
September 2007 and December 2008, their deposits from non-banks and 
households have increased by 14.2% while the same figure was 11.4% for 
commercial banks. 
4.4  Service, access, proximity and financial inclusion  
a)  Service and access at the regional level 
As shown in the previous section, the expansion of savings banks in Spain 
has an important territorial dimension. The question we ask ourselves is to 
what extent are regional differences in access to financial services related to 
savings banks’ branching and business expansion during the last two 
decades.  
Tables 4.1A and B show some indicators of the level of bank services 
and bank penetration in the seventeen Spanish regions. The indicators 
proxy average savings per person (‘deposits/inhabitants’), average debt 
per person (loans/inhabitants), the demographic reach of banking services 
(‘population/branches’), average branch size (‘loans/branches’ and 
‘deposits/branches’), and the relative weight of loans (and deposits) in 
each region as a percentage of total loans (deposits). The indicators reveal 
significant regional disparities in banking services across Spanish regions. 
First of all, the ratio ‘loans/inhabitants’ is found to be larger in regions such 
as Madrid (€70,710/inhabitant) and Catalonia (€45,586/inhabitant) and 
substantially lower in less populated regions such as Extremadura 
(€19,996/inhabitant). These disparities also apply to the ratio 
‘deposits/inhabitants’ with Madrid (€54,717/inhabitant) and the Basque 
Country (€30,667/inhabitant) exhibiting the higher ratios and some other 
large regions such as Andalusia (€13,889/inhabitants) and the Canary 
                                                      
82 All data on credit institutions are from Boletín Estadístico, Bank of Spain, January 
2009.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 101 
 
Islands (€12,337) showing much lower ratios. The regional asymmetries 
reflect, inter alia, demographic and economic differences such as population 
density and financial wealth. Taking 2007 as a reference, Table 4.2 shows 
that more than the 60% of all loans and deposits in Spain are concentrated 
in four out of the seventeen regions (Madrid, Catalonia, Andalusia and 
Comunidad Valenciana).  
It should be noted, however, that the branching expansion of savings 
banks helps to alleviate regional disparities. Table 4.3 shows that only 
between 2003 and 2007, the regions with the lower ratios of loans (or 
deposits) per person have shown larger improvement in the level of service 
(decrease in the ratio ‘population/branches’). During 2003-2007, population 
per branch has decreased by 355 inhabitants in the Canary Islands and by 
208 inhabitants in Andalusia. Considering regional disparities, the outreach 
of bank business seems to be a critical feature of Spanish banking. 
Therefore, we study how savings banks (relative to commercial banks and 
credit cooperatives) are located across Spanish regions. Importantly, the 
leading role of savings banks in deposits markets is more pronounced in 
some of the regions that were previously identified as those with higher 
levels of bank service. In particular, Table 4.2 shows that the market share 
of deposits of savings banks was 71.93% in Catalonia and higher than 60% 
in Aragon, Murcia, Castille and Leon and Comunidad Valenciana in 2007. 
Similarly, Table 4.3 also confirms these differences in market shares in the 
loan market with savings banks showing a market share of more than 55% 
in Catalonia and Aragon and progressively increasing their market share in 
all regions over time.  
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Table 4.1A Bank business and service indicators across Spanish regions (2003, 2005, 2007) 
 2003  2005  2007 
 
Loans / 
Inhabitants 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Deposits / 
Inhabitants 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Loans 
(% all 
regions) 
Deposits 
(% all 
regions) 
Loans / 
Inhabitants 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Deposits/ 
Inhabitants 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Loans 
(% all 
regions) 
Deposits 
(% all 
regions) 
Loans / 
Inhabitants 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Deposits / 
Inhabitants 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Loans 
(% all 
regions) 
Deposits 
(% all 
regions) 
Andalusia  12.89  9.03  12.95  10.68 20.50  11.03 13.80  10.48 29.28  13.89 13.89  10.25 
Aragon  17.33  16.76 2.79  3.18 25.84  17.45 2.79  2.66 36.27  23.40 2.76  2.77 
Asturias  12.89  12.24 1.75  1.96 17.53  14.40 1.59  1.85 24.83  18.85 1.59  1.88 
Balearic  Islands  19.99  12.56 2.52  1.87 29.71  14.67 2.51  1.75 42.36  18.11 2.52  1.68 
Canary  Islands  13.40  8.67  3.37 2.57  20.21  9.97  3.40 2.37  28.00  12.34  3.32 2.28 
Cantabria  14.37  11.88 1.03  1.00 20.26  14.00 0.97  0.95 27.95  17.70 0.94  0.93 
Castille 
La Mancha 
11.34  11.32 2.76  3.24 17.82  12.98 2.91  2.99 27.18  16.79 3.12  3.00 
Castille and 
Leon 
14.32  17.06 4.55  6.38 20.55  17.99 4.38  5.41 28.36  22.51 4.26  5.25 
Catalonia  21.95  16.14 19.72  17.08 32.38  19.79 19.50  16.83 45.59  24.65 19.35  16.27 
Ceuta  8.42  7.26  0.08 0.08  11.95  8.19  0.08 0.07  16.69  10.31  0.08 0.07 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 
15.97  11.38 9.66  8.11 25.23  14.94  10.23  8.56 37.13  21.20  10.62  9.43 
Extremadura 10.27 10.24  1.41  1.65  14.44 11.47  1.32  1.49  20.00 14.72  1.29  1.48 
Galicia  11.45  11.62 3.99  4.77 16.46  12.88 3.84  4.25 23.69  16.60 3.90  4.25 
Rioja  19.36  14.37 0.75  0.65 28.23  16.53 0.73  0.60 40.55  22.47 0.74  0.64 
Madrid  30.12  27.48 22.78  24.48 44.36  39.26 22.49  28.11 70.71  54.72 25.27  30.42 
Melilla 8.56  8.32  0.07  0.08 11.82  8.72  0.07  0.07 16.52  11.48 0.07  0.07 
Murcia  13.89  10.26 2.40  2.08 23.22  13.04 2.69  2.13 35.13  17.03 2.86  2.16 
Navarra  18.71  19.42 1.42  1.73 26.94  20.28 1.37  1.45 37.83  27.50 1.35  1.53 
Basque 
Country 
21.95  21.02 5.90  6.65 29.22  22.90 5.26  5.82 38.53  30.67 4.89  6.05 
Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 103 
 
Table 4.1B Bank business and service indicators across Spanish regions (2003, 2005, 2007) 
 2003  2005  2007 
 Population/ 
branches 
Loans/ 
branches 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Deposits/ 
branches 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Population/ 
branches 
Loans/ 
branches 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Deposits/ 
branches 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Population/ 
branches 
Loans/ 
branches 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Deposits/ 
branches 
(thousands 
of euro) 
Andalusia 1,361.27  17,552.85  12,297.23 1,267.19 25,980.80  13,972.38 1,153.89 33,788.07  16,026.20 
Aragon 767.25  13,298.51  12,862.54  747.50  19,318.92 13,043.16  714.87  25,925.03 16,727.18 
Asturias 1,230.74  15,868.25  15,068.42 1,179.51 20,673.88  16,980.23 1,126.46 27,969.68  21,237.99 
Balearic Islands  899.43  17,978.01  11,301.07  860.76 25,568.83  12,627.42 806.66 34,170.45  14,610.83 
Canary Islands  1,740.05  23,321.51 15,089.23  1,567.82  31,685.31 15,638.66  1,386.00 38,810.08  17,098.38 
Cantabria 1,234.98  17,749.46  14,671.29 1,201.04 24,335.51  16,813.77 1,147.66 32,075.79  20,310.13 
Castille 
La Mancha  1,099.12  12,461.99  12,443.51  1,050.71 18,727.99  13,637.94 976.88 26,553.37  16,403.89 
Castille 
and Leon  876.05  12,547.52  14,945.34 853.81 17,545.20  15,362.03 802.49 22,758.64  18,062.65 
Catalonia 973.09  21,363.30  15,708.40  928.60  30,071.63 18,382.56  880.50  40,138.78 21,702.17 
Ceuta 3,568.30  15,973.18  13,770.93 3,398.38 40,390.21  28,681.24 3,102.87 51,527.70  33,698.30 
Comunidad 
Valenciana  1,143.96 18,271.69  13,023.32 1,064.65 26,857.81  15,909.67 968.74 35,964.80  20,539.66 
Extremadura 938.96 9,647.22  9,619.10 929.32 13,414.79  10,662.27 912.15 18,239.13  13,428.15 
Galicia 1,161.36  13,295.23  13,492.63 1,140.78 18,775.03  14,690.69 1,103.92 26,148.68  18,324.35 
Rioja 710.85  13,758.82  10,211.63 670.41 18,928.96  11,080.41 633.01 25,669.22  14,226.43 
Madrid 1,223.41  36,845.38  33,621.77 1,111.19 49,294.43  43,622.89 1,020.93 72,189.67  55,862.83 
Melilla 1,211.59  16,830.26  12,426.11 1,128.75 26,209.77  14,720.58 1,033.41 36,302.57  17,599.98 
Murcia 883.81  16,537.92  17,159.71 878.65 23,672.64  17,819.94 852.51 68,183.01  33,056.05 
Navarra 1,236.92  27,155.91  26,003.03 1,210.26 35,366.15  27,720.04 1,109.56 1,1839.23  8,606.80 
Basque Country  1,124.75  19,984.90 16,966.02  1,065.03  28,226.29 19,990.26 998.77 37,526.84  17,979.8 
Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 104 | COUNTRY ANALYSIS: SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS 
 
Table 4.2 Market share of deposits in the Spanish regional banking sectors (2003, 2005, 2007) 
 2003  2005  2007 
 
Commercial 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Credit 
cooperatives 
Commercial 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Credit 
cooperatives 
Commercial 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Credit 
cooperatives 
Andalusia 28.16 58.36  13.48  28.77 56.14  15.08  29.89 56.12  13.99 
Aragon 21.26  67.21  11.53  19.05 67.17  13.78  19.71 66.58  13.71 
Asturias 42.77  47.41 9.81  40.47 49.33  10.20  42.18 47.63  10.19 
Balearic 
Islands 
34.32 64.14  1.54  33.83  64.55 1.62  33.86  64.52 1.62 
Canary Islands  41.94  52.17  5.90 40.61  51.65  7.74 38.94  53.14  7.92 
Cantabria 41.25 58.02  0.73  39.90 59.00  1.10  41.67 56.82  1.51 
Castille 
La Mancha 
24.25 60.25  15.50  23.01  60.67 16.32  23.44  60.28 16.27 
Castille 
and Leon 
26.29 66.82  6.89  26.17  65.79 8.05  27.91  63.43 8.66 
Catalonia 27.24 71.37  1.39  25.26 73.39  1.35  26.71 71.93  1.36 
Ceuta 46.36  48.63  5.01 46.14  49.06 4.80  44.55  50.17 5.28 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 
31.42 54.50  14.08  28.59  57.41 14.01  25.77  61.97 12.26 
Extremadura 32.84  59.76  7.39  32.45 59.09  8.46  32.25 59.61  8.14 
Galicia 41.40  57.87  0.73  42.40 56.81  0.79  43.01 56.25  0.74 
Rioja 28.41  62.28  9.31 25.77  63.06 11.16  29.31  59.30 11.39 
Madrid 67.38  31.94 0.68  71.46 27.88  0.66  69.51 29.85  0.64 
Melilla  50.33  45.55  4.12 50.83  44.67  4.50 50.57  45.53  3.89 
Murcia 22.72  63.86  13.43 21.86 63.80  14.34  20.80 64.61  14.59 
Navarra 18.38  60.46 21.16  19.88 55.09  25.03  22.12 52.90  24.98 
Basque 
Country 
29.53 54.76  15.71  29.00  55.08 15.92  30.24  53.44 16.32 
Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
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Table 4.3 Market share of loans in the Spanish regional banking sectors (2003, 2005, 2007) 
 2003  2005  2007 
  Commercial 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Credit 
cooperatives 
Commercial 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Credit 
cooperatives 
Commercial 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Credit 
cooperatives 
Andalusia  43.41 46.69  9.90  42.92  47.25 9.83  41.51 49.29 9.20 
Aragon  35.08 54.78 10.14  34.83  54.26 10.91  32.83  54.93 12.24 
Asturias  52.78 38.83  8.39  50.17  41.16 8.66  45.06 46.06 8.88 
Balearic Islands  49.48 49.50  1.02  48.53  50.27 1.21  46.38 52.38 1.24 
Canary Islands  56.78 39.45  3.76  53.94  42.53 3.53  50.11 46.20 3.69 
Cantabria  45.91 52.95  1.14  42.18  56.22 1.60  38.14 59.58 2.28 
Castille 
La Mancha  32.10  55.74  12.16  32.19 57.26  10.55  29.36 61.40 9.24 
Castille 
and Leon  38.61  53.18  8.22  37.44 54.06 8.50  35.94 55.18 8.88 
Catalonia  45.91 53.09  0.99  44.55  54.21 1.24  42.54 56.31 1.15 
Ceuta  42.50 52.41  5.09  44.25  51.26 4.49  42.71 53.54 3.74 
Comunidad 
Valenciana 43.48  47.37  9.14  42.38 49.02 8.59  41.50 50.23 8.27 
Extremadura  41.89 52.33  5.78  41.60  52.71 5.68  42.07 52.14 5.79 
Galicia  53.27 46.22  0.51  51.81  47.67 0.52  46.56 52.98 0.46 
Rioja  37.39 54.53  8.08  35.27  56.72 8.02  33.13 57.30 9.57 
Madrid  62.11 37.23  0.66  59.60  39.49 0.91  61.03 38.18 0.79 
Melilla  55.57 39.25  5.18  59.63  35.90 4.47  57.69 37.84 4.47 
Murcia  36.51 53.16 10.33  34.55  53.65 11.81  33.58  54.35 12.07 
Navarra  30.71 45.09 24.21  28.74  46.60 24.66  27.50  47.30 25.21 
Basque Country  44.60 42.61 12.79  42.06  44.65 13.29  41.20  44.89 13.90 
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b)  Financial inclusion: The role of Spanish savings banks 
Financial exclusion has become one of the key concerns in the rise of social 
exclusion in Europe. Several initiatives have been considered to tackle this 
problem – from both the public and the private sectors. In Spain, the 
market initiatives dominate and savings banks are leading most of them. In 
recent years, many Spanish savings banks have explicitly stated their keen 
interest in reducing financial exclusion in their annual Corporate Social 
Responsibility Reports by reporting the territorial scope of their financial 
and social activities, and providing a complete list of their community 
investment programmes – known as ‘Obra Social’ – and, in some cases, the 
estimated impact on employment and/or growth in the territories where 
they operate. In this context, Spain is probably among the leading countries 
in tackling financial exclusion via ‘private market’ means.83 Leaving 
specialisation and other generalised business features aside, there are at 
least five different aspects that should be considered when analysing the 
active role of savings banks in promoting financial inclusion: i) Obra Social 
(social mandate); ii) branching and demographic coverage; iii) c) 
involvement with family and SME businesses; iv) immigration and 
remittances; v) microfinance. We briefly discuss each of them below.  
1.  Obra Social 
The most explicit social involvement of Spanish savings banks is their 
mandate to fund community investment programmes (Obra Social). The 
Obra Social serves to encourage social integration, strengthen economic 
activity and contribute to conserving the environment. The evolution of 
these Obra Social from savings banks’ surplus is shown in Table 4.4. The 
€1,692.9 million of allowance for Obra Social assigned to be paid from the 
profit in 2006 represent 23.8% of the savings banks’ net result of last year 
and it is 2.7 times the amount provided from this source in 1996. 
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Table 4.4 Distribution of savings banks’ surplus in Spain (1996-2006) 
 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 2007 2008 
For reserves 
and others 
74.25  74.31  73.62  74.26 73.83 73.23 73.22  72.40  71.34  72.91  76.20 82,23 74,45 
For Obra 
Social 
25.75  25.69  26.38  25.74 26.17 26.77 26.78  27.60  28.66  27.09  23.80 17,77 25,55 
Million of € 
for Obra 
Social 
620 722  733 867 936  985  1,040  1,10  1,197  1,375  1,693 1.952 1.637 
% change  20.3  16.5  7.1 12.2  8.0 5.2 5.6 14.5  0.6 14.9  23.2 15,32  16,13 
Source: Spanish Savings Banks Confederation. 
As for the composition of the Obra Social (not shown), the main 
change in the figures for 2006 is that funding for Health Care and Social 
Care has grown considerably over the past years. At most of the savings 
banks, there are now more and more short and medium-term plans and 
projects in these areas, such as specific programme for the health care of the 
eldest and investments in, and subsidies for, health institutions for other 
deprived and marginalised groups of people. This area has increased its 
relative weight in the Obra Social as a whole from 30.4% in 2005 to 32.1% in 
2006, reaching a level of €489.2 million. The area that absorbs most of the 
resources is Culture and Leisure. Funds used for this area have only grown 
at 7% in 2006, but with a total figure of €609.3 million they still represent 
almost 40% of total spending for Obra Social in 2006. Other relevant areas 
within Obra Social include the Historical-Artistic and Natural Heritage 
Area and the Education and Research Area.  
The evolution of the composition of the Obra Social aims at achieving 
social efficiency by supporting areas that other public or private initiatives 
do not fully cover. It has typically been focused on low-income groups, the 
elderly, and less populated areas. A recent study shows that the Obra 
Social benefits 96% of the Spanish population, with the disadvantaged 
groups receiving most of the benefits.84 Spanish citizens, on average, make 
use of services or public goods provided by savings banks about three 
times per year. The study concludes that the extensive provision of social 
and cultural services by the private sector – and specifically by savings 
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banks – in Spain cannot be found in any other country. Finally, it suggests 
that the private provision of public goods through the Obra Social 
complements the government’s provision of such goods very well. 
Moreover, as Spain’s per capita income has increased, Obras Sociales have 
constantly adjusted the menu of services they provide.  
Some figures illustrate the economic impact of Obra Social. As for the 
impact on GDP, the Obra Social of the savings banks contributed €1,082 
million to the national wealth, which is almost one euro for each euro 
invested. As a result of this active participation in many sectors of the 
Spanish economy, the Obra Social generated 34,816 jobs in 2006 alone. This 
figure includes the indirect employment hired, the induced employment 
and direct employment from the savings banks’ Obra Social. The Obra 
Social generates more jobs than the average of the productive sectors of the 
economy, with two fundamental characteristics: the great variety of 
activities in which it generates employment (construction, health, NGOs or 
services companies, among others) and the higher quality of the 
employment in terms of qualifications, stability and salary. 
2.  Branching and demographic coverage  
The general trend related to the branching expansion of savings banks 
across the Spanish regions has already been shown in section 4.1. However, 
there are some other facts related to savings banks’ branch network with 
further implications for financial inclusion. First of all, the increase in 
branches registered over the last years has made a great contribution to 
increasing the savings banks’ presence in different regions to their 
traditional areas of action, without at the same time reducing their 
proximity to their original customers and their regions of origin. 20% of the 
new branches opened from 2005 to 2007 have been opened in the regions of 
origin.  In 2007, 63% of the savings bank branches were located in their 
regions of origin and an additional 10% in neighbouring regions, which 
means that they remain largely locally rooted.  
As regards the territorial distribution, together with the profitability 
criteria, one of the aspects to take into account is the possibility of reaching 
the highest number of inhabitants. This is why just over a third of the 
branches opened between 2005 and 2007 have been opened in small and 
medium-sized towns. These towns currently have more than 11,200 savings 
bank branches, which is almost half of the total. The continuing increase in 
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Spanish population covered or attended by savings bank branches remains 
at 97.3%, with 4,185 towns having at least one saving bank branch. 
The percentages for population coverage have remained high, 
whether the analysis is carried according to the size of the towns or 
according to geographical criteria. In the first case, there is total coverage 
for all towns with more than ten thousand inhabitants; around 93% for 
towns between one thousand and ten thousand inhabitants; and over 40% 
for those with less than 1,000 inhabitants. According to geographical 
criteria, despite the dispersion of the population in some regions of Spain, 
in 34 provinces (two more than the previous year) the savings bank 
branches are situated in such a way that they cover over 95% of the 
population.  
3.  Involvement with family and SME businesses 
Despite the specialisation of Spanish savings banks in retail business, 
savings banks go one step further in their involvement with the segment of 
family business and SMEs through direct shareholdings. The  direct 
investment in non-financial companies is very close to €20,000 million for 
the sector as a whole in 2007. The profile of companies that receive these 
funds with a high level of involvement is very diverse, and it reaches 
practically all sectors of activity through direct investments in more than 
2,000 businesses. The vast majority of these are unlisted companies 
including start-ups, and a high percentage of them have a capital stock of 
less than one million euros.  
Based on information for 2007, the standard loan to SMEs supplied 
by savings banks in Spain has an average value of €100,000, with an 
average nominal (typically floating) interest rate of around 5% and a time 
horizon of 5-10 years. It should be noted, however, that many savings 
banks offer a ‘subsidised’ loan (in collaboration with the Official Credit 
Institute, ICO, a public institution providing credit to firms with special 
needs of – and difficult access to – external funding) for SMEs with less 
than 250 employees and an annual turnover of less than €50 million. There 
is evidence, however, that the credit to SMEs has taken a heavier blow as a 
result of the financial crisis that started in mid-2007.85  
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lines are found to be “less buoyant” (p. 63) and the margin between the interest 
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4.  Immigration and remittances 
Remittances represent one of the latest instruments used by the Spanish 
savings banks to combat financial exclusion. Remittances services for 
immigrants have become an important financial service since immigrants 
represent a market in full expansion with more than four million citizens 
from other countries registered in Spain at the end of 2007. Practically all 
savings banks in Spain offer remittances services for immigrants, whether 
through the sector initiative, the CECA platform, or individually. Although 
similar services exist in other financial institutions, the Spanish savings 
banks remittances services show clearly differentiated objectives. The main 
distinctive feature that has inspired the remittance sector platform has been 
the intention to ensure that the resources sent to the immigrants’ countries 
of origin enter the circuit of the formal economy. This is why the operations 
are carried out with financial institutions, with which the savings banks 
and CECA have signed collaboration agreements. 
5.  Microfinance 
Microloans are one of the main instruments to combat financial exclusion. 
Since 1999, Spanish savings banks have been adapting this tool to the 
specific needs of Spanish society. Different formulas have been chosen to 
set up their microloan initiatives. However, they all contain the 
fundamental characteristic that is the social focus conferred to the 
microloans, predetermined by the presence of an outstanding institution in 
the savings banks, the Obra Social, which finances or backs the granting of 
the loans, depending on the case. The definition commonly accepted by the 
savings banks maintains that a social microloan is a loan of a small variable 
amount, which is granted for self-employment or economic activities to 
people at risk of exclusion or with no access to the traditional financial 
system and to people who do not have guarantees with which they could 
back their loan requests. 
Another feature of the social microloan schemes set up by savings 
banks is that they place great value on feasibility studies covering the 
operations that are to be financed. This practice has the consequences of 
low default rates on the microloan portfolios and high success rates of the 
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activities or projects of the borrowers that are financed. This socially 
compatible way of financing leads to a high level of respect for these 
schemes and great confidence in them.  
Over the period 2001-2006, Spanish savings banks have granted a 
total of 9,033 social microloans, to a sum of more than €97.2 million. This 
figure includes the microloans granted by the savings banks in 
collaboration with the lines of the Official Credit Institute (ICO) that 
represent around €10 million.  
One of the fundamental characteristics of the microloans is the 
flexibility in paying off the loans. Almost all savings banks offer the 
possibility of a grace period for loan repayment and other credit terms that 
are tailored to the situation of the borrowers and therefore lead to a high 
level of success in the business initiatives. The user profile for the typical 
microloan client of the savings banks is, and has already been for quite 
some time, a 35-year-old immigrant woman, with a clear idea of an SME 
who requests a loan of around €10,000 to set up a business, mainly in the 
services sector. Moreover, around 60-80% of the people who request 
microloans from savings banks are foreigners, and people who have 
immigrated to Spain for economic reasons. According to the CECA Social 
Responsibility Report for 2006, microloans from the Spanish savings banks 
have created around 13,000 direct jobs to date. The average interest rate is 
4.5%, with rates varying from almost zero to a maximum of 7%.  
In 2006, CECA announced the launch of the Spanish Micro-financing 
network, an initiative of the savings bank sector to promote the extension 
of the microloan in Spain and to spread its key role in combating social and 
financial exclusion. Apart from its informative work, the network also aims 
to set up programmes for preparation and improvement of the 
management of microloan schemes, particularly aimed at NGOs and social 
institutions.  
4.5  Conclusions 
This chapter has surveyed the main distinctive, competitive and social 
features of Spanish savings banks. In order to summarise these features, six 
main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis: 
i)  Following the financial liberalisation processes in Spain during the 
1980s, Spanish savings banks were permitted to operate just like any 
other financial institution and started to offer their clients a complete 
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financial institutions with strong local roots, whose mission is 
extending financial services to large segments of the population and 
distributing the profits obtained in the way of supporting social 
activities.  
ii)  The liberalisation trend, their branching expansion and their 
relationship-based banking model led them to fiercely and 
successfully compete with other banking entities, until reaching 
market shares of more than 50% at the present time.  
iii)  The current political debate in Spain has left behind some of the main 
past concerns and in particular those related to their legal status as 
private enterprises. Spanish savings banks are private foundations 
with a heritage showing a markedly social purpose.  
iv)  At present, there are forty-five savings banks in Spain covering the 
entire national territory. They provide their services to 96.3% of the 
Spanish territory, thanks to wide branch coverage.  
v)  Spanish savings banks are leading the main initiatives towards 
combating financial exclusion in Spain. These initiatives include not 
just their retail specialisation and their investment in Obra Social. 
They also cover many other relevant areas such as the location of 
branches in deprived and less populated areas, the development of 
specific products for family business and SMEs, remittances 
platforms and microfinance services.   
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5.  COUNTRY ANALYSIS: 
GERMAN SAVINGS BANKS 
5.1  Origins and historical development  
The first savings bank in Germany was founded by philanthropically-
minded citizens in Hamburg in 1771 in the form of a private foundation. Its 
main purpose was to further the savings habits of low-earning workers like 
sailors and housemaids. A limited number of other groups of citizens 
adopted this model in ensuing years. Public savings banks appeared in 
1801 with the creation of a municipal savings bank in Göttingen, and soon 
this became the dominant form of savings banks all over Germany.  
Until the late 1920s, the savings banks were an integral part of the 
administration of the respective city or county; then, in the aftermath of the 
banking crisis of 1929, they became independent institutions governed by 
savings banks laws issued by the respective federal state in which the 
banks were located.86 As a consequence of this reform and of the first 
German Banking Act of 1934, savings banks obtained the right to operate in 
almost any respect like all other German banks, provided the relevant 
savings bank law did not impose any specific restriction, and were subject 
to all the rules that apply to any credit institution in Germany. Thus, for 
almost eighty years, they have been universal banks by law and in practice.  
In spite of this, the business of all savings banks is local and retail-
oriented. They play an important role in the collection of deposits, payment 
transfers and lending to private households, small and medium-sized firms 
and municipal authorities. According to tradition, statutes and laws, they 
operate under a regional principle, which implies that as far as their 
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lending operations are concerned they are predominantly to serve clients 
who live and work in the area covered by the respective municipality.  
Until 2005, the savings banks and the ‘Landesbanken’ (see below) 
enjoyed certain privileges. Most importantly, they benefited from public 
guarantees. In the course of the 1990s, private banks raised complaints with 
the EU Commission that these guarantees created an unfair competitive 
advantage, especially in the capital market operations of the Landesbanken, 
and this finally led to a phasing out of the guarantees.  
In 2008, there were 438 savings banks in Germany, with a trend of 
reducing the number through mergers among savings banks. In parallel, 
the average savings bank size has increased considerably over the past 20 
years. Table 5.1 provides the relevant data. 
Table 5.1 Number and average sizes of savings banks in Germany, 2002-08 
Year  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of 
savings banks 
519 489 477 463 457 446 438 
Branches  15.628 14.757 14.292 13.950 13.756 13.624 13.756 
Avg. total 
assets/SB 
1.88 2.01 2.07 2.15 2.20 2.29 2.22 
Source: German Savings Bank Association (DSGV). Average assets per savings bank are in 
billions of euro.  
Three features of the German savings banks are particularly 
noteworthy.  
One is that they are the most successful banking group in Germany 
on several counts. Relevant data are presented in section 3, below. 
However, it is important to properly understand the meaning of the word 
‘group’. As it is used here and in the following text as well as by the 
savings banks themselves, the term group refers to specific types of bank 
and also to classifications used by the German central bank in its official 
statistics. Therefore, it does not have the connotation of a group of 
institutions under common management and related through equity ties, as 
this term is used in corporate law and competition law.  
The second feature is that they form an integral part of a network, the 
so-called ‘Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe’  (or S-Group). Besides the local or 
primary savings banks, the most important other financial institutions in 
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Landesbanken, all of which had formerly also been public law institutions 
and most of which are now still publicly owned institutions, emerged as 
important financial institutions in their own right only after the Second 
World War. Initially, they had mainly served as clearing houses for the 
savings banks in their respective regions, and at the same time they were 
the ‘house bank’ of the respective state. Later on they adopted the 
additional roles of providing those services to the local savings banks and 
their clients that would be too difficult to offer to the individual savings 
banks, due to their size. Now many of them are large banks operating at 
the national, European and in some cases even international levels.  
In terms of total assets, it might be said that the entire group of local 
savings banks and that of the Landesbanken are equally large. The 
aggregated balance sheet volume of the local savings banks was €1,045 
billion at the end of 2007, and that of all 11 Landesbanken, which existed at 
that point in time, amounted to €1,587 billion. However, in terms of total 
staff and branches, the savings banks are much larger than the 
Landesbanken. Since the beginning of 2008, the number of independent 
Landesbanken has declined to 8 through mergers and acquisitions. The S-
Group also includes a number of specialised financial service providers as 
well as several training institutes and other financial service firms. In 
addition to their close affiliation with the Landesbanken, the savings banks 
are related through a network of associations at state and federal levels. All 
in all, the number of people employed in the S-Group was 377,431 at the 
end of 2007. Out of these, some 250,000 were employed by the savings 
banks, some 50,000 by the Landesbanken, and the rest by the other 
institutions belonging to the network.  
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the institutions that make up the 
entire ‘Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe’. The graph represents organisational 
links but does not show the hierarchy or the equity-holding relationships. 
The third noteworthy feature of the Savings Banks Group is that it 
has for many years been the largest group in the German banking system. 
The main competitors of the local savings banks are the group of private 
commercial banks with the two subgroups of ‘large banks’ and others, 
called regional banks in the terminology of the official statistics provided 
by the Deutsche Bundesbank, and the Cooperative Banking Group, which 
comprises local or primary cooperative banks and two large 
regional/national banks. Table 5.2 shows the sizes of these three banking 
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Figure 5.1 The Savings Banks Group 
 
Source: DSGV, Markets 2008 (data 2007).  
Note that there has been a consolidation process among the Landesbanken since 2007. In 
2008, the number has decreased to 7.   
Table 5.2 Size distribution of the three most important banking groups in Germany 
(in €bn and in percentages of total bank assets of all German banks, as of 
year-end 2007)  
Year  S-Finance-Group  Commercial Banks  Cooperative Bank Group 
1999 1971.01  35.72  1421.71 25.77  728.87  13.21 
2000 2106.06  35.34  1617.85 27.15  742.59  12.46 
2001 2205.07  34.92  1802.02 28.54  756.83  11.98 
2002 2267.19  35.60  1785.10 28.03  744.70  11.69 
2003 2324.18  35.95  1825.41 28.24  748.22  11.57 
2004 2362.64  35.80  1862.31 28.22  761.48  11.54 
2005 2341.52  34.04  1958.02 28.46  798.33  11.61 
2006 2419.45  34.11  2021.40 28.50  829.30  11.69 
2007 2521.89  33.94  2187.08 29.44  869.26  11.70 
Source: Bundesbank, Monthly reports, various issues. Note that percentages do not add up 
to 100, since not all banks belong to one of these three groups. 
For a first general characterisation of German savings banks it is 
helpful to place them in the broader context of the German financial 
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still largely bank-based.87 This fact shows how important it is that the 
Savings Bank Group is the largest one among the three banking groups. 
Traditionally and even only a few years ago, the relationships between 
most banks and their business clients in Germany were close and largely 
conformed to the so-called house bank principle.88 This is much less so 
today in the case of some large private commercial banks, which have in 
recent years reoriented themselves to become more capital market-
focussed. In contrast, savings banks still see themselves as the house banks 
of their enterprise clients, most of which belong to the large number of 
small and medium-sized firms that are the backbone of the German 
economy called the ‘Mittelstand’.  
Finally, due to their legal and ownership status, the savings banks are 
still governed by a broader objective function than being merely profit or 
shareholder-value oriented. Not too long ago, most banks, including the 
large private commercial banks, de facto shared this orientation to a large 
extent too.89 But for about ten years, these other banks have become much 
more profit-driven.90 Now the savings banks and the cooperative banks are 
the only banking groups in Germany with a clear ‘dual-bottom line 
orientation’. Thus, generally speaking, the savings banks maintained some 
of those features that had formerly characterised the entire German 
banking system, and this makes them appear as institutions that preserve 
                                                      
87 For a comprehensive survey see Krahnen & Schmidt (2004), especially chapter 2, 
and most recently Sachverständigenrat (2008).  
88 For an account of the role of banks and bank-client relationships in the time 
before the First World War, see Hilferding (1910), and for recent empirical 
evidence pertaining to the 1990s, see Elsas & Krahnen (1998; 2004).  
89 It seems that not too long ago, most large banks in Germany, as well as the 
people leading these banks, were more concerned with their role and importance 
in the German economy than with profits and share prices. This business attitude 
had historical and economic reasons, many of which can be traced back to the early 
years of German industrialisation at the end of the 19th century. For a historical 
perspective of the role of banks and the relationship between banks and society, 
see Abelshauser (2003) and for a political science analysis of the specific German 
‘variety of capitalism’ see Hall & Soskice (2001).  
90 A number of factors seem to have induced this change, most notably the stock 
market boom towards the end of the last century and a generation change among 
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old, well-proven and likable features that are generally perceived as having 
contributed greatly to Germany’s economic recovery after the Second 
World War. At the same time, it makes them appear conservative in a 
clearly positive sense, and this may be the reason why they enjoy great 
political support on all sides of the political spectrum.  
For a general characterisation of the German savings banks, it is 
equally important to compare them to the savings banks of other European 
countries. In the Nordic countries and in Austria, the savings bank groups 
are far more concentrated than in Germany; in Spain, the savings banks 
have for a very long time been private organisations governed by private 
law. In Italy, most savings banks have more or less fully converted to 
becoming private banks and in a number of cases they have been absorbed 
into large private banking establishments like INTESA and UNI-Credit. In 
the UK, they have disappeared as a specific type of bank, and in France, 
they have been converted into the fourth pillar of the cooperative banking 
group.  
Thus, in contrast to those of other countries, the German savings 
banks have largely remained the same in terms of their organisational and 
legal structure and status and maintained most of those features which the 
savings banks of other countries once shared. At the same time, in terms of 
their institutional features and their business orientation, they changed less 
than most other elements of the German financial system. There are several 
factors that explain this characteristic of the German savings banks, which 
one may, depending on political preferences, either call stability or 
resistance to change. One factor is that German savings banks experienced 
less political pressure to undergo far-reaching transformation as happened 
in other countries. However, not only was the political pressure weaker in 
Germany than elsewhere, but also the economic pressure to change was 
less for savings banks in Germany since, in stark contrast to the situation in 
France or Italy for example, the economic performance of the German 
savings banks was good for many years and indeed even better than all 
other banking groups. This may be a reason for the limited political 
pressure from inside Germany. That German savings banks performed so 
well can in turn be explained by two factors. One is that German savings 
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other banks. The other factor may be their organisational and institutional 
structure,91 which we now address.  
5.2  Ownership structure, regulation and supervision  
The Savings Bank Group consists of a three-layer structure of financial 
institutions which comprises the local savings banks, the Landesbanken 
and Deka Bank, a bank that operates on the national level and serves 
mainly as the provider of investment products for the Savings Bank Group, 
and a parallel structure of associations consisting of a set of regional 
savings banks associations and, at the top, the German Savings Bank 
Association (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband – DSGV).  
Almost all savings banks are still municipal savings banks – despite 
numerous efforts to change this and to privatise them, as discussed in 
chapter 2 above. As to their legal form, they are public law institutions 
(Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts). This implies that they have no owner in 
the legal sense. The municipality or, as the case may be, several 
municipalities, which may be cities or counties, are the public bodies that 
bear the responsibility for ‘their’ savings bank. The German term for this 
status is ‘Träger’, which can be translated as ‘supporting or responsible 
institution’. As such, they have certain rights to influence the operations of 
the savings banks and are in a political sense responsible for them. Even 
though in economic terms their role has some similarity to that of the 
owner of a private corporation, the ownership rights of the ‘responsible 
institutions’ of a savings bank are more restricted. For instance, a 
municipality does not have the right to sell its savings bank, as a recent 
controversial case in North-East Germany concerning the Sparkasse 
Stralsund made clear, and its right to take out profits or other surpluses are 
extremely weak; a feature that can easily be explained by reference to the 
reliance on self-financing.  
Until recently, public savings banks enjoyed a dual and quite 
comprehensive public or state guarantee. Firstly, all deposits were 
guaranteed by the state in which a savings bank was located. The German 
term for this guarantee is ‘Gewährträgerhaftung’, which could be 
                                                      
91 These different causes of the stability and the good performance of German 
savings banks, and their organisational features tend to interact and mutually 
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translated as ‘sponsor’s guarantee’. However, in fact this state guarantee 
was never invoked after the Second World War. If a German savings bank 
is in difficulties, it is likely to be merged with another savings bank in the 
same region, and if this is not possible, the S-group’s own guarantee system 
comes into play, thus avoiding the need to invoke the public guarantee.  
The second type of public or state guarantee was the so-called 
‘maintenance obligation’ (Anstaltslast). This concept, which has in fact 
never become relevant in the past 60 years, refers to the obligation of the 
responsible municipalities to create the conditions under which their 
savings banks can operate.  
These two kinds of guarantee were abolished or at least watered 
down almost completely in 2005 after a consensus between the EU 
Commission and the German Federal Government had been reached in 
2001, and they will be completely phased out in a precisely defined time 
frame.  
As licensed banks, the German savings banks have to conform to the 
general banking regulation and are subject to normal banking supervision, 
which is exercised by the Federal Financial Services Authority (BAFin) in 
cooperation with the Bundesbank. For instance, they have to have the same 
level of equity and to follow the same structural and prudential rules as 
other banks. Also with respect to taxation and labour law, all banks are 
treated equally in Germany. However, in contrast to other banks, savings 
banks are also subject to the savings bank law of the respective German 
state in which they are located. All savings bank laws stipulate that savings 
banks have to serve the public interest of their region by fostering 
individual savings and the awareness of the general population of the 
importance of savings and prudent conduct in financial matters, and by 
satisfying the credit demand of their local communities. Savings banks 
have to focus on the needs of employed people, small and medium-sized 
enterprises and certain public authorities. As a part of their public service 
mandate, they are obliged to open a transaction account for every 
applicant. Typically, the laws further stipulate that profit maximisation is 
not the only or even not the primary business objective of savings banks, 
although they are obliged by law to conduct their businesses according to 
sound business principles. And indeed, profits are particularly important 
for them to self-finance and increase their equity in accordance with a 
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rarely in a position to inject additional equity, and since they cannot raise 
equity by issuing shares in the general market.  
The savings bank laws do generally not permit savings banks to hold 
equity participations in enterprises outside the Savings Banks Group or to 
undertake certain risky operations. These rules may appear outdated and 
excessively restrictive. But in the current banking crisis they have proven to 
be utterly beneficial because they prevented the savings banks from 
investing in risky assets based on foreign subprime mortgages. Moreover, 
the savings banks are expected, but not required by law, to observe the so-
called regional principle, which means that each institution should focus its 
lending operations on clients from its local area. This rule serves to limit 
competition within the group of savings banks. But since by limiting 
within-group competition it enables the savings banks to cooperate easily 
with each other, it serves to strengthen competition between the savings 
banks and other banks or banking groups.  
Formally speaking, the governance structure of savings banks 
resembles that of private commercial banks. There is an executive board 
that reports to a supervisory board called Administrative Council 
(Verwaltungsrat). In most cases, two thirds of its members are appointed 
by the municipality or the municipalities of the city or county in which the 
Savings Bank is domiciled, and one third is elected by the employees. A 
third body, the credit committee, comprises at least three members of the 
supervisory board and gives the sponsoring entity or entities the 
opportunity to exert a certain influence on important credit decisions. The 
extent to which the responsible municipality or municipalities are entitled 
to receive dividends, is more or less limited according to all savings bank 
laws. In most cases, profits are ploughed back to strengthen the banks and 
to help them expand their operations and to fund extensive social support 
activities, which we will address in subsection 4 below.  
As Figure 5.2 shows, the Savings Banks Group looks like a three-
storey building with a broad base of some 446 local savings banks (in 2007). 
On this common base rest two separate structures with two storeys each. 
One of these structures comprises financial institutions, and the other one 
associations of savings banks. On the second level, we find the regional 
financial institutions, the Landesbanken, and the regional associations of 
savings banks, while the third and highest level consists of one financial 
institution, the DekaBank and one top-level association, the German 
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Figure 5.2 The structure of the German Savings Banks Group 
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represent a hierarchical system with the institutions on top being 
something like the ‘corporate centre’. The savings bank system is not a 
hierarchy with the central power residing on top. Instead, the formal power 
and in many respects also the real power resides with the institutions at the 
bottom, the local savings banks. The Landesbanken are neither formally 
nor de facto superior to the local savings banks, and DekaBank does not in 
any sense have a supreme authority over the Landesbanken.  
In addition to 440 public savings banks, since 1997 there have been 
six so-called free savings banks that are essentially self-controlled and 
‘owned’ by foundations. Two of these are among the oldest German 
savings banks, and they operate in large cities and therefore are also among 
the largest savings banks in Germany, while four are among the smaller 
German savings banks. In all other respects they are comparable to their 
public peers. This applies in particular to their mandate and their 
commitment to the interests of their region and their clients and to their 
policy of retaining profits to fund internal growth and permit social 
support activities.  
The second main group of financial institutions within the Savings 
Banks Group, are the Landesbanken. In mid-2008, there were seven legally 
independent Landesbanken, but in view of the various capital links 
between them, one can only speak of seven economically independent 
institutions of that kind. Their legal form varies from case to case. Some are 
joint stock companies, whose shares are held, in varying proportions, by 
regional savings banks associations, federal states and other Landesbanken, 
Local Savings Banks 
Regional Associations of 
Savings Banks 
Deka-Bank  DSGV 
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while others are still public law institutions. Landesbanken are also 
regulated by the general banking law and supervised like other banks.  
For some years now, and especially since the end of the state 
guarantees in 2005 (see below), reducing the number of Landesbanken to 
four or three or even a lower number through a consolidation among the 
Landesbanken has been discussed. The urgency of this consolidation has 
grown in the course of the current financial crisis, since several of these 
banks have been seriously affected by the crisis.  
Landesbanken have three functions. Firstly, they serve as the house 
banks of their respective state(s). Secondly, they act as the central banks or 
clearing houses for the local savings banks in their region. Their third 
function consists of supporting the much smaller primary banks in 
providing complex, non-standard products and services to the local 
savings banks and to their customers. Moreover, they are truly universal 
banks in their own right providing commercial and investment banking 
services to larger domestic and foreign banks, non-bank financial 
institutions and corporate and private clients. They thus compete directly 
with the large private commercial banks. It is essentially this latter role that 
was vigorously attacked by the group of private banks as being unfair and 
incompatible with the various forms of public subsidies, including full state 
guarantees, from which Landesbanken benefited in the past.  
The local savings banks of one federal State or, in some cases, several 
states, are members of their respective regional savings banks associations. 
These regional associations provide certain common non-financial services 
to the member savings banks and represent them in the public and political 
arena of their respective home state(s), for instance when changes in 
savings bank-relevant issues are debated in the state legislature.  
The financial institution located at the third and highest level of the 
Savings Banks Group, or the institution housed on the third floor of the 
savings banks ‘building’ is DekaBank. It is, among other things, the 
provider of investment management services for the entire group. 
DekaBank is also a public law institution (Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts), 
but largely patterned on the model of a joint stock corporation. Half of its 
equity is held by the Landesbanken and the other half by the DSGV. At a 
formal level, one can say that the status of DekaBank as the financial 
institution at the top of the pyramid resembles that of the DSGV, the 
highest level Association within the Savings Banks Group. However, 
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specialises in providing investment products and services for the savings 
banks and their clients and in this capacity operates on a national scale. It 
does not have a central bank or clearing function with respect to the 
Landesbanken.92  
In spite of the high degree of independence of the primary savings 
banks granted by the ‘federal corporatist’ type of organisation and in spite 
of the formal or legal situation, it is instructive to look at the Savings Banks 
Group as one large bank-assurance group. As such it would constitute the 
largest financial institution in the world with roughly €3.6 trillion in assets 
and 377,000 employees at the end of 2007. Furthermore, the market 
penetration of the savings banks is unrivalled in Germany. With 446 
savings banks and some 16,500 branches at the end of 2007, they have an 
outreach into every corner of the country.  
5.3  Competitive and other market developments  
a)  The financial situation of savings banks  
Even though the German Savings Banks have a mandate to provide 
financial services that are relevant and valuable for a broad segment of the 
population and despite not being primarily profit-oriented, they are, as a 
group (in the sense of the official statistics as explained above), surprisingly 
successful in economic and financial terms. This is most evident when the 
years between 1970 and 2000 are considered and becomes even more 
pronounced in the years after the beginning of the new millennium. The 
early years after 2000 were difficult for all banks, but in particular for the 
big private commercial banks and the second-tier institutions of the 
cooperative and Savings Banks Groups. Notably, the primary savings 
banks were much less affected by the recent financial market turmoil than 
the other banks mentioned. To illustrate this proposition, we take a brief 
look at various performance indicators.  
                                                      
92 The Savings Banks Group furthermore includes eleven regional public loan and 
building associations (market share in their market in 2006: 36%), six leasing 
companies (32%), two factoring companies (12%), the second largest insurance 
group in Germany with a market share in all- and life-insurance of 10.5% and 
10.2% respectively, as well as central data processing and training institutions. (see 
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Figure 5.3 shows the market shares of the major German banking 
groups in terms of loans to non-banks and deposits from non-banks for 
different time periods. With a market share of 35% for loans and 38% for 
deposits (for the 2000 to 2007 period) the savings banks grant more loans to 
German SMEs and mobilise more deposits than any other banking group. 
Since not all banks are covered, the percentages in Figure 5.3 do not add up 
to 100%. 
Thus, as Figure 5.3 illustrates, the savings banks are the market leader 
in German retail banking, well ahead of the cooperative and the private 
commercial banks, who are their most important competitors since they 
also offer retail banking services and maintain large branch networks. The 
left hand panel shows the market shares of the entire Saving Bank and 
cooperative banking groups in regard to deposits from non-banks whereas 
the right-hand panel shows that of domestic lending to non-banks. 
However, since the Landesbanken are hardly involved at all in retail 
banking, the figures for the entire S-Group largely resemble those of the 
savings banks on a stand-alone basis. 
Figure 5.3 Market shares of the three banking groups, deposits and loans to 
non-banks93 
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93 The data source of this figure as well as those that follow is Deutsche 
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A brief look at the structure of the aggregated balance sheet of the 
German Savings Banks and their long-term development is provided in 
Figure 5.4. By far the largest asset class are loans to non-banks, which 
consistently comprise more than 60% of the assets, while the largest item on 
the liabilities side are deposits from non-banks with more than 70% on 
average over the years. This balance sheet structure differs greatly from 
that of commercial banks and indicates that the savings banks have 
retained the traditional function of banks as financial intermediaries, 
namely that of transforming client deposits into loans to businesses and 
households. All in all, these figures clearly reveal the savings banks’ special 
and indeed quite conservative business model. 
Figure 5.4 Development of savings banks’ balance sheet structure over time 
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We now take a look at the efficiency and profitability of the 
operations of the German savings banks. Throughout the last thirty years 
of the last century, the savings banks achieved a return on equity that was 
consistently higher than that of the private commercial banks and, despite 
the vast branch network, their cost-income ratio, a widely used measure of 
efficiency, was consistently lower than that of their peers. Thus, in terms of 
financial efficiency, the savings banks were the most successful banking 
group during this period of time.  
In the years around the turn of the century (1999-2002), the relative 
positions changed slightly as a consequence of the stock market hype and 
the dot-com bubble which pushed up the returns of the commercial banks. 
But already in 2003, the ‘old order’ of profitability had been restored. 
According to data published by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the savings 
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commercial banks and the central institutions of both the Savings Banks 
Group and the cooperative banking group. In the very recent past, the 
situation was difficult to assess due to the consequences of the ongoing 
turmoil in the financial markets. Even though the savings banks have 
hardly been affected at all by the crisis through their own operations, they 
have suffered from having to bear a share of the burden that resulted from 
the critical losses incurred by some of the Landesbanken in the course of 
the crisis.  
Figure 5.5 shows the return on equity and the cost income ratios as 
measures of profitability and operational efficiency for the time between 
1970 and 2000, while Figure 5.6 covers the more turbulent years at the 
beginning of the new millennium. These figures show that, almost entirely 
over the time span depicted, the savings banks as a group had the highest 
return on equity and the lowest cost-income ratio. Moreover, their 
profitability and cost-structures were much more stable than those of the 
commercial banks. This stability seems to be due to their conservative and 
seemingly old-fashioned emphasis on deposit taking and lending as their 
core businesses.  
Figure 5.5 Return on equity and cost income ratios for the period 1970-2000 
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Figure 5.6 Return on equity and cost income ratios for the period 2000-07 
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Figure 5.7 provides a comparison of various performance indicators 
for the three groups of banks covering the last forty years of the old 
millennium, while Figure 5.8 contains the same information for the years 
after 2000.  
Figure 5.7 Performance indicators for main German banking groups for 1970-2000 
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Figure 5.8 Performance indicators for the German banking groups for 2000-06 
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It should be emphasised that the data used in the figures for balance 
sheet structures, efficiency and profitability comprise only the savings 
banks and not those of the Landesbanken.  
In many respects, the economic performance of the primary 
cooperative banks is similar to that of the local savings banks. One of the 
similarities is that the share of total revenues coming from fees is 
consistently low. These similarities reflect the fact that they both belong to 
complex but highly decentralised systems of banks, which are called 
‘Verbundsysteme’ in German. One might translate this term, for which no 
English expression exists, as ‘federated system’. These systems evidently 
differ in a fundamental way from the conventional organisational structure 
of an integrated enterprise, and as it seems, this is a strong advantage of the 
savings and cooperative banks. In particular, if the business focus is on 
retail banking, these decentralised structures seem especially conducive to 
a sound and stable financial performance.  
b)  Competition and market structure  
It is well-known that the German banking market is highly competitive as a 
whole, probably more so than those of all other large countries in Europe. 
One reason for this is that banking concentration is extremely low by 
international standards. Banking concentration can be measured in various 
ways. One way is the so-called C5 ratio, which indicates the market share 
of the largest five institutions. Germany’s C5 ratio stood at 37.8 in 2002 and 
since then has not changed dramatically. The other method is the use of the 
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values indicating a lower level of concentration. According to the European 
Central Bank (ECB) the HH-Index for Germany stood at 183 in 2007. 
Consequently, concentration in Germany is unusually low, and this may be 
taken as an indication and possible even as a cause of a high level of 
competition.  
Of course, measuring the intensity of competition only with 
indicators of concentration may be misleading, since these concentration 
measures apply for an entire national economy, while competition, at least 
competition in retail banking, takes place on local markets. Moreover, the 
standard measurements of concentration for the case of German banking 
treat the local or primary savings banks and cooperative banks as 
individual banks. Formally, this is correct, since they are legally 
independent entities. However, in an analysis of competition, this may be 
misleading because they also belong to their respective networks (the 
Verbundsysteme mentioned above), and belonging to these ‘federated 
systems’ is probably an important competitive strength. If one treated each 
one of these the two groups as one big bank, the concentration figures 
would be more or less in line with those of other European countries.  
Moreover, retail competition is essentially local, and the numerous 
savings banks and cooperative banks operate under their respective 
regional principle, that is, they hardly compete with each other within their 
respective groups. Thus, on a local level, there are not hundreds of banks 
competing with each other, but rather one or at best very few savings 
banks, one or possibly very few cooperative banks, and possibly a few 
branches of the big commercial banks. Nevertheless, the level of 
competition is extremely high in Germany, as one can see from other 
competition indicators. One of these, the so-called Lerner Index, measures 
competition directly by identifying the extent to which actual prices 
charged in a market diverge from those that could be expected if perfect 
competition were obtained. However, applying this ‘direct’ measure of 
competition to narrowly defined local or regional markets for retail 
banking services in Germany yields the same result as the ‘indirect’ 
measurement based on national concentration indicators: competition in 
German banking is fierce. The reason for this is that savings banks and 
cooperative banks are, by their design, strictly tied to their local markets. 
This means they are confined to their markets and compete with others 
within these markets. They would find it extremely difficult to move out of 
these local markets like large private banks do easily and have done 
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the regional principle that applies to these groups are the main reason for 
the highly intense competition in German retail banking markets.  
There is also strong indirect evidence for the high level of competition 
in German banking. One indicator is that the prices for financial services in 
Germany are very low by international standards,94 a fact that is clearly 
beneficial for the clients of the banks. The high level of competition and the 
low level of prices are also reflected in the fact that by international 
standards the profitability of German banks is low. It would be wrong to 
regard this as a consequence of high costs or low productivity, since the 
costs of German banks are not higher or even lower, and their productivity 
is not lower than those in comparable other countries, as recent research 
has clearly shown.95 The difference in profitability can therefore only be the 
consequence of low earnings caused by low prices and indirectly by strong 
competition, a fact for which the institutional design of the savings and 
cooperative banking groups bear the main responsibility. The competitors 
of those banks that are tied to their local markets may not like this, and this 
is why they are so strongly opposed to the regional principle and the 
‘Verbundstrukturen’ of savings banks and cooperative banks and keep 
calling them anti-competitive. But the clients seem to appreciate the 
situation as it is – as is becoming all the more evident in the current 
financial crisis in which the savings banks are substantially gaining 
additional market share in the deposit and the lending markets!  
One aspect of banking competition is merger activity. By their 
institutional design and their legal status, savings banks and cooperative 
banks cannot be acquired by commercial banks. Thus, mergers across the 
dividing lines between the three pillars of the German banking system are 
virtually impossible. But this does not suggest that mergers do not occur. In 
fact, the opposite is true. The number of banks in Germany has declined 
almost dramatically during the past 20 years. In 1990 there were 4,719 
Banks, and at the end of 2007, there were only 2,300 banks left. This decline 
is almost exclusively due to mergers and consolidations within the groups 
of the savings banks and, even more so, that of the cooperative banks. 
Smaller and economically weaker institutions have been absorbed by 
others from their respective groups, thus raising the average size of savings 
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banks and cooperative banks. And since the costs of really small banks tend 
to be higher than those of mid-sized banks, the process of within-group 
consolidation has improved the efficiency of these two banking groups and 
this, together with the benefits of having their respective networks, seems 
to have enabled them to withstand the competitive pressure from the large 
commercial banks.  
A reflection of the causes of the high level of competition in local 
German banking markets is the extent to which clients have access to 
banking services. In contrast to the situation of other countries, the access to 
financial services does not seem to be a problem in Germany, and this is 
again due to the existence of savings banks and cooperative banks and their 
presence in almost all parts of the country. If they were not present, access 
would be a problem, because under increasing pressure to achieve high 
rates of return, the big private banks have thinned out their branch 
networks in remote areas of the country. The fact that in every tenth county 
(Landkreis) in Germany there is now no longer a single branch of a 
commercial bank, is evidence of this trend. In former East Germany, the 
absence of the commercial banks in rural and other less developed areas is 
particularly conspicuous. Whether their retreat from remote regions is 
caused by the dominating role and the high market shares of the savings 
banks in different lines of retail banking or rather the opposite, that is, 
whether the strong position of the savings banks is a consequence of the 
retreat of the commercial bank, is an open issue on which, understandably, 
opinions are divided. In any event, the banks belonging to the ‘federated 
structures’ currently assure good access to banking services.  
5.4  Service, access, proximity and financial inclusion  
Because of their origins, their legal mandate, their institutional design and 
their ownership structure, savings banks in general are quintessentially 
dual-bottom line institutions. This implies that they have to make 
sufficiently large profits to survive, grow and prosper as financial 
institutions in order to be able to offer more and better services to their 
clients, and that they should at the same time have a positive effect on the 
economic and social situation of their clients and, more generally, of the 
region in which they operate. Thus observers and policy-makers should 
also have an idea of the extent to which both objectives are met even 
though it may be difficult to determine precisely for methodological 
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As we have discussed in the last section, the performance measured 
in purely financial terms of the German savings banks as a group as well as 
that of most individual savings banks is positive. Over the medium-to-long 
term, it is at least as good as that of other German banking groups, as can 
be read-off from the time series of the cost-income ratio and those for the 
return over assets and return over equity. For obvious reasons, it is more 
difficult to measure and assess the extent to which the other, not directly 
financial objectives are met. One possible indicator that may be regarded as 
useful in this context is the amount of money that savings banks set aside 
and use for social and cultural projects and purposes and for sports 
sponsorship. In the case of German savings banks, this sum is around half a 
billion euro per year and thus beyond any doubt very substantial. The 
major part of this sum is provided directly by the savings banks and is 
taken out of their surplus, but a substantial part also comes from more than 
600 foundations that have been set up by institutions belonging to the S-
Finanzgruppe. The savings banks provide about one third of all non-
governmental funding for social, cultural and other purposes. In the area of 
cultural and sports activities, they are the largest provider of financial 
support in Germany.  
However, one should not be misled into thinking that the sponsoring 
and direct support activity of savings banks is all that they contribute to 
meeting their non-financial objectives. Sponsorship is in fact just the most 
visible part of their contribution to achieving a better society, but probably 
not the most important part. The main part is what kind of financial 
services they provide, to whom they provide these services and how they 
provide them. It would seem that the savings banks themselves see their 
role in this way and others too would share this view.  
The German savings banks are the most important providers of loans 
to the numerous German small and mid-sized firms, which employ almost 
half of the working population. Three out of four firms are clients of the 
savings banks, and in a very large number of cases, the savings bank is the 
most important one among the banks with which a given firm has a 
working relationship. It is exactly this role of being the main financier of 
small and medium-sized firms that the general public in Germany 
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recently been confirmed in an opinion poll conducted by the opinion 
research firm FORSA.96  
It is interesting to look at how this situation has been affected by the 
financial crisis. According to the latest Ifo Business conditions survey, 
between 20 to 30% of large and medium-sized manufacturing firms have 
indicated that access to credit has become restrictive just within the last 
quarter of 2008 as a result of the financial crisis.97 Quite surprisingly, the 
changes of credit availability have been more moderate for the small-sized 
firms, which by February 2009 face less restrictive access to credit than all 
other firms, reversing a long-standing historical trend. The findings of 
Bundesbank’s Bank Lending Survey (BLS) offers an explanation of why the 
conditions have not worsened as much for these firms: most of them 
borrow from their local banks, such as savings banks and credit 
cooperatives, which obtain their funding from deposits. With more ample 
funding, these institutions have been able to apply less restrictive standards 
and lower margins to their customers.98 
In a similar way, savings banks play an important role in avoiding 
financial and social exclusion and limiting the effects of regional disparity. 
One out of two Germans has at least one bank account with a savings bank. 
But what is more important is the fact that the savings banks are prepared 
to open an account for anybody, irrespective of his or her financial 
situation. This policy of the savings banks prevents financial exclusion from 
being as much of a problem as it is in many other countries in the EU and 
especially in the UK, where public banks no longer exist.  
Moreover, with more than 16,000 branches the savings banks also 
maintain by far the largest network of branches among all banking groups. 
Savings banks are also present in areas where the purely profit-oriented 
commercial banks have closed the branches which they once had or where 
                                                      
96 See the summary of the FORSA findings, published by DSGV 2006. 
97 For more, see the Credit Conditions Indicator in Ifo Business Survey, February 
2009. 
98 See box on p. 17 of Monthly Report, Deutsche Bundesbank, January 2009. Also, 
see the discussion on p. 21 of the same report, which remarks that “lending 
business with SMEs is conducted to a great extent by credit institutions that fund 
themselves by deposits rather than the capital and money markets and which are 
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they never opened branches. Indeed, in 31 counties (Landkreise) in 
Germany, which represent 13% of national GDP, not a single branch of a 
large private bank can be found today; the only banks that are present are 
the savings banks and the cooperative banks. The difference in 
geographical coverage can be seen most clearly when one compares the 
situation in the (former) East and West German states. The ratio of 
inhabitants to savings bank branch is essentially the same, namely between 
5,000 and 6,000, in both parts of Germany, whereas this ratio differs greatly 
for the so-called big banks. It stands at nearly 50,000 in the new Eastern 
Länder compared to 35,000 for the Western Länder.  
Maintaining branches in areas and places where it might be more 
profitable not to have a branch is part of the savings banks’ attempt to fulfil 
their economic and social mandate of supporting the local economy. Not 
having any bank presence is a severe disadvantage for a town or a county. 
It would prevent people from moving there or even encouraging them to 
move away; it would prevent firms from setting up their operations there, 
and ultimately increasing regional economic disparities.  
However, in spite of these impressive achievements as supporters of 
culture, non-professional sports and various social activities, it needs to be 
emphasised once more that the savings banks regard the services that they 
provide and the ways in which they provide them as their most important 
contribution to society. Still today, the savings banks provide socially 
relevant services to all groups of clients and in all parts of the countries, 
including groups of clients and areas which purely profit-oriented banks 
would now no longer serve. Thus their commitment to society also shows 
up in how the savings banks earn their money, and not only in how they 
use and distribute their profits. In this respect it is appropriate to also 
mention that the total sum of taxes paid by the institutions that belong to 
the Savings Bank Group is about 1 billion euro and thus twice as large as 
the amount paid out in the form of project support and sponsorship, and 
that the group employs a total staff of some 370,000 people, which is about 
half of all those men and women employed in the German financial sector.  
5.5  Conclusions 
The German savings banks have a long and successful tradition. Many of 
them were created in the first half of the 19th century, and ever since that 
time, they have been an important element of the German financial system. 
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which are, however, part of a network of affiliated institutions that jointly 
form the so-called ‘S-Finanzgruppe’. In spite of this name, the S-
Finanzgruppe is not a group of companies held together by equity ties and 
common management, that is, a group of companies in the sense in which 
this term is used in the context of corporate law. Institutionally, the 
individual local savings banks are independent entities governed – in most 
cases – by a public law regime conforming to the savings banks laws of the 
individual German federal states. In this sense, they are public banks, but 
they are not public banks in the sense of being under the influence of the 
central political power.  
Currently, the savings bank network comprises some 446 local or 
municipal savings banks, 7 groups of Landesbanken and a considerable 
number of other institutions such as insurance companies, building 
societies and training institutions. The focus of this report is only on the 
local savings banks.  
The German savings banks have long been the market leaders in 
retail banking in Germany in general and even more so in most of the local 
markets on which their operations are focused by tradition. As financial 
institutions and business enterprises, they are also the most successful 
German banking group in terms of costs and profitability if one takes a 
medium-term perspective. Moreover, their performance is more stable over 
time than that of their competitors from the ranks of the private commercial 
banks.  
According to the laws that govern their operations, and according to 
the way in which they operate, they are financial institutions that strive for 
financial as well as non-financial success. In order to survive economically 
and to grow, they need to be financially successful; and they have the 
mandate to support the economic activities of the people, and especially the 
small and medium-sized business enterprises, in their respective areas of 
operation, which by and large correspond to the areas covered by the 
municipality or municipalities which are responsible for them.  
The role of the respective municipality or municipality of being 
responsible for the savings banks in their region is sometimes designated 
by the term ‘ownership’. But this is incorrect and misleading because the 
property rights of the responsible municipalities is fundamentally different, 
and in fact much weaker, than that of the private owners in the case of a 
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In contrast to those of most other countries, the German savings 
banks have largely remained the same in terms of their organisational and 
legal structure and status and maintained most of those features which the 
savings banks of other countries once shared. At the same time, in terms of 
their institutional features and their business orientation, they changed less 
than most other elements of the German financial system. There are several 
factors that explain this peculiarity of the German savings banks, which 
one may, depending on political preferences, call and evaluate as stability 
or resistance to change. One factor is that there was, in past years, less 
political pressure on the German savings banks to undergo a far-reaching 
transformation than on the savings bank systems of other countries. 
However, not only was political pressure weaker in Germany than 
elsewhere, but also the economic pressure to change was less for savings 
banks in Germany than for those in other countries since, in a stark contrast 
to the situation in countries such as France or Italy, the economic 
performance of the German savings banks has been good for many years 
and indeed even better than that of all other banking groups. That the 
German savings banks performed so well – and probably therefore were 
also less under political pressure to change – can be explained by two 
factors. One is that under regulatory aspects German savings banks were at 
a very early stage put on the same basis as all other banks, and therefore 
had to really develop and prove their business strengths. The other factor 
may be their organisational and institutional structure, which prevented 
them from getting involved in overly risky operations and following all the 
fashions of the financial industry.  
In an economic and social perspective, the importance of the savings 
banks derives primarily from what they are doing and how they do what 
they do as partners of local business and households and as one of the 
biggest employers in Germany. Moreover, by being themselves stable 
financial institutions they perform a stabilising role for the entire German 
financial system.  
By tradition and according to their business model, the savings banks 
play an important role in preventing social and financial exclusion, and 
they do this together with the cooperative banks which are also an 
important element in the German financial system and are also organised 
as a federated network that in many respects resembles that of the savings 
banks. It may be due to the strong role of these two banking groups that 
SME financing and financial exclusion are much less of a problem in 
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providing financial services to a broad segment of the population, the 
institutions that belong to the savings bank network are also important 
supporters of culture, sports and social activities in Germany.  
The current financial crisis has affected the savings banks – and 
equally the cooperative banks - less than most other banks. This evident 
crisis resistance has further improved their image with the general 
population and may also serve to strengthen the political support for both 
of these banking groups. That they are hardly directly affected by the crisis 
at all is due to the traditional business model that these banking groups 
have followed over the years.  
However, indirectly, the savings banks are also affected by the crisis 
because they are, to varying degrees, co-owners of the regional banks 
(Landesbanken) which also belong to the S-Finanzgruppe, some of which 
have suffered greatly from the crisis. In so far as the system of regional 
banks is concerned, there is an urgent need to undertake far-reaching 
reforms, and it is one of the main challenges for the German savings banks 
to make sure that these reforms are effective and substantial without 
undermining the sound and successful part of the S-Finanzgruppe: the 
local savings banks.   
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6.  COUNTRY ANALYSIS: 
AUSTRIAN SAVINGS BANKS 
6.1  Origins and historical development  
Currently the Austrian Savings Bank Group consists of 53 local and 
regional savings Banks, the Erste Group Bank AG (henceforth ‘Erste 
Group’) as the group’s lead institution, the Second Bank (see section 6.4 
below) and a number of affiliated service and training institutions.  
As in many other European countries, savings banks in Austria came 
into existence in the early 19th century. They were created in much the same 
way, and with similar intentions, as their peers in Germany, Spain and 
other countries: They were local initiatives, undertaken in most cases by 
public authorities or groups of citizens with a strong sense of social 
commitment. They were founded with the aim of supporting local 
development and the economic endeavours of people with lower incomes 
and wealth. Their business model consisted in collecting deposits locally, 
transforming them into loans to local borrowers and holding on to these 
loans until they matured; and they regarded it as their mandate to offer 
access to financial services to local people who might not have access if 
savings banks did not exist. In terms of their organisational structure, they 
also were part of a ‘federated network’, and had, to varying degrees, as we 
will discuss below, local public ownership. Thus the similarity to the 
tradition of German savings banks is hard to overlook.  
However, the developments of the past 25 years differ substantially. 
Austrian savings banks are now more similar to those of Spain and other 
countries. The regional principle that had once even been imposed by law 
was abolished. A new trend emerged to adopt legal forms that more 
resemble joint stock corporations than ‘public administrations’, and there is 
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central institution. That is, the entire Austrian savings bank system is less 
decentralised than it once was and less so than those of Germany and 
Spain. The leading institution, the Erste Group, has a much stronger role in 
the Austrian savings bank system than corresponding institutions in 
Germany and Spain. Even though the Austrian savings bank system is a 
federation, it is one that more resembles a group of companies.  
In addition to the tendency towards more concentration and a 
stronger role of the leading institution, there are four features of the 
Austrian savings bank system which are particularly noteworthy.  
1. The concentration of savings banks exceeds that in Germany. 
Besides truly local savings banks, there are savings banks that operate on 
the level of federal states.  
2. Not all savings banks are genuinely public institutions. There are 
three different types of savings banks, as far as their legal status and 
ownership are concerned (see section 6.2 below).  
3. In the history of the Austrian savings banks, unrestricted private 
ownership of savings banks was legally not allowed. However, non-public 
and semi-private ownership has always existed to some extent. Since 1987, 
savings banks are permitted to transfer their banking operations into a 
‘Savings Bank Stock Corporation’. Through this legal change the Austrian 
savings bank system has become more similar to the Italian system with 
institutions that have a mixed ownership status. At the same time, it now 
also resembles the Spanish system with operating units in the legal form of 
private banks and foundations that own shares in the operating banks.  
4. Finally, the Austrian savings banks have been very active in the 
recent past in ‘going East’. Like several other large Austrian banks, Erste 
Group plays an important role in a number of Central, Eastern and South-
Eastern European countries. Its heavy involvement in this region is the 
main reason why former Erste Bank reorganised its structure on 9 August 
2008 spinning-off of the Austrian core business from the newly formed 
holding company ‘Erste Group Bank AG’ (‘Erste Group’) and transferred it 
to ‘Erste Bank der oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG’.  
Last but not least, the Austrian savings banks have experienced an 
interesting history of their top institution. Formerly, two institutions, Bank 
Austria and GiroCredit, had played this role. But in 1997 Bank Austria 
merged with Creditanstalt AG to form the private listed bank Bank 
Austria-Creditanstalt AG, which ceased t o  b e  p a r t  o f  t h e  S a v i n g s  B a n k  
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and ultimately, in 2005, together with HVB, by Italy’s UniCredit. In 
parallel, Erste Bank (now Erste Group) took over the role of being the top 
institution of the Austrian Savings Bank Group after acquiring GiroCredit, 
the former central or clearing bank of the savings bank system, in 1997. At 
the same time it emerged as the country’s largest savings bank with total 
assets in Austria that make up more than half of those of the entire savings 
bank system.  
To fully appreciate the role and status of the Austrian savings banks, 
it is necessary to briefly place them in the context of the entire Austrian 
banking system. For a long time, and still today, the Austrian banking 
system is characterised by a very strong role of banking firms that are, 
more or less and in different ways, committed to a dual-bottom line 
approach. Besides the savings bank group, there are two large groups of 
mutual or cooperative banks, the group of Raiffeisenbanken, which mainly 
operate in rural areas, and the österreichische Volksbanken-Gruppe. The 
market shares of these three groups as well as that of the private 
commercial banks, measured in total bank assets (without their operations 
in Central and Eastern Europe) are shown in Table 6.1, and the numbers of 
employees are shown in Table 6.2.  
Table 6.1 Total Assets of Austrian Banks by Sector (Mio. Euros) 
Year  1995 2003 2007 
Joint stock banks and private banks  111,057  129,264  250,932 
Savings  banks  120,186 203,214 150,351 
Raiffeisen credit cooperatives  78,629  125,760  221,977 
Volksbanken  credit  cooperatives  17,228 29,363 69,300 
Others 64,097  100,139  196,043 
All  banks  391,198 587,741 899,542 
Source: Austrian Central Bank. 
Table 6.2 Employment (Number of Persons) in Austrian Banks by Sector  
Year  1995 2003 2007 
Joint stock banks and private banks  18,246  16,371  23,043 
Saving  banks  24,008 24,810 15,679 
Raiffeisen credit cooperatives  19,437  21,035  23,456 
Volksbanken  credit  cooperatives  5,189 5,599 6,616 
Others  9,377 8,558 10,386 
All  banks  76,257 76,373 79,180 
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As the figures in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate, still today the purely 
private and purely profit-oriented banks have a minority position in 
Austrian banking.  
This brief look at the history of the Austrian savings banks suggests 
an intriguing question. Is there a recurrent theme, a ‘Leitmotiv’, that comes 
up repeatedly in the development of this banking group and possibly also 
in other similar decentralised or federated groups of banks? This general 
trend would be that there is a strong and seemingly irresistible pull 
towards a concentration of power, assets and activity in a central institution 
that is open to becoming simply a private for-profit firm. This is what had 
occurred in the case of Bank Austria-Creditanstalt and what might once 
more occur in the case of Erste Group, which is also partially owned by 
private investors and listed on the stock exchange. This also seems to be the 
case with the powerful and resourceful central institutions of the two 
cooperative banking groups in Austria. And if this should indeed be true, 
would it suggest that this is, seen from the perspective of all of the 
decentralised institutions that belong to the respective network and of their 
clients, a good way to go or one that should better be avoided? 
In any event, the particular role that the central institution plays in 
the Austrian savings bank system is a specific feature of this system, which 
sets it apart from the savings bank systems of the other countries that this 
study covers and makes it represent yet another ‘model’ of how the savings 
banks in a given country can be organised.  
6.2  Ownership structure, regulation and supervision 
For many years, there were two alternative legal forms and/or forms of 
ownership or, to be more precise, of the allocation of property rights that 
Austrian savings banks could use. They could be supported or ‘run’ by 
municipalities as are most of their peers in Germany, or by associations of 
local citizens, a legal form which corresponds to that of the small minority 
of the so-called ‘free savings banks’ in Germany or the savings banks in 
some other countries. It is important to understand that, like in the German 
case, this ‘running’ of a savings bank only vaguely resembles the normal 
concept of ‘owning’ a bank.  
In spite of some differences concerning the applicable legal regimes, 
the distinction between these two types of savings banks did not play a 
great role for a long time. Both types conformed to the general description 
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business orientation, and they were ‘dual-bottom line institutions’ in the 
sense explained in chapter 2 above. Among their common features was that 
the structure of the internal organisation of all savings banks reflected their 
commitment to the objective of improving the local economy and the 
welfare of the local people. One might be inclined to think that for this 
reason they were less professional and less profit-oriented in the way they 
went about their business than private banks.  
The set of legal forms that an Austrian savings bank can have was 
enlarged in 1987, when an amendment of the Savings Banks Act made a 
third organisational design available, namely that of splitting a savings 
bank up into two entities, an operating unit in the legal form of a (private) 
joint stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) and an institution which has the 
role of being the owner of the operating savings bank. The latter institution 
is called the owning or administrating savings bank (Träger- or 
Anteilsverwaltungssparkasse). Since 1999 the transformation of 
Anteilsverwaltungssparkassen into foundations (Privatstiftungen) has been 
possible. One motive for allowing the separation of banking operations 
from bank ownership was to help the savings banks increase transparency 
and efficiency and thereby making them more professional, more flexible 
and thus ultimately also more competitive.  
Since the time when this possibility was opened up, most of the 
Austrian savings banks have adopted the new ‘dualistic’ organisational 
form. The new form was clearly preferred by the larger savings banks that 
operate at the level of a Federal State, while the two old forms are now only 
used by a few local savings banks.  
Even though now the legal form of the operating unit is in most cases 
that of an Aktiengesellschaft, the Austrian savings banks still have their 
own specific legal status. In order to understand the essence of the legal 
structure of this system it is important to keep in mind the distinction 
between the operating savings banks, which are by now in many cases joint 
stock corporations (Savings Bank-Aktiengesellschaften), and the 
‘Administering Savings Banks’ (Anteils-Verwaltungssparkassen), which 
have just one role, namely that of owning shares in one or several Savings 
Bank-Aktiengesellschaften. These Verwaltungssparkassen have no owners 
in any sense, that is, they belong to themselves or are ownerless like a 
foundation. In contrast, there may in principle be several owners in the 
operating units, the Savings Bank-Aktiengesellschaften, and they may also 
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banks that have not adopted the new regime are also ownerless like the 
Verwaltungssparkassen.) 
Not by law, but in fact the group of owners in the Austrian Savings 
Bank-Aktiengesellschaften is in most cases limited to the group of 
Verwaltungssparkassen and other organizations that also belong to the 
savings bank system, notably other savings banks including the Erste Bank. 
And this latter possibility, that is, shares in savings banks being held by 
other Austrian saving banks, is indeed widely used, giving rise to a 
complex system of cross-ownership among the savings banks. Currently, 
the Erste Group holds substantial shares in the equity of other savings 
banks, especially regional savings banks. One can of course not rule out 
that it uses its ownership role to influence the business policy of those 
savings banks in which it is an important shareholder. Even the mere 
potential of an ownership-based influence is the reasons why the group of 
Austrian savings banks seems more integrated and more homogenous than 
their German and Spanish peers.  
It is important to note that the Erste Group has a special status. It is a 
listed joint stock corporation. Close to 50%  of its shares are held by 
institutional investors and the remainder by a foundation, by private 
investors, by other Austrian savings banks and by savings bank employees. 
Thus it is more exposed to the pressure of the stock market than the other 
institutions in the savings bank system.  
For a longer time than, for instance, in Germany, the savings banks in 
Austria were subject to specific and more restrictive regulation than private 
commercial banks. Restrictions applied to the kinds of permitted business 
activities and to regional expansion. This special regulatory status has been 
abolished by the savings banks Law of 1979, which put savings banks in 
the same situation as other banks as far as taxation, regulation and 
supervision are concerned, allowing the savings banks to become truly 
universal banks, and also abolished the former legally mandated regional 
principle. As a consequence, savings banks could open branches in all parts 
of the country, and in particular Erste Bank and other larger savings banks 
made use of this newly gained freedom. Only the special status of being a 
‘Savings Bank’ continued to be legally protected, and this was mirrored in 
public guarantees for the ‘municipal savings banks’ that largely conformed 
to those in force in Germany at that time.  
The 1987 Amendment of the Austrian Banking Act made the 
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the undertaking or the banking operations of the savings banks into a joint-
stock corporation (‘Savings Bank Stock Corporation’) possible, a move that 
was complemented in 1994 by another Amendment to the Savings Bank 
Act that allowed the ‘Anteilsverwaltungssparkassen’ to transfer their 
ownership positions to third parties.  
In 1979, the legal obligation of the savings banks to act in the public 
interest was also abolished. However, this legal change only referred to the 
operating units. Since the social and regional commitment continued to 
play a dominant role for the Anteilsverwaltungssparkassen and the 
foundations as the owners of savings bank stock corporations, it can be 
assumed that it still also matters for how the operating units implement the 
policies that are, more or less, determined by their owners. Thus social and 
regional objectives still play an important role as a complement to the profit 
objective to which Austrian savings banks, like all other banks, must 
adhere in order to be able to survive and grow. Therefore, they are still 
‘dual-bottom line institutions’, though perhaps less clearly so than in the 
past.  
Under EU pressure, the public guarantees that had been in force for 
the ‘municipal savings banks’ until that time started to be phased out in 
2003. However, the effect of the termination of the public guarantees was to 
a certain extent compensated by the creation of a system of mutual 
guarantees, the so-called ‘Haftungsverbund’. Already in 2002, Erste Group 
had formed the Haftungsverbund on the basis of a set of agreements with 
the majority of the Austrian savings banks. The purpose and the essence of 
this Haftungsverbund were to establish a joint early-warning system as 
well as a system of cross-guarantees for certain liabilities of member 
savings banks and to strengthen the Group’s cooperation in the market. 
Much like the former public guarantees, the mutual guarantees were a 
matter of concern for the EU. For that reason, the Haftungsverbund was 
subject matter of several competition proceedings before the Austrian 
Cartel Court. In March 2007, the Austrian Supreme Court set an end to this 
debate when it decided that the agreements which constitute the 
Haftungsverbund are for the most part in compliance with Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty.  
Moreover, as an additional move to strengthen the character of the 
Savings Bank Group as a group of companies, Erste Group Bank AG 
entered into contractual agreements with almost all Austrian savings banks 
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Group Bank AG a decisive influence on the other savings banks and their 
operations and that lead to the establishment of one economic unit within 
the meaning of the EC Merger Regulation and the Austrian Cartel Act. 
These agreements were formally approved by the competition authorities 
in October 2007, January 2008, and May 2008. Thus, the transformation 
from a decentralised system or a federated network, as it still is the case 
with the German savings bank group,99 to a largely centralised system is by 
now almost completed and thus also the transformation to a group in the 
narrow sense of the term used in corporate law and competition law is 
rather far advanced. Nevertheless, in what follows, we will continue to use 
the term ‘group’ not in the sense of corporate and competition law, but in 
the sense of the totality of the institutions that share certain common 
characteristics and are treated as belonging to the same category (or 
‘group’) in official statistics.  
6.3  Competitive and other market developments  
a)  The financial situation of savings banks  
Table 6.3 provides a first general overview of the financial situation of the 
Austrian Savings Bank Group concerning the last five years. The data refers 
only to the activities in Austria, thus does not include the data relating to 
Erste Group’s activities, subsidiaries and other equity participations in 
Central, Eastern and South-East Europe. The data is comparable in so far as 
the time series begins after Bank Austria had left the group. It reflects a 
stable and positive financial situation of the group. Total assets and Tier-1 
equity have increased at a considerable pace over the past years, while the 
interest margin has slightly declined, though not dramatically. By 
international standards, asset growth, equity and interest margin are 
clearly satisfactory. Naturally, the data concerning the individual 
institutions that make up the Savings Bank Group differ to some extent, 
and the financial crisis has also seriously affected the financial situation and 
the stock price of Erste Group, not least because of its involvement in the 
neighbouring countries to the East.  
 
 
                                                      
99 In spite of the misleading term ‘group’ in the German case; see chapter 5 above. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 147 
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Table 6.3 Financial data for the Austrian Savings banks Group 
Year  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total assets in €m  109,786  116,929  127,029  138,535  150,340 
Equity ratio 
(Tier1-capital in % of RWA) 
9.5  10.0 9.6  13.6 15.7 
Interest margin 
(in % of average total assets) 
1.62 1.60 1.55 1.47 1.34 
Operating profit/ 
personnel TEUR 
71 77 89 88 85 
Source: Austrian Central Bank. 
However, in order to properly assess the performance of the Austrian 
savings banks it is necessary to provide comparative data. Figure 6.1 shows 
time series of cost-income ratios, return on assets and return on equity as 
three important indicators of efficiency for the three most important 
banking groups in Austria, covering the time span from 1995 to 2007.  
Figure 6.1 Efficiency Indicators of Austrian Banking Groups  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Austrian Central Bank. 
The first and ultimately also correc t  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  F i g u r e  6 . 1  
conveys is a stunning degree of similarity between the three groups of 
banks. Cost-income ratios vary somewhat between 70 and 60%, and 
slightly decline for all three groups. Return on asset figures vary more over 
time, but also do not differ significantly between the three groups, while 
Cooperative Banks 
 
Commercial Banks 
 
Savings Banks 
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return on equity is similar and also more stable. Thus the general finding is 
that of a high degree of similarity between savings banks, private 
commercial banks and cooperative banks. As we show more extensively in 
chapter 3 of this study, the situation in Austria also does not differ a great 
deal from that in other countries, with the slight exception that in Germany 
and Spain the financial performance of savings banks is even slightly better 
than that of other types of banks, a situation that does not seem to prevail 
in Austria.  
b)  Competition and market structure  
Austria is a rather small country with a sizable set of banks and banking 
groups or networks that have existed for a long time and that largely 
compete for the same clientele of private households and small and 
medium-sized firms. The fact that many individual banks and banking 
groups in Austria are not, or at least formerly were not, strictly or 
exclusively profit oriented may have contributed to what appears as an 
over-expansion in the number of bank branches in the course of the 1980s 
and early 1990s when they were competing for market share.  
As a consequence, competition in Austrian banking became fierce 
and profitability fell. This created the need to find a solution to this 
problem, and indeed such a solution suddenly appeared possible after 
1990. Together with the centuries-old tradition of Austria being politically 
and economically oriented towards ‘the East’ and the opportunities that 
arose after the end of the former Soviet Block the specific competitive 
situation in their home markets seems to have induced several important 
Austrian banks to expand into the neighbouring countries of Central, 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In this new area they are now 
competing once more for a new, but much larger and still largely 
underserved clientele.  
With its lead bank Erste Group investing in more and more of these 
countries, the Savings Bank Group is heavily involved in this process of 
expansion and competition. However, at least until the middle of the year 
2008, the rates of growth of the banking markets in these countries are still 
high and the Austrian banks’ profits from operating in these markets are 
also high and indeed much higher than those that could be achieved in 
their home market. However, this situation may have changed in the recent 
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Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the banks in the countries 
of the West that own these banks.  
Compared to the competitive battle in the larger area to the East of 
Austria, competition in the home market seems relatively unimportant. As 
in Germany, there is, and has always been, a high level of competition 
between the different banking groups, whereas within-group competition 
is not that strong. For a certain time after 1979, there had also been strong 
intra-group competition in the Savings Bank Group. It weakened, when the 
positions of Erste Group as the new lead bank was clearly established and 
when this bank and the local and regional savings banks had closed an 
agreement that amounted to a private re-establishment of the regional 
principle. The essence of the agreement was that Erste Group gave up most 
of its decentralised branches outside the Greater Vienna area, transferred 
them to the respective regional bank and in exchange received shares in 
other savings banks.  
One may wonder why the federated systems of the Savings Bank 
Group and of both cooperative banking groups in Austria have developed 
in a way which allocates more power and more resources to their 
respective central institution than in many other countries. This may be 
related to the competitive situation that seems to prevail in the Austrian 
banking market, a situation that has inspired the banks to expand their 
influence and ownership to the Eastern neighbour countries. As long as 
expansion and competition took place in the home market, central 
institutions may have had less importance than at times when stronger 
institutions and stronger leadership are required for a successful expansion 
abroad. If this conjecture is correct and if competitive requirements were 
indeed the driving force for the expansion towards the East, the current 
structure of the Austrian Savings Bank Group of having one strong lead 
institution (while others stand more or less in a second line), may reflect 
this country’s special situation rather than truly being a model for how 
savings banks could be successfully organised in general. 
6.4  Service, access, proximity and financial inclusion  
Access to financial services is not a problem in Austria. The three groups of 
banks that are organised as federated group have established a network of 
branches that is clearly sufficient to meet the existing demand, even though 
the number of branches has been substantially reduced during the past 15 
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state-owned or had merged with state-owned institutions also maintain 
extensive branch networks and have a large number of ATMs. Table 6.4 
provides information about the number of branches of the different 
banking groups.  
Table 6.4 Number of branches of Austrian banks (1995-2007) 
Year 1995  2003  2007 
Joint stock banks and private banks  751  531  852 
Saving banks  1,397  1,446  1,011 
Credit cooperatives  2,213  2,198  2,184 
Others 195  226  239 
All banks  4,556  4,401  4,286 
Source: Austrian Central Bank. 
Compared to other European countries, Austria ranks high in terms 
of banking outlets per inhabitant, even though the total number of bank 
branches has declined during the past 15 years. The seemingly marked 
decline in the number of saving bank branches between 2003 and 2007 is 
due to the fact that Bank Austria has left the system.  
Exclusion from the access to financial services does also not seem to 
be a serious problem in Austria, even though it exists as a phenomenon. 
That financial exclusion is a problem of limited importance so far in Austria 
may be related to the present or former ‘dual-bottom line’ orientation of 
many important Austrian banks and banking groups. It is a part of the 
business model of the savings banks and the two groups of cooperative 
banks that they aspire to be ‘inclusive’ providers of financial services and 
focus on providing loans and other financial services to local SMEs and 
private households from all income brackets. Despite the ongoing global 
financial and economic crisis, lending to households and non-financial 
corporations in Austria has grown at a steady pace well into the year 
2008.100 The growth of loans has been particularly strong for savings banks, 
with a 5.9% of year-on-year growth on September 2008 compared with a 
                                                      
100 The latest figures available from the online statistics database Austrian Central 
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2.6% growth for commercial banks. Savings banks were particularly strong 
in granting new loans to non-financial firms.101  
Nevertheless, financial exclusion also exists in Austria. In this context 
it is important to mention the recent creation of a special institution called 
‘Zweite Wiener Vereins-Sparkasse’ which specifically addresses people as 
their clients who do not have access to even a simple bank account. This 
‘Second Vienna Savings Bank’ was established with a grant from the 
foundation that owns a large part of the Erste Group shares, and the service 
provided at the Zweite Sparkasse is pro bono work of former and present 
savings bank employees. Since its inception, the Zweite Sparkasse has met 
with considerable demand for its services among people who need this 
form of support.  
Due to their heritage, the Austrian savings banks have always had a 
commitment to supporting not only the local and regional economy but 
also cultural and similar activities in their respective regions of operations, 
even though there is now no longer a legal mandate or even obligation to 
undertake such activities. Since a few years now, the Austrian Association 
of Savings banks publishes an annual report about these support activities. 
The total volume of relevant sponsoring activity was above 20 Mio. € in 
2007. The range of areas in which savings banks support local projects and 
initiatives is extremely broad. It ranges from sports over education and 
research, from genuinely cultural affairs to charity and traditional local 
culture.  
It is instructive to read in this report that the sponsorship just 
described is only the minor part of what the savings banks regard as their 
effort to contribution to social improvement and inclusion. For them, the 
more important part shows up in the way in which they deal with their 
staff and their clients. It seems to be essential part of the mission of savings 
                                                      
101 Recent data on loans of different categories of banks is not yet available. For 
more information, see p. 49 of Austrian Central Bank’s Financial Stability Report for 
December 2008. A large fraction of loan growth is attributable to the increased 
deposits that the banks have received from customers who discontinued investing 
in more volatile instruments. After having remained relatively constant for years, 
bank deposits jumped by 8.7% between September 2007 and 2008. While deposit 
growth rates were largely similar for all banking groups in Austria, the growth 
rates of loans to the private sector differed savings banks. 152 | COUNTRY ANALYSIS: AUSTRIAN SAVINGS BANKS 
 
banks that staff and clients are not merely regarded as providers of labour 
and buyers of services, respectively. Instead, they are truly regarded and 
treated as partners in the sense that fair and trustful relations with these 
core stakeholder groups are of utmost importance. One might be inclined 
to take such a declaration of the Association as pure public relations 
activity. However, it may be more and may indeed be a part of the banks’ 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), and it may indicate that staff and 
clients are treated in ways which are fairer, more openly and supportive or 
in some other sense simply better than what would be optimal from the 
perspective of an exclusive profit orientation.  
At least this is the interpretation that one can derive from simply 
looking at where and how this aspect is dealt with in the annual CSR 
report. And if this impression is correct, it points to an important aspect: In 
spite of the fact that most of the Austrian savings banks have by now 
adopted the legal and institutional form of a separate operating savings 
bank Stock Corporation and an owning Anteilsverwaltungssparkasse or 
Foundation, the way in which day to day business seems to be conducted 
by savings banks still differs from that of banks that would simply try to 
maximise the profits they make for their owners. Thus the separation of 
operating Savings banks Stock Corporations and bank-owning 
Foundations does not seem to suggest that only the Foundations are 
responsible for ‘welfare’, while the banks are only meant to be efficient in a 
narrow financial sense and to make profits that can in part be distributed 
for social purposes by the Foundations that own them. Looking back at the 
financial performance data discussed in section 3, it seems worth 
emphasising that the possibly greater concern with corporate social 
responsibility in all of its forms does not lead to lower efficiency and 
profitability of the savings banks in Austria  
6.5  Conclusions 
The origins of the Austrian savings banks are largely the same as those of 
the savings banks of Germany and a number of other European countries. 
Also in Austria, savings banks were once founded with the mission of 
giving broad segments of the population access to financial service and to 
foster local and regional development, and in spite of the modernisation of 
the Austrian savings banks and rather far-reaching transformations of the 
Austrian savings bank system in the recent past, this original mission 
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and to do and also for what they are and what they do. Still today, they are 
essentially decentralised ‘dual-bottom line institutions’.  
This is not the only feature that the Austrian saving banks share with 
their peers from other countries. Much like those of Spain or Germany, the 
Austrian savings banks have fared quite well in financial terms during the 
past years. They have transformed themselves into modern and efficient 
financial institutions that provide services to broad segments of the 
population, and they are important players in the national market for retail 
financial services. However, it would be wrong to assume that because of 
the social mission to which they still subscribe, the Austrian savings banks 
would be less profitable than the commercial banks of that country. As in 
most other countries in which savings banks still exist, their financial 
performance is almost indistinguishable from those of other banks, if not 
even better. Finally, the Austrian savings banks have over the years also 
been the object of political debate and, at times, harsh political criticism. As 
in almost any other country, the main issues in this debate – and in the 
criticism that the EU Commission directed at the Austrian savings banks 
over the years – were the forms and the extent of public support that the 
savings banks enjoyed and the anticompetitive effects that the cooperation 
within their federated network, their mutual guarantee system, the so-
called Haftungsverbund as the most visible feature of the network 
structure was said to entail.  
Thus, the list of features in which the Austrian savings banks hardly 
differ from those of other countries is long. However, there is also one very 
important and characteristic difference. In an international comparison, the 
Austrian savings bank system sticks out as having adopted a very specific 
organisational structure. It is much more built around one central 
institution than the savings bank systems of other countries. The central 
institution, the Erste Group Bank AG, is one of the largest banks in Austria 
with total assets that exceed those of all other Austrian savings banks taken 
together. Erste Group Bank AG is an important player in the Austrian 
financial market and at the same time the hub of one of the most extensive 
banking groups in Central, Eastern and South-East Europe. The high 
degree of centralisation of assets, activities and power at the level of Erste 
Group makes the Austrian savings bank system resemble a group of 
companies in the sense of a ‘concern’ more than the savings bank systems 
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This peculiarity of the Austrian savings bank systems suggests asking 
why this organisational form has developed in Austria and not in other 
parts of Europe and whether it might be regarded as a model of how 
savings bank systems should be organised in general. As it seems, the 
answer to this question is that it is not a general model of best practice. A 
high degree of concentration of assets, activities and power seems to rather 
reflect a rational response to very specific local problems and opportunities.   
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7.  COUNTRY ANALYSIS: PRIVATISATION 
OF ITALIAN SAVINGS BANKS 
7.1  Origins and historical development  
Before the 19th century, the only formal banking institutions in Italy were 
the ancient public banks whose roles were limited to the provision of 
current accounts for merchants and the issuance of notes in exchange for 
metal coins. A modern banking structure was heralded during the first half 
of 19th century with the creation and rapid expansion of savings banks. The 
first institution, Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde (Cariplo), 
was founded in Milan in 1823 using public funds and grew quickly in the 
region within the first years of its operation. Much like the Austrian and 
German savings banks it was modelled after, Cariplo was set up to provide 
a ‘safe and convenient method for setting aside money’ to craftsmen, 
workers and members of lower-income classes (Hertner, 1994, p. 646). 
Other savings banks also flourished in the 1830s and 1840s, mostly in the 
northern and central regions of the country. Despite being founded to 
provide services to the working classes and the poor, the lack of clear 
alternatives during these early years made savings banks appealing to a 
broader group of clients. By 1850, their numbers reached 60 while their 
liabilities represented almost half of total bank liabilities in Italy (Polsi, 
1996, Table 4).  
Three properties of Italian savings banks are worth noting. First and 
foremost, Italian savings banks were conceived as autonomous non-profit 
institutions (Polsi, 1996, p. 132). Indeed, some savings banks, such as Cassa 
di Risparmio di Roma, were set up as partnerships with the joint 
participation of a group of nobles (Hertner, 1994, p. 641). The operations 
had to be compliant with the banks’ internal charters, which required 
profits to be either retained or put to charitable uses. The self-imposed rules 
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savings banks grow amidst difficult market conditions and a contracting 
banking sector towards the end of 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century.  
Second, unlike the postal savings banks, the public bodies had no 
official power over the operations of savings banks.102 However, the 
authorities could exercise some political influence on the operations of 
savings banks. For example, the 1936 Banking Law103 put forth clear, 
functional and geographical restrictions on the activities of banks. Almost 
all banks, including the savings banks, were restricted to short-term 
activities. This meant that long-term loans could only be originated by 
special credit institutions owned by the government. The law also imposed 
strict authorisation requirements to protect the system from the perils of 
over-banking, restricted the growth and consolidation of the sector and 
prohibited banks from expanding or operating in multiple regions. In a 
more direct manner to influence the operations of savings banks, the public 
authorities started placing their representatives into the savings banks 
during the 1950s, effectively politicising the provision of credit (Barca & 
Trento, 1997; Sapienza, 2004).  
Third, responding to the needs of the country in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, the authorities permitted the savings banks and other 
local banks to expand their activities to provide long-term local credit to 
start-ups and small businesses. Other banks remained under the strict 
restrictions imposed by the 1936 law. Policy-makers were concerned that if 
allowed to expand, large banks would divert resources from 
underdeveloped regions (Goglio, 2007, p. 21).104 Several recent empirical 
                                                      
102 Postal savings banks were created in 1875 by local authorities to facilitate the 
financing of infrastructure development projects and to service debts. The postal 
banking service has been managed by the Cassa depositi e prestiti (CDP), which 
has been operational since 1850 providing financing for the needs of local 
authorities. In addition to the funding provided by the deposits of the postal bank 
(BancoPosta), CDP can also raise funds by issuing public bonds. Since 2003, CDP 
operates as a public bank with 70% of its share capital owned by the Ministry of 
the Economy.  
103 Decree No. 375 of 12 March 1936. 
104 See also Hakenes & Schnabel (2006), who show that information asymmetries 
may lead big national banks to direct capital from poorer to richer regions, i.e. 
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studies have confirmed that local banks did enhance the development 
prospects in underprivileged regions in post-war Italy.105 Indeed, the 
banking system was quite successful in fostering the growth of the 
industrial sector, which is composed of a large number of small and 
medium enterprises.  
7.2  Privatisation process  
The reform of the Italian banking sector occurred in several steps. A crucial 
push came in 1990 with the Amato legislation,106 which called for the 
transformation of the state-owned banks into joint-stock companies and the 
transfer of ownership rights. Effectively, this requirement separated the 
bank functions from the social and cultural responsibilities of the savings 
banks. Two distinct units emerged as a result. The first was a joint-stock 
company (Cassa di Risparmio SpA), entrusted with conducting the banking 
business while the second was a foundation (Fondazioni), which simply 
held the stock in the joint-stock company and continued, in most cases, to 
exist as a non-profit organisation with benevolent aims.  
                                                                                                                                       
‘capital drain’. The authors argue that the existence and accessibility of regional 
banks may prevent such flows and may indeed increase welfare.  
105 Ferri & Messori (2000) show that the close bank-firm relations have been 
beneficial for the allocation of credit in the Northeastern and Central (NEC) parts 
of the country. According to their findings, local banks in the NEC areas had 
significantly lower exposure to bad and doubtful loans. Moreover, the bank-firm 
relations in the NEC area do not seem to suffer from ‘information capture’, which 
would have allowed the local bank to use its monopolistic position to raise the 
interest rates on loans (see Sharpe, 1990). More recently, Guiso et al. (2004) examine 
if local financial development was an important indicator for the creation of new 
businesses in different regions. The authors take advantage of the fact that the 1936 
l a w  m a d e  t h e  b a n k s ’  b r a n c h  s t r u c t u r e  u n r e s p o n s i v e  t o  c h a n g e s  f o r  o v e r  h a l f  a  
century, allowing them to disregard the potential endogeneity between financial 
and economic development. The study’s findings show that an individual’s odds 
of starting a new business are significantly higher in financially developed regions 
and that the heavy presence of local banks and savings banks in the region in 1936 
made this event more likely (Guiso et al., 2004, Table III).  
106 The legislation was enacted by Act No. 218 of 30 July 1990 and implemented by 
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The newly created joint-stock banks resembled their commercial 
peers.107 The legislation also created the framework for tax-neutral legal 
transformations as well as offering tax incentives for mergers between 
commercial and savings institutions (Berlanda & Masera, 1993). The 
foundations, in turn, were attributed with public and national aims, mostly 
focusing on promoting arts, science and research in the country.  
While the 1990 Amato law sought to harmonise the legal aspects of 
banks, there were still disparities between the regulations of different 
institutions dating from the 1936 Banking Law. In 1993, Italy implemented 
the EU’s Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC) with the adoption of its 
Consolidated Law on Banking.108 The new law eliminated all the regional 
and functional restrictions and thus formally introduced the universal 
banking business model in Italy. The lifting of geographical restrictions also 
paved the way for the creation of banking groups in Italy. 
The 1993 Consolidated Law on Banking prepared the groundwork 
for consolidation. However, the 1990 Amato Law effectively required most 
foundations to maintain controlling ownership in the original banks.109 
There was some ambiguity about how private an institution could be when 
controlled by a holding company with a public character. On the one hand, 
the implementing legislation allowed the foundations to have an 
‘administrative’ role, which could imply that the public body remained as a 
‘purely rentier institution’ (Maltoni, 2004). On the other hand, by ensuring 
that the foundations retain the majority stakes in these banks, the 
legislation also gave the foundation the ability to exert substantial influence 
on the internal functioning of this institution. In short, it was not clear if the 
separation of control from management of the banks really was effective in 
encouraging banks to operate under market discipline (see Maltoni, 2004). 
The requirement for foundations to maintain a majority stake in the 
banks was eliminated with Law No. 474 of July 1994, allowing the sale of 
                                                      
107 The aim of the reform was to facilitate the access of newly created institutions to 
the capital markets (Zadra, 2005). 
108 Legislative Decree No. 385 of 1 September 1993. 
109 Sales of shares were allowed, but only “in exceptional cases, in order to 
strengthen the Italian credit system, its international role and asset base” (Berlanda 
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controlling shares in banks. Moreover, the Dini Directive,110 implemented 
in November 1994, introduced tax incentives for a broader group of 
undertakings, including foundations, to reduce their bank shares over the 
1994-99 period. A more direct obligation was put forth in 1998 and 1999 
with the Ciampi Regulation111 requiring the foundations to shed their 
controlling stakes in banking institutions until June 2003. In order to 
encourage the foundations to sell off their shares, the regulation 
temporarily suspended the capital gains tax arising from these transactions. 
In 2003, the law was repealed for smaller foundations with up to €200 
million of assets or those that are based in special-status regions. 
Apart from the shedding of shares and the suspension of capital 
gains tax, the Ciampi Regulation also clarified the legal basis of 
foundations.112  
Although the Ciampi law provided clear incentives for foundations 
to limit their influence in the banking sector, it is debatable whether such 
motives have been successful. According to Table 7.1, although their 
numbers have declined since 1990, there are still 15 foundations that hold 
controlling stakes in the original banks. It is also worth noting that the 
numbers have barely changed since 2000.  
 
 
                                                      
110 Directive No. 273 of 18 November 1994.  
111 Law No. 461 of 31 December 1998 and the subsequent implementing Decree No. 
153 of 17 May 1999.  
112 More specifically, the regulation specified that foundations were: 1) not allowed 
to provide financial assistance in any way, directly or indirectly, to profit-seeking 
businesses, except those that engage in activities furthering the foundations’ 
statutory goals; 2) subject to the same fiscal conditions as “non-profit organisations 
of social utility” as long as they abided with the requirements; 3) required to 
devote at least 50% of net income as grants to sectors indicated by the legislation; 4) 
permitted to take a controlling stake in a company only if the business of the 
c o m p a n y  i s  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  s o c i a l  a i m s  o f  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  a n d  5 )  r e q u i r e d  t h e  
diversification of risk and the allocation of resources to generate adequate returns 
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Table 7.1 Equity interests of banking foundations in original banks 
(number of foundations) 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Majority shares  88 62 23 16 15 
Minority shares  0  26 57 57 56 
No shares  0 1 9 15  17 
Source: ACRI. 
It is also necessary to examine the importance of the banks that are 
under the control of their original foundations. According to the ownership 
figures published regularly by the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e 
la Borsa (CONSOB), Fondazione Monte dei Paschi has maintained its 
controlling stake in one of Italy’s largest banks, Monte dei Paschi, since 
1999 (Table 7.2).  
Table 7.2 Evolution of the shares of foundations in top Italian banks 
(% of total voting shares) 
 December  1998  September  2008 
  Largest 
single block 
All 
foundations 
Largest 
single block 
All 
foundations 
Intesa  23 23 
San Paolo - IMI  16 19 
8* 19* 
Unicredito  19 38 5†  8† 
Monte dei Paschi  78 78 55‡ 55‡ 
Source: CONSOB. 
* In January 2007, Banca Intesa merged with Sanpaolo IMI to form Intesa SanPaolo. 
†  In October 2007, Unicredito Group merged with the Capitalia Group, to form the 
Unicredito Group, the third Italian banking group at the time. In May 2008, the 
group changed its name to UniCredit Group. 
‡ Data for June 1999.  
Table 7.2 also highlights another important point. As evidenced by 
Unicredit’s ownership structure in 1998, several foundations may hold 
shares of a single bank. The matter has become particularly important as 
mergers have created large banks from smaller savings banks. For example, 
Unicredito was formed between 1996 and 1998 as a result of a series of 
mergers between several institutions, including five savings banks: Cassa 
di Risparmio di Verona, Vicenza, Belluno e Ancona (Cariverona), Cassa di 
Risparmio di Torino, Cassa di Risparmio della Marca Trivigiana INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 161 
 
(Cassamarca), Cassa di Risparmio di T r e n t o  e  R o v e r e t o  a n d  C a s s a  d i  
Risparmio di Trieste. By 1998, the joint stakes of the foundations associated 
with the first three savings banks was 38% of all shares (see Table 7.1). The 
biggest single shareholder, Fondazione Cariverona, held half of these 
shares. By September 2008, the joint ownership had declined to 8%, divided 
almost evenly between Fondazione Cariverona and Fondazione Cassa di 
Risparmio di Torino.  
Although the direct influence of foundations has declined remarkably 
within the last decade, the previous discussion reveals that foundations 
may exercise indirect control through joint ownership. Cross-holdings 
among foundations and banks may also be another form of control. Indeed, 
in some cases, a foundation may exercise indirect control over a bank with 
whom it had no original ties. For example, in December 1998, two 
foundations, Fondazione Cariplo and Compagna di San Paolo, had around 
19% of total stakes of San Paolo – IMI. However, Banca Monte dei Paschi 
also owned 6% of the shares of San Paolo – IMI. As Table 7.2 clearly shows, 
Banca Monte dei Paschi, in turn, was majority owned by its foundation, 
which held over 78% of all its shares (see Table 7.1). Although two 
foundations owned a total of 19% stakes in San Paolo – IMI by the end of 
1998, the potential influence of foundations on Intesa San Paolo is greater 
once one considers the fact that one of the shareholders, Banca Monte dei 
Paschi, is controlled by its foundation.113 In short, although most 
                                                      
113 The Finance Reform of 2002 put forth by the Finance Minister Tremonti 
contained several elements to address these issues regarding the ultimate 
ownership of a bank (Law No. 448, Article 11 of 2001). In order to mitigate the real 
influence of foundations and other political bodies, the proposal considered a 
broader definition of control. In particular, controlling interests would be assumed 
to exist when there were cross-holdings among foundations or when a core group 
of shareholders had a majority stake in a single entity. Apart from these changes, 
the proposed law also contained elements that would reduce the autonomy of the 
foundations. For one thing, the proposed article gave Banca d’Italia the 
discretionary power to determine if the foundations had joint control over a 
particular bank. More importantly, the legislation sought to limit the sectors in 
which foundations could operate and contained a provision on maintaining a 
majority of local government representatives on the board of the foundations. The 
Constitutional Court ultimately rejected the parts of the Tremonti proposal that 
contained the named amendments in 2003. The court found the powers conferred 
to local and supervisory authorities unconstitutional and reinstated the 
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foundations have reduced their influence on the banks, there is some place 
for concern due to direct or cross-holdings. 
7.3  Competitive and other market developments  
One of the main objectives of the Italian banking reforms was to foster the 
development of the financial services sector by making it more competitive. 
Prior to 1990s, savings banks were seen as an obstacle to competition. 
Among other arguments, the critics claimed that these banks could hold 
onto their dominant positions in their local markets, which made it less 
likely for other (presumably more efficient) banks to enter or subsist in 
those areas.  
Figure 7.1 The evolution of banking sector and consolidation activity 
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Source: Banca d’Italia (1998 – 2007a).  
The gradual privatisation of banks led to an enormous growth of the 
stock market. Between 1991 and 1998, the market capitalisation of Borsa 
Italiana rose significantly, from 12% of the country’s GDP in 1991 to reach 
                                                                                                                                       
foundations’ full statutory and managerial autonomy over their activities. In 
responding to the amendments on the definition of control, the court ruled that a 
broader definition would be incompatible with the Italian Civil Code. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 163 
 
44% in 1998 and 47% in 2007. This rise in market capitalisation was largely 
associated with the growth of the financial services sector, with the share of 
the banking sector in the stock exchange’s total market capitalisation 
reaching 30% by September 2008 (Borsa Italiana, 2008).  
In terms of market structure, the total number of banks contracted by 
over 30% in the last three decades, decreasing from 1,156 in 1990 to 806 in 
2007, as a result of a booming consolidation process,114 which peaked 
during the second half of 1990s (Figure 7.1). In terms of concentration, the 
Italian banking structure has not changed much since the 1990s. Ever since 
the 1990s, the five largest banks accounted for between 25 to 30% of total 
bank assets in Italy. When compared to other EU15 countries, the Italian 
banking sector is one of the least concentrated markets. Indeed, according 
to Figure 7.2 the Italian banking sector was the second least concentrated 
market among all EU15 countries by the end of 2006.  
Like in most other developed countries, Italian banks have reduced 
their interest income. As the profitability of traditional banking activities 
has come under pressure, banks have increased their non-interest income 
activities (Smith et al., 2003). These observations suggest that the banks 
have realigned their position as financial intermediaries, increasingly 
engaging in non-traditional fee-based activities like security underwriting, 
insurance services, investment advice, etc. 
Figure 7.3 confirms that Italian banks have indeed generated 
increasingly more income from fee-generating activities, which made up 
roughly 25% of their gross incomes in 2007. Although banks earn less and 
less from traditional activities, the figure also shows that Italian banks still 
rely more on interest income than their peers in other EU15 countries. By 
2005, the interest incomes of EU15 countries came to about 55% of their 
gross income on average, roughly 10% less than that of Italian banks. 
                                                      
114 At the same time, the real impact of the restructuring activity has varied over 
the years. For example, the 57 M&As that took place in 1996 all involved smaller 
institutions that held in aggregate about 2% of the system’s total assets (Banca 
d’Italia, 1999b, p. 276). In turn, the transactions that occurred over the past few 
years have had a sizeable impact on the banking sector. In particular, the share of 
system assets attributable to the handful of transactions that occurred between 
January 2006 and May 2007, including Banca Intesa’s merger with San Paolo IMI 
and UniCredito’s merger with Capitalia is estimated at 23.5% (Banca d’Italia, 
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Figure 7.2 Comparison of Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices* (HHI) for EU15 
countries in 2007 (index ranging from 0 to 10,000) 
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* The HHI measures concentration by taking into account the relative size and distribution 
of the firms, approaching zero when a sector is composed of firms with similar sizes. 
Source: ECB (2008). 
Figure 7.3 Breakdown of income for Italian banks (1984-2007) 
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Given that Italian banks rely more on traditional activities than their 
peers in other EU15 countries, it is questionable whether they can remain 
competitive in the rapidly changing financial world. The data seem to 
suggest that the banks are doing rather well. Indeed, one of the key 
characteristics of the Italian banking sector has been the persistence of high 
revenues. However, these high revenues also come with persistently high 
costs. As depicted in Figure 7.4, over the last two decades, Italian banks 
have both earned and expended more than their peers in EU15 countries. 
Within the same period, the difference between the average revenues of 
Italian and EU15 banks is slightly below 1% of total bank assets. Likewise, 
the difference between average costs is approximately 0.5% of total bank 
assets.  
Figure 7.4 Gross income and operating expenses (% of total bank assets, 
1984-2007) 
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Source: OECD Bank Profitability Statistics (2009); Bank of England. 
Although Italian banks differ from their EU15 peers in terms of their 
revenues and costs, Figure 7.4 also highlights a shared trend. Indeed, both 
variables have been on the decline since 1984. In particular, the revenues 
and costs of Italian banks have been diminishing at a stable pace of about 166 | COUNTRY ANALYSIS: PRIVATISATION OF ITALIAN SAVINGS BANKS 
 
0.8 and 0.6% of total assets per year, respectively.115 The trend is mirrored, 
albeit with less consistency, in other countries. Apart from a brief period in 
the beginning of the 1990s when Sweden and other Nordic countries faced 
severe banking crises, operating expenses and gross incomes have declined 
monotonically across the EU15 countries. 
Table 7.3 shows that the cost-to-income ratio of Italian banks has 
improved since the early 1990s, comparatively with the EU15 averages. 
This trend is more likely due to changing market conditions, i.e. varying 
income and costs over time, rather than structural reorganisation.116 
Table 7.3 Cost-to-income ratios in major EU15 countries (average percentages) 
 Italy  EU15 
1988 - 1992  67.3%  71.7% 
1993 - 1997  67.9%  66.2% 
1998 - 2002  58.0%  63.2% 
2003 - 2007  58.9%  62.8% 
Source: OECD Bank Profitability Statistics (2009); Bank of England. 
Several studies have also noted that Italian banks enjoy persistently high 
operating profits (Carletti et al., 2005; Drummond et al., 2007). The 
performance ratios displayed in Figure 7.5 confirm these observations to a 
large extent. Indeed, Italian banks performed better than their peers in 
EU15 countries for most of the years between 1985 and 2007, at least in 
terms of return-on-assets ratio. The notable exception is the period between 
1994 and 1996, which corresponds to the initial privatisation era for the 
Italian banking sector. As more and more institutions were privatised, the 
banks had to assume large amounts of write-downs on some of the bad 
loans and securities in order to ensure a “healthy placement in the market” 
to attract potential buyers (Deutsche Bank Research, 2004, p. 13). 
 
                                                      
115 A simple linear trend regression using the Italian data explains about 90% of the 
annual variation in gross income and operating expenditure.   
116 Empirical evidence appears to confirm this hypothesis. According to a recent 
study, the top 50 Italian banks “are less effective than [most banks in other 
European countries] in managing costs and generating higher revenues”, which is 
a clear evidence of lower productive efficiency (Drummond et al., 2007, p. 18). INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 167 
 
Figure 7.5 Evolution of the performance of Italian banking sector 
a) Return-on-asset (ROA) ratio 
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Source: OECD Bank Profitability Statistics (2009); Bank of England. 
Indeed, the net provisions of Italian banks peaked between the years 
1994 and 1997, accounting for over two-thirds of net income before 
provisions during the entire duration of these four years. In the years that 
followed, the net provisions fell to their pre-1994 norms, never exceeding 
40% of net income before provisions. As a consequence of these massive 
write-downs and value readjustments, the Italian banks performed 
considerably below the banks of other EU15 countries between 1994 and 
1997, but then improved their performances (Figure 7.5). 
The findings above show that the Italian banking sector is neither 
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thing, although operating expenditures as a share of total assets have been 
declining, so are the gross incomes as a share of total assets (Figure 7.4). 
Figure 7.5 shows that apart from a brief period of low profits in the mid-
1990s, Italian banks have performed consistently better than EU15 banks. 
Indeed, the persistence of high profits, “coupled with high revenues 
and/or high costs” may be an indicator of “anti-competitive behavior” 
(Drummond et al., 2007, p. 9).  
Since 2007, the financial crisis has had a notable impact on Italian 
banking. Profits have been hit; return on equity has fallen to 9% in the first 
nine months of 2008, compared to 11% in the same period in 2007. Loan 
deterioration accounted for an increase of about 40% of allocations to loan-
loss provisions and valuation adjustments, which absorbed a significant 
portion of the profits. These losses have also contributed – and will 
continue to do so – to a slowing of lending.  
7.4  Service, access, proximity and financial inclusion  
Historically Italian banking has been one of the least accessible banking 
systems in Europe. Indeed, according to the findings of a project recently 
commissioned by the European Commission, financial exclusion – which 
refers to a lack of access to transaction banking, savings, credit and 
insurance services – is quite high in Italy (European Commission, 2008). In 
particular, 26% of all surveyed individuals had no transaction bank 
account, 19% had no account of any kind, while exactly half of the 
respondents did not have any savings accounts (ibid., Tables 7.5 and 7.6).117 
These values are significantly higher than the reported EU15 averages of 
18, 10 and 30%, respectively.  
Part of the reason for the lack of access may be traced back to the 
regional restrictions imposed by the 1936 Banking Law, which prohibited 
banks from growing in several regions at one time. By the 1980s, the branch 
structure was one of the least extensive among the larger countries in 
Europe. In 1987, the Italian banking structure had just over 0.20 branches 
per thousand habitants, which was lower than Austria (0.55), Germany 
(0.51), Spain (0.86), and the UK (0.24).  
                                                      
117 A recent bi-annual survey conducted by the Bank of Italy finds that almost 11% 
of the respondents had no accounts of any kind (Banca d’Italia, 2008).  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 169 
 
Figure 7.6 Number of branches per 1000 habitants (1984-2007) 
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By abandoning the regional restrictions, the 1990 Banking Law 
opened a new set of opportunities for Italian banks. The banks quickly 
developed their networks, providing banking services to remote areas. 
Figure 7.6 shows that after a period of weak growth during the 1984 to 1989 
period, the Italy’s branch network expanded rapidly after 1990 and 
surpassed the EU15 average by the end of 1990s. By the end of 2007, Italy 
had more branches per habitant than most other developed nations. 
Indeed, an international comparison suggests that Italy outranks most 
other developed nations in terms of branch access (Figure 7.7a). 
An extensive network structure is necessary for providing services to 
a larger part of the population. However, it is not sufficient to ensure access 
to banking services. Although Italy ranks high on a comparison of 
countries in terms of number of branches, the same cannot be said when 
one considers access to automated teller machines (ATMs). According to 
Figure 7.7b, Italy ranks poorly among a list of developed countries in terms 
of number of inhabitants per ATM. Even though Italy has the second-most 
extensive branch network among the 11 countries depicted in the 
comparison, it is fourth from the bottom in terms of the availability of 
ATMs. 
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Figure 7.7 Comparison of access to bank networks 
a) Number of branches per 1000 habitants 
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Source: CapGemini (2006). 
Another question is whether the benefits of liberalisation have been 
passed on to customers. The unavailability of historical time series makes a 
definite answer difficult. However, several studies have shown that the 
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Europe. Figure 7.8 summarises the findings of a study by CapGemini, 
which ranks countries according to the average price of basic banking 
services, including fees and commissions associated with opening and 
maintaining a current account, debit and credit card services, online 
banking, wire transfers, etc. Among the major developed countries 
included in the study, the figure shows that Italy had the highest pricing. 
Other surveys have also reached similar conclusions. A recent Oxera (2006) 
report shows that the annual fees on a current account used by a typical 
median-income family were the greatest in Italy when compared to other 
developed nations. The results of a survey by Mercer Oliver Wyman (2005) 
points to a less extreme result after accounting for various implicit 
overheads associated with holding an account. Despite an improved 
ranking, the survey finds that the price of a current account is still 23% 
higher in Italy than the average for the seven major EU countries included 
in the study. The European Commission’s retail banking inquiry also 
reaches a similar conclusion for a wider range of fees and charges. 
According to the market survey that was conducted by the Commission, 
Italy had the highest account management fees among all EU25 countries 
and the second highest (only after Lithuania) in account closing charges 
(European Commission, 2007, Figures 12 and 13).  
Figure 7.8 Comparison of price of basic banking services 
(in €, adjusted for local customer profiles)  
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Another dimension of access is the use of services by different classes 
of customers. In general, lending to private sector firms has increased from 
56% of the GDP in 1990 to over 100% of the GDP in 2007. Similarly, the use 
of current accounts has also increased, from 29% of the GDP in 1990 to 46% 
of the GDP in 2007 (IMF International Financial Statistics, 2008). The loans 
to households have also increased from 18% of GDP in 2005 to 34% of the 
GDP in 2007 (Eurostat).  
One question is whether these observations apply also for SMEs. One 
can suspect that by liberalising the local banks, the 1990s reforms have 
impaired the relationships between local lenders and borrowers, thereby 
reducing the availability of loans to SMEs (Berger & Udell, 1995). On the 
other hand, a counter argument is that expanding branch networks and a 
competitive banking sector might have actually enhanced the credit 
opportunities for SMEs. While both arguments are plausible, the 
information that is provided publicly suggests a mixed picture. According 
to Banca d’Italia (1998a, p. 180), “the credit lines granted to households and 
small business … rose from 37% of total bank lending in the mid-eighties to 
44%” in 1998. Despite these modest gains, the share of lending to small 
businesses contracted after early 1990s, “falling from 29% in 1991 to 27% in 
1998”, while lending to households “expanded at annual rates of around 
10%, or nearly twice as fast as total lending” (ibid.). Empirical evidence 
seems to confirm the latter observation. According to the findings of a 
study by Bonaccorsi di Patti & Gobbi (2001), the structural changes that the 
Italian banking industry has faced in the 1990s might have had negative 
effects on SME lending.  
European Flash Barometer (European Commission, 2005) suggests 
that Italian SME managers are the most likely among their peers in other 
EU15 countries to voice their discontent with the financing of their 
enterprises. In particular, only 66% of the Italian respondents stated that 
their company’s current financing was sufficient, the lowest percentage 
among all 15 countries and lower than the EU15 average of 77%.  
The impact of the financial crisis has been notable on the Italian 
economy, with GDP contracting by 1.8% on an annual basis in 2008. One 
particular problem is the declining business lending. Credit surveys 
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of loans are becoming more restrictive for all firms alike.118 About half of all 
banks surveyed indicated that the conditions they apply to firms were 
tightened considerably. Moreover, there is evidence that new loans to 
smaller firms are declining. Although loans to non-financial corporations 
have increased by 7% annually by November 2008, the growth of loans to 
smaller firms was only 2%. These developments point at present and 
upcoming financing shortages for small-sized firms.  
7.5  Conclusions 
The 1990 Amato reforms and what followed had an enormous impact on 
the Italian banking sector. The number of banks has declined as a direct 
consequence of the mergers and acquisitions in the sector. In the meantime, 
Italian banks have posted improved performances as they increased their 
non-interest earning activities. Despite these findings, however, cost-to-
income ratios have remained constant through the last 20 years, suggesting 
that the banks are not more efficient than they were prior to the reform. 
More critically, bank revenues and costs have been persistently high, 
possibly due to a lack of competition in the sector.  
In terms of access to services, the evidence is also mixed. Despite an 
improved branch network, bank terminals remain relatively scarce and 
more importantly basic bank services remain expensive. Although lending 
to the private sector has increased significantly, there is some evidence that 
small businesses are having a harder time to obtain financing.  
These results suggest that the original aim of the 1990s reforms has 
not fully been achieved in Italy. In fact, apart from several indicators of 
improved performance and the shift to non-traditional activities, there is 
little evidence that the Italian banking sector is more efficient or 
competitive today than it was before the 1990 reforms. Access to bank 
services is limited and below EU15 averages. The disappearance of savings 
banks might have worsened the provision of credit to some customers. 
These conclusions are reinforced by how the financial sector has responded 
to the financial crisis that started in August 2007 with visible lending 
restrictions.  
                                                      
118 For more information, see pp. 35-36 in the Bank of Italy’s Economic Bulletin, 
January 2009.   
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8.  COUNTRY ANALYSIS: DISAPPEARANCE 
OF BELGIAN SAVINGS BANKS 
8.1  Origins and historical development  
The origin of savings banks in Belgium dates back to the mid-1810s under 
Dutch rule. During those years, a number of institutions were developed 
under the leadership of William I of the Netherlands and the Dutch Society 
for General Utility (Maatschappij tot nut van’t Algemeen). The banks, 
founded with the initial capital contributions from nobles and the members 
of Chambers of Commerce, grew locally and remained private, away from 
the direct influence of the government. The institutions aimed at 
stimulating saving behaviour among the working classes and at providing 
them with the means of becoming economically autonomous (Witte & 
Parmentier, 1986, pp. 73-78).  
The political and economic turbulences that hit the country following 
independence in 1830 and the ensuing banking crises that followed led to 
the closure of most of the savings institutions between 1840 and 1850 
(Buyst & Maes, 2008). In response, the Belgian government set up the 
General Savings and Pension Fund (Caisse générale d’épargne et de retraite 
– CGER) in 1865. The bank differed from earlier savings banks in that it 
was managed by the state. The deposits held at the bank were put under 
government guarantee while the bank had access to the post office’s branch 
network.119 Much like its predecessors, its main aim was to provide safe 
                                                      
119 Over the years, the CGER’s use of post offices for the collection of deposits and 
provision of bank services continued. In 1873, a postal savings system was intro-
duced under the management of the public entity, Office des comptes postaux. In 
1995, a Banque de la Poste was formed as a result of a public-private partnership 
with the Belgian post office and Générale de Banque, which later became Fortis.  INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 175 
 
deposit accounts for lower-income individuals. CGER grew quickly and 
managed to capture about half of all bank deposits in the early 19th century 
(Van Molle, 1986). The bank remained an important player in the sector 
until its merger with the privately owned Société Générale de Banque to 
form Fortis in 1999.120  
In the years following the Great Depression, and soon after enacting 
the Royal Decrees of 22 August 1934 and 9 July 1935, the Belgian banking 
landscape was composed of commercial banks, which were collecting 
deposits and granting commercial loans under the strict liquidity and 
solvency requirements imposed by Commission Bancaire et Financière 
(CBF); private savings banks, which managed the deposits121 of small 
savers and had no public backing or mandate and were subject to the 
supervision of a newly created Office Central de la Petite Epargne (OCPE) – 
a subdivision of the National Bank of Belgium (NBB); and public credit 
institutions, comprised of the CGER as well as a number of credit smaller 
institutions specialised in providing small commercial, agricultural and 
household loans. Among the public institutions, only CGER was subject to 
regulation by the CBF.  
In the years following the Second World War, Belgian banks 
increasingly became the “banquiers de l’Etat”,122 acting on behalf of the 
government to collect deposits (Durviaux, 1947). Moreover, the price 
controls pushed them to develop an extensive branch network (Quaden, 
1993; Abraham, 1999). Between 1960 and 1970, the number of bank 
branches increased from 1,787 to 3,073 branches. Until the end of 20th 
century, the extensive branch network has remained one of the most 
important characteristics of the system.  
 
                                                      
120 Fortis was the first true cross-border bank active in Belgium until its demise in 
October 2008. See the discussion at the end of the section.  
121 The Royal Decrees of 22 August 1934 and 9 July 1935 restricted the activities of 
these banks, requiring them to invest at least 60% of their deposits in government 
securities or mortgage loans.  
122 Between 1945 and 1960 the credits to public sector represented roughly half of 
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Table 8.1 Shares of different categories of banks in major market segments 
(% of sector total) 
 
 
Commercial 
banks 
Private 
savings banks 
Public 
credit institutions 
1950 45.2%  4.5%  50.3% 
1960 40.2  8.6  51.2 
1970 52.0  9.9  38.1 
1980 62.5  9.1  28.3 
Total assets 
1990 66.5  10.7  22.8 
1950 39.3%  4.9%  55.8% 
1960 33.9  9.3  56.8 
1970 37.9  12.8  49.3 
1980 40.4  14.4  45.2 
Total deposits 
1990 48.2  15.3  36.5 
1950 87.1%  ..  12.9% 
1960 85.9  ..  14.1 
1970 77.4  1.7%  20.9 
1980 67.3  4.8  27.9 
Sight deposits 
1990 69.9  6.6  23.5 
1962 30.0%  11.4%  58.6% 
1970 35.8  13.4  35.8 
1980 45.7  14.0  40.3 
Private loans 
1990 51.0  14.6  34.4 
Source: Belgian Association of Banks-ABB (1986, 1992). 
The restrictions on banking institutions, including private savings 
banks, were gradually lifted in 1967123 and in 1975.124 As a consequence of 
these legal changes, deposit banks increased their market shares from 
about 40% in 1960 to over 66% in 1990 (see Table 8.1 above). The banks also 
provided more loans to the private sector, with their shares increasing from 
30% of total private sector loans in 1962 to 51% in 1990. The gains were not 
limited to commercial banks. Private savings banks also gained some 
                                                      
123 The law of 3 May 1967 authorised banks to hold bonds of non-financial 
companies as well as allowing them to hold shares for short periods of time for 
placement in the market 
124 The “Mammoth” Law of 30 June 1975 abolished the prohibition of commercial 
bank participation in the equity market. Perhaps more importantly, the law lifted 
the asset management restrictions on savings banks, effectively subjecting them to 
the same regulatory environment as their commercial peers. INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 177 
 
ground, increasing their share of total deposits from under 10% in 1960 to 
about 15% in 1990 even though the share of their assets remained virtually 
the same around 9 to 10% of total bank assets in the country.  
The 1975 laws proved less beneficial for public credit institutions, 
which lost their dominant position in the market. Between the years 1960 
and 1990, the share of their assets dropped from 51% to 23% (Table 8.1). 
The two largest public credit institutions, Credit Communal de Belgique and 
CGER, remained among the top five banks in terms of total assets 
throughout the second half of the century until mid 1990s.  
In the 1990s, the general trend of privatisation and the 
implementation of the Second Banking Directive125 i n  E u r o p e  h a v e  
contributed to the changing market structure of the Belgian banking 
industry. Mergers and acquisitions occurred chiefly between different 
categories of banks. For instance, in 1993, part of the capital of CGER, the 
largest public bank was sold to Fortis at the government’s request; two 
years later, CGER acquired Société Nationale de Crédit à l’Industrie (SNCI), 
allowing it to expand into the corporate lending market; in 1998, 
Kredietbank merged with a savings bank Centrale des Caisses Rurales 
(CERA) and a number of Belgian insurance companies to form the KBC 
Bank, in the same year, the Dutch banking group ING acquired Banque 
Bruxelles Lambert (BBL), which was one of the first large cross-border 
acquisitions in the EU; finally in 1999, Fortis effectively took over CGER 
and Société Générale de Banque, to create one of the largest pan-European 
banks.  
                                                      
125 Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989. The Directive was implemented in 
Belgium on 22 March 1993 and aimed at harmonising the legal and regulatory 
framework for all credit institutions. It defined a credit institution as a Belgian or 
foreign undertaking that receives deposits or other repayable funds from the 
public and gives loans for its own account. The only institutions that were 
authorised to use the term ‘savings bank’ were CGER and the small communal 
savings banks, which have been in existence since the 1930s. It is important to note 
that since the legal status of all credit institutions were the same, the use of the 
term savings bank could simply be for “marketing purposes” (Vander Vennet, 
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8.2  Competitive and other market developments  
Following the 1993 reform, profitability and efficiency of the Belgian 
banking sector have increased. Data shows that Belgian banks started to 
catch up with their EU15 counterparts (Figure 8.1), right about the same 
time that they have started to undertake more non-interest earning 
activities at the expense of net interest income126 (Figure 8.2). In parallel, 
cost efficiency – proxied by the cost to income ratio – improved over years 
until being aligned with the EU15 average by 2007 (Figure 8.3).  
Figure 8.1 Evolution of the performance of Belgian banking sector 
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b) Return-on-equity (ROE) ratio 
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Source: OECD Bank Profitability Statistics (2009); Bank of England. 
Figure 8.2 Share of net interest income for Belgian banks (% of gross income)  
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Figure 8.3 Cost-to-income ratios of Belgian banks (average values for given years) 
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Source: OECD Bank Profitability Statistics (2009); Bank of England. 
In the fall of 2008, Fortis became the largest European institution to 
fall prey to the global financial crisis that has engulfed the global markets 
since August 2007. The bank’s troubles stemmed from its acquisition of the 
Dutch bank ABN AMRO’s retail arm in October 2007. In the months 
following the onset of the global financial crisis, the purchase proved too 
costly. At first, the bank was able to raise funds from the capital markets 
and by the issuance of asset-backed securities from its US subsidiary. Then, 
in June 2008, responding to calls from EU’s competition authorities, the 
bank was forced to sell some of the assets it acquired from ABN AMRO at 
highly unfavourable terms. By the end of September 2008, the fall of 
Lehman Brothers worsened the global conditions. Short of borrowing 
opportunities, the bank had no option but to accept a partial nationalisation 
by the governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.  
In early October 2008, only days after the coordinated rescue, the 
Dutch government decided to fully nationalise the bank’s Dutch arm. 
Meanwhile, an agreement with BNP Paribas was initiated by the Belgian 
government for the eventual sale of the remaining banking and 
international insurance arms. In the following months, the sale has been 
blocked due to legal challenges posed by the Dutch government’s 
unilateral decision and by shareholders who challenge the legitimacy of the 
proposed sale. In December, a Belgian court has ruled that the shareholders 
must have their say. The ensuing turmoil has led to the Belgian INVESTIGATING DIVERSITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN EUROPE | 181 
 
government’s resignation on 19 December 2008. After a period of 
uncertainty and a vote against the sale in February 2009, shareholders 
voted in favour of the sale on 28 April 2009.127  
8.3  Service, access, proximity and financial inclusion  
A distinguishing characteristic of the Belgian banking sector has been the 
extensive branch network developed in the 1960s. Up until 2002, Belgium 
was among the top ten countries worldwide in terms of number of 
branches per habitant and geographical dispersion of branches (Beck et al., 
2007). However, ever since the mid-1990s, Belgian banks have been 
contracting their branch networks, mostly in an effort to reduce their 
operational costs (Figure 8.4). Indeed, by the end of 2007, the number of 
branches per thousand habitants in Belgium (0.42) was below the EU15 
average (0.50) (ECB, 2007).  
Figure 8.4 Number of branches in Belgium per 1000 habitants 
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127 According to the details of the final agreement, the French bank will own 75% of 
the banking operations (Fortis Bank) in exchange for around €9 billion. BNP 
Paribas will also take hold of 25% of the insurance arm (Fortis A.G.) in exchange 
for around €1.38 billion destined for shareholders. The remaining insurance 
business will remain in the hands of Fortis’ shareholders under the Fortis Group.  182 | COUNTRY ANALYSIS: DISAPPEARANCE OF BELGIAN SAVINGS BANKS 
 
The contraction in the number of branches and the disappearance of 
cooperative and public banks, which had the traditional role of providing 
services to lower-income residents, raises concerns about access to financial 
services and financial exclusion. In response, the Belgian Association of 
Banks (ABB), which represents the banking industry, adopted a charter 
regarding basic banking services by the end of 1996. The charter required 
the member banks to provide basic banking services to all legal residents. 
However, a 2001 study commissioned by the Minister of the Economy 
pointed to the deficiencies of self-regulation (Bayot, 2001). In particular, the 
number of individuals with no bank accounts had actually grown since the 
adoption of the charter (p. 84).128 In response to these shortcomings, the 
government adopted the law of 24 March 2003, obliging Belgian banks to 
provide a basic bank account and related services, including transfers, 
deposits, withdrawals and provision of statements, to all legal residents. 
According to the findings of a recent survey conducted in 2005, the law has 
been partly responsible for the drop in the number of residents with no 
bank accounts (Disneur et al., 2006).129  
Another issue is whether a more concentrated market enables banks 
to charge higher prices for their services, thereby limiting access.130 Indeed, 
this is a relevant concern in Belgium, where the share in total assets of the 
top five banks rose from 48% in 1985 to 84% in 2006, putting the Belgian 
banking sector among the most concentrated markets in the EU (ABB, 1999; 
ECB, 2007). The concern is that the large banks can exercise their market 
power by charging higher prices for basic services. Comparative evidence, 
however, suggests that such services are relatively cheap in Belgium 
                                                      
128 According to the 2001 study, the number of residents with no bank accounts 
was around 40,000 in the year of publication (Bayot, 2001, p. 75). The principal 
reason that banks refused to provide basic banking services was insufficient 
income and existence of other debts (ibid., Table 23).  
129 According to the study, over 5,500 basic bank accounts were created by the end 
of 2005. The number undermines the actual effect of the law since some potential 
beneficiaries have opted for normal deposit accounts. Indeed, the study reveals 
that the number of unbanked residents has declined from around 40,000 in 2001 to 
about 11,500 in 2005 (Disneur et al., 2006, p. 21).  
130 Although the Law of 24 March 2003 has put a reasonable upper limit on the 
account fees, it does not cover other direct and indirect costs associated with basic 
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(Figure 8.5). In particular, basic bank services are cheaper in Belgium than 
in Germany, Spain and the UK, which have significantly less concentrated 
markets.  
Figure 8.5 Comparison of price of basic banking services 
(in €, adjusted for local customer profiles)  
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Source: CapGemini (2005). 
An additional concern is whether the reforms and the banking sector 
restructuring have harmed the provision of credit to small- and medium-
sized enterprises. Empirical evidence suggests that such a concern is not 
entirely baseless. Degryse et al. (2005) show that there is a robust negative 
effect between loans to small businesses and mergers, especially for 
borrowers that had an exclusive relationship with the acquired bank. 
However, the same study also affirms that firms that maintained a 
relationship with acquiring banks or with multiple banks are less likely to 
be impacted by mergers, either because the institution that they have 
maintained a close relation with remains active or because they have 
several options for obtaining loans. 
A 2005 European Flash Barometer (European Commission, 2005) 
suggests that Belgian SME managers were relatively content with the 
financing opportunities available for their enterprises. More specifically, 
82% of the Belgian respondents surveyed stated that their current financing 
was sufficient, which was 5% above the EU15 average. Moreover, only 7% 
of the respondents found that an easier access to means of financing would 184 | COUNTRY ANALYSIS: DISAPPEARANCE OF BELGIAN SAVINGS BANKS 
 
assure the development of their companies, again significantly lower than 
the EU15 average of 14%.  
8.4  Conclusions 
In the 20th century, the Belgian banking sector has been shaped by the laws 
enacted in response to the Great Depression, which restricted the activities 
of different categories of banks, and the easing of these restrictions in 1975 
and, more recently, in 1993.  
The empirical evidence suggests that banks have improved their 
performance and efficiencies and caught up with the EU15 averages. The 
reforms did not lead to a worsening of access to financial services, despite 
an increased concentration. One reason may be the government initiatives 
on ensuring financial inclusion. Also, the price of basic banking services is 
among the lowest in Europe, which either suggests that banks have passed 
the gains to customers or that they are benefiting from cross-subsidisation 
anchored in the bank-insurance business model. Although some SMEs 
might have been disadvantaged with increased concentration, the financing 
opportunities available to them remain sufficient and are above EU15 
averages. The 2007 financial crisis and the fall-out of Fortis will bring new 
challenges to the Belgian banking sector in terms of competition, access and 
inclusion.  
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POSTSCRIPT 
he background to this study was the debate about the role of savings 
banks which has taken place in Europe over the last two decades.  
The most often used arguments against savings banks concerned 
such issues as their legal status, political interference, governance and, 
most of all, their nature as ‘dual-bottom line’ financial institutions. Our 
study argues that this dual-bottom line nature and the general contribution 
of savings banks to institutional diversity are welfare-improving since they 
enhance competition and limit financial exclusion.  
Savings banks and the welfare consequences of institutional diversity 
We have found that there is diversity across selected European countries, 
namely Austria, Germany and Spain, in terms of the legal status of 
European savings banks and showed that their (natural) evolution has not 
always followed the same pattern, nor has the increasing similarity of 
economic and social problems in different European countries been so 
marked as to lead to similar legal and institutional solutions. There are 
many important differences in the legal regimes governing what seems to 
be the most common form of the financial institutions: the shareholder-
based bank. Even in Europe, where great harmonising efforts have been 
made, company law directives refer a multitude of essential points to 
national legislators, recognising that singularity and particularity are 
irrefutable. In so far as the banking sector is concerned, the most explicit 
regulatory recognition of institutional diversity took place with the 
European Parliament resolution of 5 June 2008 on the European 
Commission sector inquiry on retail banking (2007/2201(INI)). In this 
resolution, the European Parliament states: 
The diversity of legal models and business objectives of the 
financial entities in the retail banking sector (banks, savings banks, 
cooperatives, etc.) is a fundamental asset to the EU’s economy 
which enriches the sector, corresponds to the pluralist structure of 
the market and helps to increase competition in the internal 
market. 
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With special reference to savings banks, the European Parliament 
considers that: 
The European Commission (in the sector inquiry on retail banking) 
underestimates some of the typical features of such banks, such as 
their presence in areas considered to be outlying, the degree to 
which they are rooted in the territory and their social role. 
It also acknowledges that these features are very important in terms 
of the efficiency with which financial services are provided. The current 
crisis has shown that institutional diversity in European financial markets 
reduces systemic risk. The relative stability of the savings bank sector 
mitigates against some of the instability created in the sector dominated by 
other banking models. 
We also find that in terms of efficiency, profitability and earnings 
stability, no particular ownership model for banking can claim overall 
superiority. In some cases, however, savings banks perform slightly better. 
An additional argument for institutional diversity derives from the 
consideration of social efficiency. Differences between countries in this 
regard are partly due to the application of very similar strategies by some 
banking institutions in providing financial services. Collective measures, 
used as alternatives to public intervention or to an individual approach (of 
which savings banks are the embodiment) and which are dual-bottom line 
financial institutions with a clear social vocation and strong community 
roots, have contributed to spreading financial activity and made financial 
services available to large segments of the population. In this context, there 
are many institutions that have begun to develop different responses to the 
challenges brought about by this phenomenon. 
In this respect, the concept of ‘proximity banking’ in its various forms 
exists in most developed countries. The term proximity banking refers to a 
concept of banking that is defined by its orientation towards the client, its 
territorial outreach and its social character. In any case, attempting to 
define the term ‘proximity banking’ is difficult and complex, if one 
considers the great variety of institutions within this field. To simplify the 
analysis, many studies have adopted two models to implement the concept. 
In the US, proximity banking is identified with community banks, which 
essentially include the institutions with less than a billion dollars in assets – 
which are, generally speaking, small private banks, savings banks and 
credit cooperatives. In contrast, the European model draws mainly from 
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banks and is especially widespread in countries such as Spain, Germany 
and Austria. In the American case, the relative importance of community 
banks has decreased in recent years. This trend has drawn the attention of 
policy-makers to an important characteristic of the proximity bank in the 
United States: the need to adopt certain regulatory measures such as the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (revised in 1995). It seems that this 
act was necessary to avoid the complete disappearance of these institutions, 
which play an important role in ensuring access to the credit and banking 
services of the population most susceptible to financial exclusion. The 
European model differs from the American one in three important respects: 
a) savings banks have embodied the proximity concept in their business 
model, b) their quotes are as competitive as their commercial peers and c) 
there is no regulatory umbrella that protects this type of bank, yet its 
market share has grown steadily in several countries. Thus, the European 
proximity banks have succeeded in coping with the changes in the sector 
without neglecting their social mandate.  
The developments of the recent past have shown how valuable it is to 
promote open and pluralistic markets in Europe, thus protecting all types 
of ownership structures without abandoning the principle of ‘same 
business, same risks, same rules’. A policy of openness offers consumers 
various options and preserves competitiveness within the European 
markets.   
If financial pluralism were abandoned, a likely result would be 
increased social exclusion. An increase in market power, resulting from 
high concentration levels in national markets could lead to a fall in the 
number of branches and, subsequently, to a decrease in the accessibility of 
financial services in regions with lower incomes. This can lead to increases 
in social exclusion.  
Financial instability and regulatory changes: Opportunities for savings 
banks 
How can the dual-bottom line nature of institutions such as savings banks 
help withstand financial instability? One cause of the financial crisis was 
the hunger for yield in financial markets and the pressure on commercial 
banks to maximise shareholder return by increasing leverage. The 
incentives to use leverage as a means to increase the expected return on 
equity are not as strong in the case of savings banks as they are for 
shareholder-driven banks. But as the crisis clearly shows, when problems 188 | POSTSCRIPT 
 
emerge at one bank, leverage becomes the mechanism for transferring 
problems from one bank to another, thereby spreading bank-specific 
problems to the economy as a whole.  
Another fundamental way of facing the crisis and the likely new 
regulatory environment is to acknowledge savings banks as solid 
contributors to financial stability. Recent empirical evidence131 shows that 
the risk-shifting incentives are among the lowest in countries such as Spain 
or Germany, where the presence of savings banks is highly significant. 
Importantly, capital discipline – solvency regulation – is found to be 
effective both for commercial and savings banks with no significant 
differences between them. While combining these results, we can draw 
some lessons. Since the new regulatory environment will value both 
solvency and deposit insurance reputation, a good way for savings banks 
to deal with this new environment is by selling a package of ‘deposit 
insurance plus capital insurance’ which is equivalent to selling solvency 
plus low risk-shifting incentives. All in all, this will help savings banks to 
raise funds, since any security issued will have to be valued, at least 
partially, in terms of a ‘safety-net reputation’. 
 
                                                      
131 See Carbó Valderde, Kane & Rodriguez (2008).  
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